Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

ILFORD CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

LUTON CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

POOLE CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday, 17th March.

BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Read a Second time and committed.

LEICESTER CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL (By Order)

SALFORD CORPORATION BILL (By Order)

Second Reading deferred till Thursday next.

PETITION

British Museum

The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Major Gwilym Lloyd-George): I have been asked by the Trustees of the British Museum to present a Petition, which they have to submit to this House each year, explaining their financial position and praying for aid. The Petition recites the funded income of the Trustees, and points out that the establishment is, necessarily, attended with an expense far beyond the annual production of the funds and the Trust cannot, with benefit to the public, be carried on without the aid of Parliament. It concludes with this Prayer:
Your Petitioners therefore humbly pray your Honourable House to grant them such further support towards enabling them to carry on the execution of the Trust reposed in

them by Parliament, for the general benefit of learning and useful knowledge, as to your House shall seem meet."—(Queen's Recommendation signified.)
Petition referred to the Committee of Supply.

Oral Answers to Questions — WALES

Digest of Welsh Statistics

Mr. Gower: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will arrange for the inclusion in future publications of the Digest of Welsh Statistics of more comprehensive financial returns as far as this is practicable.

Major Lloyd-George: I would refer my hon. Friend to the answer which I gave on 23rd February to a Question by the hon. Member for Merioneth (Mr. T. W. Jones).

Mr. Gower: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that I have received many letters expressing appreciation—indeed, many people have done it publicly—of the extension in the knowledge of Welsh activities which is afforded by the Digest? However, is he aware that a number of people have written to me complaining of its lack of financial information? While I appreciate the Minister's difficulties, will he do all that is possible in this connection?

Major Lloyd-George: I wish to make the Digest as comprehensive as possible, but my hon. Friend will appreciate that there are very real practical difficulties with regard to financial matters.

South Wales Ports (Report)

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has considered the Report on South Wales Ports from the Council of Wales; and what action he proposes to take by representation to the authorities concerned or otherwise, particularly in regard to railway rates and charges.

Major Lloyd-George: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply which I gave to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, North (Mr. Llewellyn) on 16th February.

Mr. Freeman: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that the South Wales ports will be suffering under a very serious disadvantage until this matter is put right? Will he make inquiries to see what action can be taken to put this in order, so that South Wales will not have these anomalies, as it has at present?

Major Lloyd-George: I certainly will. I am in close consultation with my colleagues.

Oral Answers to Questions — POLICE

Official Secrets Act (Colonel A. P. Scotland)

Mr. Marlowe: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department under what authority Metropolitan Police officers recently entered and searched the residence of Colonel A. P. Scotland; what evidence there was of any suspected intention to commit an offence; and whether he is satisfied that the Official Secrets Acts give power to seize documents before any offence has been committed under such Acts.

Mr. Anthony Greenwood: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department for what purpose officers of the Special Branch visited the home of Colonel Scotland.

Major Lloyd-George: Section 9 of the Official Secrets Act, 1911, empowers a justice of the peace to grant a search warrant if satisfied that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence under the Act has been or is about to be committed. A warrant was issued under this section for the search of Colonel Scotland's residence because he had declared his intention of publishing a book containing unauthorised disclosures of confidential information entrusted to him while in the service of the Crown. It was not, however, executed, as Colonel Scotland voluntarily handed over certain documents to the police officers who visited his flat

Mr. Marlowe: As Colonel Scotland is a man who has served the country well and is very experienced in security matters, will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman give an assurance that these powers are not in such a case as this being used merely as an instrument to enforce Foreign Office policy? Can he give an

assurance that this was not done merely at the request of the Foreign Office because the book which Colonel Scotland intended to publish might give offence to the Germans?

Major Lloyd-George: I have no information on that aspect. I have just stated the facts, which seem to be perfectly normal. I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend will realise that I can make no further comment on the matter as the question of taking proceedings is under consideration.

Mr. Greenwood: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that responsible newspaper editors with considerable wartime experience of security are of opinion that there is no breach of security in the book, and that Colonel Scotland's only offence is that he has questioned the efficiency of the War Office during the war? Does he not think it is a little unfortunate that this 73-year-old soldier should be hounded in this way while more influential people, like Field Marshal Montgomery and the Prime Minister, have got away with publishing their memoirs based largely on official information?

Major Lloyd-George: I cannot add to what I have said in reply to my hon. and learned Friend. The question of taking proceedings is being discussed at the moment. As to the procedure under the Act, it was, as I have explained, in order and perfectly normal.

Retired Officers' Widows

Miss Ward: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the fact that the question of railway super annuitants has been referred to a committee as a result of Government action, he will refer the case of retired police officers' widows who died before July, 1948,to an independent committee to see what suggestions can be made for meeting their claim.

Major Lloyd-George: No, Sir. I do not think there is any basis of comparison between these two classes of pensioners.

Miss Ward: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend give an assurance that he will be a fighting friend for a good cause within the Cabinet? Can I have an assurance, please?

Major Lloyd-George: I readily give my hon. Friend that assurance.

Prostitution, London

Mr. Lewis: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department to what extent his recent attempts to reduce prostitution in the central London area have proved successful; and whether he will make a statement in connection with this problem.

Major Lloyd-George: There is nothing that I can usefully add to the reply which I gave to Questions by the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) and the hon. Member for Fife, West (Mr. Hamilton) on 9th December last.

Mr. Lewis: That reply was not entirely satisfactory. In view of the great number of cases which are continually being reported in the Press, and the fact that many people and organisations have stated that they believe that the nominal fines which are levied are not really satisfactory penalties for the crime committed, will not the Minister look into the matter again to see if something further can be done?

Major Lloyd-George: As I told the hon. Gentleman in answer to a Question last December, a Departmental Committee on homosexual offences and prostitution is sitting at the present time, and I think that it would be better to await its report.

Mr. Stokes: Leaving aside the question of homosexual offences, can the right hon. and gallant Gentleman say to what extent the whole prostitution organisation in the West End is run with the knowledge and approval of the police?

Major Lloyd-George: I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman has seen fit to make an observation of that sort. It is a reflection upon what everybody agrees to be a very fine force. On further consideration, the right hon. Gentleman may wish he had not made it.

Mr. Stokes: On the contrary. I make it.

Major Lloyd-George: In that case I do not think so highly of the right hon. Gentleman as I used to. It is not done with the knowledge of the police. The very fact, to which attention was called by the hon. Gentleman, that the number of arrests has increased, is due to increased activity on the part of the police

in the West End. The matters which were referred to the Committee were homosexuality and prostitution.

Mr. Stokes: I am not talking about homosexuals, and I am indifferent to what the Minister thinks about me. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I want to know whether the Minister will deny that the whole of this prostitution organisation is within the knowledge of the police and is connived at by them.

Major Lloyd-George: I can only say what I said before. I do not accept that, and I say again that it is an attack upon the police which is wholly unjustifiable.

Incidents, Central London (Police Action)

Mr. Lewis: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action he now proposes to take, in view of the additional evidence supplied to him, concerning the actions of the police on 25th January in and around the central London area, whereby, in many instances, they exceeded their legal rights in dealing with peaceful citizens.

Major Lloyd-George: I am making inquiries into the complaints put forward in a letter which the hon. Member has brought to my notice, and I will communicate with him as soon as those inquiries have been completed.

Mr. Lewis: Will the Minister try to make investigations into the action of the mounted police in charging ordinary members of the public who were standing in Leicester Square tube station as onlookers? Why should they charge them into the underground station at Leicester Square?

Major Lloyd-George: I cannot accept what the hon. Gentleman says about charges by mounted police. That is what the hon. Gentleman says here. I am having inquiries made into the matter.

Mr. Hamilton: Is it not a fact that several of these peace-loving citizens have been fined heavily in the police courts for attempting to kick police horses in the belly?

Major Lloyd-George: If they were, I am glad to hear it.

Mr. Lewis: On a point of order. My question refers to peaceful citizens. My


hon. Friend from one of the Scottish divisions has said that these peaceful citizens——

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order. Major Anstruther-Gray.

Mr. Lewis: Excuse me, Mr. Speaker. It is a point of order.

Mr. Speaker: An hon. Member cannot secure audience of the House by saying "On a point of order" about something which is not a point of order. If the hon. Member has a dispute with his hon. Friend he had better settle it with him.

Mr. Lewis: I am raising with you a point of order, Mr. Speaker. When you have heard it you may then be able to decide whether it is a point of order or not. I was going to raise with you the point that in my Question I referred to "peaceful citizens" who were some of my constituents, and who were not fined, as my hon. Friend suggested in his supplementary question. Is it, therefore, right for my hon. Friend to insinuate that my constituents were fined in court?

Mr. Speaker: There is no point of order. All matters of difference between Members of Parliament and in this House are not points of order.

Mr. Edwin Braybrook Webb (Death)

Mr. Robert Jenkins: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department to make a statement concerning the case of the late Mr. Edwin Braybrook Webb, details of which have been submitted to him, who died in Paddington Police Station.

Major Lloyd-George: On 20th February, 1955, Mr. Webb was arrested and charged with being drunk and incapable, was placed in a cell at Paddington Police Station at. 3.15 a.m., and was visited at half-hourly intervals. At 4.45 a.m. he could not be roused. A doctor was called immediately and found that he was dead, death having taken place very recently. The notes of the coroner's inquest show that the severe cerebral haemorrhage which caused Mr. Webb's death would have proved fatal in any case and that it would have been difficult in the circumstances even for a doctor to distinguish between the symptoms of cerebral haemorrhage and

the symptoms of alcohol. I am satisfied, as the coroner was, that the police officers acted properly and called a doctor as soon as a change in Mr. Webb's condition was noted.
I have great sympathy with Mr. Webb's relatives that his death should have occurred in such unfortunate circumstances, and I am glad to have this opportunity of making it clear that there was nothing in the post-mortem findings to suggest that Mr. Webb had taken alcohol to excess.

Mr. Jenkins: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware that the statement he has made will bring substantial comfort and consolation to the relatives of Mr. Webb because it has vindicated him from the charge of drunkenness?

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME DEPARTMENT

Fire Brigades (Wages and Duties)

Mr. de Freitas: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will make a statement on the application made to him by the National Joint Council for Local Authorities' Fire Brigades for approval of a settlement on wages and duties.

Major Lloyd-George: I received these recommendations only last week. They are receiving urgent consideration by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and myself, and we hope to be able to convey our decision on the question of wages to the National Joint Council in the course of a few days. The recommendations on hours of duty may need somewhat longer consideration.

Mr. de Freitas: Will any approved settlement cover the case of regular fire brigade instructors seconded for instruction of the H Reservists whom the Home Secretary mentioned two days ago?

Major Lloyd-George: I could not reply to that question without notice, but I will certainly look into it.

School Crossing Patrols

Mr. Erroll: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will publish a list of the local authorities which have not yet implemented the School Crossing Patrol Act.

Major Lloyd-George: I will, with permission, circulate a list in the Official Report.

Mr. Erroll: Is it not disgraceful that Cheshire County Council, one of the authorities in that list, should so far have refused to implement school crossing patrols on the ground that there have not been enough child victims to justify their introduction?

The list is as follows:

The following local authorities have not yet made arrangements for the provision of patrols under the School Crossing Patrols Act, 1953:

County councils.


Anglesey.
Huntingdon.


Cardigan.
Merioneth.


Cheshire.
Radnor.


Cumberland.
Rutland.


Devon.
Wiltshire.


Flint.



County borough councils


Dewsbury.
Sunderland.


Merthyr Tydfil.
Wakefield.


Reading.
Warrington.


I understand that the Reading Borough Council proposes to institute patrols in the next financial year, and that several authorities still have the matter under consideration.

Prisons (Food)

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what action has been taken to look into the food complaints of prisoners at Dartmoor Prison; what similar complaints have come from other prisons; and whether he will have inquiries made to ensure that prisoners have plain, decently-cooked food.

Major Lloyd-George: As regards Dartmoor Prison, I would refer the hon. Member to the concluding part of the reply which I gave on3rd February to the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot). From other prisons there has been no appreciable volume of complaint about food except at Parkhurst last November, as a result of which the Prison Commissioners caused a review to be made of the arrangements there for the preparation and service of meals. It is a requirement of the Prison Rules that the food provided for prisoners shall be of a nutritional value adequate for health and strength and of wholesome quality, well

prepared and served, and reasonably varied; and I am satisfied that these requirements are observed.

Mr. Janner: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman make it clear to those who have the duty of looking after these unfortunate people that even a prisoner is entitled to have food which is decently and properly cooked, and that it is a purposeless thing to destroy food by making it unpalatable? Will he emphasise these points to the persons I have mentioned with a view to seeing that nothing which has already happened recurs?

Major Lloyd-George: I am afraid that I cannot accept what the hon. Gentleman says. The suggestion apparently is that the food is bad. That is quite untrue; it is not. The food is of a very good quality. There is only one complaint that had justification and it was immediately put right. That was the Parkhurst one to which I have referred. Considering the number of people in prison, and the time they have to think about food, it is remarkable how little complaint about food there is.

Mr. Yates: Is the Home Secretary aware that according to the dietary sheet to which he has referred, and a copy of which he was good enough to send me, it was stipulated that a prisoner should have one egg per month and 12 ounces of sugar per week? In Dartmoor no eggs have been supplied for the last 2½ years, and no sugar is issued separately to the prisoners. Does the right hon. and gallant Gentleman not think that that should be investigated?

Major Lloyd-George: I will look into the part of the hon. Member's question about eggs. It does not mean that because sugar is not issued separately, the prisoners do not get it. The quality of the diet is based on scientific advice from the Ministry of Food, and as the hon. Gentleman knows, the Prison Commissioners have their own adviser.

Performing Wild Animals (Exhibition)

Mr. Peter Freeman: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the number of deaths and accidents which have been caused and the cruel nature of the performances


and training, he will introduce legislation to prohibit the exhibition of wild animals and turns in which they appear.

Major Lloyd-George: No, Sir. I have seen Press reports of a recent fatal accident, but I am not aware that the number of fatal or other accidents is large.

Mr. Freeman: Is it not a fact that only last week one man was mauled to death by four lions, and in another case a man only just escaped with his life? Are not exhibitions of this description far more dangerous for children to see than any horror comics? Will he not take some action to prohibit these undesirable and sadistic exhibitions?

Major Lloyd-George: I do not know that I would agree about a lion looking like a horror comic. I think that it is a very beautiful sight, which many children are happy to look upon. If that were not so, there would not be so many toys made in that form. While I have not complete records, so far as I have been able to ascertain there have been only two fatal accidents in the last 25 years, and very few minor ones.

Sir T. Moore: Would not the case be met by prohibiting imports of all wild animals except those required by approved zoological societies?

Juries (Verdicts)

Mr. Gower: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will introduce legislation to enable juries in England and Wales to return the Scottish verdict of "Not proven" in appropriate cases.

Major Lloyd-George: No, Sir.

Mr. Gower: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend not agree that the very fact that this verdict has been available for generations to juries in Scotland indicates that it must have considerable value? In view of the fact that the responsibility which faces juries in England and Wales is an awful one when they have to say merely "Guilty" or "Not guilty" in doubtful cases, will he reconsider the matter?

Mr. G. Thomas: May I ask the Home Secretary if he will ignore the uneasy conscience of the hon. Gentleman, and bear in mind that it would be a terrible

thing for anyone to walk about with a verdict of "Not proven" following him, even the hon. Member for Barry (Mr. Gower)?

Mr. Gower: Quite unworthy.

Dr. Otto Strasser

Captain Kerby: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why Dr. Otto Strasser, when he arrived from Canada, at London Airport, in the early hours of 18th February, 1955, was put in custody by officers of his Department, and was not allowed to proceed to his hotel in London; and if he will make a statement.

Major Lloyd-George: Dr. Strasser was refused leave to land, and detained until arrangements could be made for him to continue his journey to Switzerland, in pursuance of the decision to which my predecessor referred in reply to my hon. and gallant Friend's previous Question on 8th July last, to the effect that it was not in the public interest to allow him to come to the United Kingdom.

Dartmoor Prison

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many complaints were made to the visiting committee at Dartmoor Prison during 1954 and to the most convenient date in 1955.

Major Lloyd-George: This information is not available, as it has been the practice to file the record of a prisoner's application to the Board of Visitors in the personal record of the prisoner concerned. I will arrange for a board of visitors' application book to be kept in future.

Mr. Craddock: Is the Minister aware that from a very reliable source I understand that many complaints have been made to visiting magistrates during the period stated in the Question, and I am very pleased to know that he is going to do something about this in the future, because I think that these records should be kept?

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why figures of the number of petitions made to him concerned with the standard of food in Dartmoor Prison are not available.

Major Lloyd-George: Prisoners' petitions are filed on the prisoners' personal files and not by reference to the subject matter of the petition.

Mr. I. O. Thomas: On a point of order. This is the fourth time I have got up and not been called. I do not know whether that is due to the sun shining through the windows, but I would like to put a supplementary question occasionally.

Mr. Craddock: It is unusual for the Home Secretary not to be forthcoming in this matter. Does he not agree that these records which concern the health of the prisoner ought not to be disregarded, but very carefully kept?

Major Lloyd-George: They are not disregarded. The hon. Gentleman's question was whether we have kept the figures. That would mean an enormous amount of work, dealing with every kind of petition. That is not to say that a petition is disregarded: on the contrary. But to keep statistics on the various kinds of complaints would provide an enormous amount of work.

Mr. I. O. Thomas: May I ask if the Minister is satisfied at the present arrangement for the functioning of visiting committees, especially regarding the number of times within a given period— [HON. MEMBERS: "Wrong question."]— well, Question No. 15 relates to the same thing——

Mr. Speaker: Mr. George Craddock. Question No. 16.

Mr. George Craddock: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is aware that the 90 men who refused their food at Dartmoor Prison on Friday, 21st January last, had signed a petition complaining about the food; and what action was taken in response to this complaint.

Major Lloyd-George: No petition or application in proper form was made to anyone in authority, but a fortnight before the refusal of food, round-robins which had been passed around for signatures, were found on two prisoners, who were reported and punished for being in possession of an unauthorised communication.

Mr. Craddock: Does the Minister deny that 90 men signed a petition complaining about the food? Surely notice should

have been taken of the significance of this action by 90 men? Further, is the Minister aware that the Assistant Commissioner was in the prison on the day when the petition was laid; that it was given to him, and he refused to entertain it?

Major Lloyd-George: I cannot accept that. The Assistant Commissioner was present the day before the mass refusals of food began, and no complaints about the food were made to him.

Mr. Janner: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that when men are confined in this way it is extremely difficult for them to have their complaints dealt with properly? If in fact 90 men did sign a petition of this nature, what did the Minister mean by saying a few moments ago, in reply to a Question of mine, that there had been very few complaints? Surely 90 complaints is a considerable number to be received at one time?

Major Lloyd-George: There is a difference between the complaints and what happened at Dartmoor——

Mr. Janner: What is it?

Major Lloyd-George: I referred to it in answer to the previous Question by the hon. Gentleman. When the hon. Gentle man says that it is difficult for these men to make complaints, that is not true

Mr. Janner: Indeed it is.

Major Lloyd-George: It is no use the hon. Gentleman repeating that it is, when I say that it is not. It is well known that there are many ways of making a complaint. If the hon. Gentleman doubts that, let him refer to what I told him in answer to a previous Question, that complaints at Parkhurst were considered to be justified and were remedied.

Brigadier Rayner: In view of the increase in brutal crimes, will the Home Secretary direct that Dartmoor be made no more comfortable than it is now?

Mr. Yates: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why four prisoners at Dartmoor Prison were placed on bread-and-water diet from 27th January to 7th February, 1954; and when this method of punishment will be abolished.

Major Lloyd-George: The information which I gave to the hon. Member on 17th February that four prisoners were on bread-and-water punishment diet between 27th January and 7th February, referred to the present year, as I had supposed that to be the period in which the hon. Member was interested. The figure for the corresponding period in 1954 was six, and the punishment was awarded for various offences, including threatening, improper or disrespectful language to a prison officer, creating a disturbance, disobedience to orders, and leaving the place of work without permission. Restricted diet No. 1 is a form of punishment provided for in the Prison Rules, which received the approval of Parliament; and no amendment of the Rules with regard to it is contemplated.

Mr. Yates: May I ask why it is that at Dartmoor the No. 2 punishment diet, specified by a dietary specialist, is never used; and why, on the evidence of the figures which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman himself has given, during the whole of last year all the punishment was bread-and-water diet? Is it not rather disgraceful that we should continue to use this medieval form of diet, and how long will it be before it is abolished?

Major Lloyd-George: As I said to the hon. Gentleman, this form of punishment was approved by Parliament. A Departmental Committee on prison punishment has looked into the matter since, and I will quote from paragraph 49 of its Report:
There was general agreement that No. 1 diet was an effective and proper form of punishment.… No witness suggested that it should be abolished.… The value of the punishment is that it is short and sharp.…

Mr. Yates: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why 42 men recently engaged in a hunger strike at Dartmoor were not seen by the medical officer until they had refused all food for over 48 hours.

Major Lloyd-George: There is no requirement in the Statutory Prison Rules or in prison regulations that a prisoner who persistently refuses food shall be seen by the medical officer from the outset of the demonstration, although the medical officer may, in the exercise of his judgment, consider it expedient to do so. In the case of the recent demonstration at

Dartmoor, the acting medical officer made it his business to interview all the prisoners concerned; this took a considerable time, and he did not manage to see them all before refusal of food had persisted for 48 hours, though he did see a number. I should like to take this opportunity of placing on record my appreciation of the tact and skill with which the acting medical officer dealt with a difficult situation.

Mr. Yates: While I appreciate that answer, may I ask if it is not rather serious that we should have as many as 42 persons refusing food who were not seen within 48 hours? Might not that have been seriously detrimental to their health?

Major Lloyd-George: There was nothing to prevent them from keeping up their health by eating, because there was nothing wrong with the food. It was a demonstration of some sort, and no one suffered from it at all. But the real point is that the prisoners could easily have eaten the food, had they wanted to.

Preventive Detention

Mr. Yates: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what steps are being taken to assist prisoners to understand the system of preventive detention; and in view of the fact that at present the overwhelming majority of such prisoners are unable to earn the full remission of their sentences even by exemplary conduct and therefore lose hope of rehabilitation, what action he proposes to take.

Major Lloyd-George: A notice has been prepared, to be given to preventive detention prisoners when they enter the second stage of their sentence. It is designed to set out as clearly as possible the considerations governing selection for the third stage and consequent earlier release. Certain alterations will be made, with the same object, in the information provided on the prisoners' cell cards. As regards the second part of the Question, I have nothing to add to the reply which I gave to the hon. Member's Question on the same subject on 17th February.

Mr. Yates: Does not the Minister realise that, on the figures which his Department supplies, the overwhelming majority of preventive detention prisoners have a long term of imprisonment, with


no chance whatever of earning full remission? If that be so, is it not a reflection on our present organisation that we do not provide the conditions to make it possible for prisoners to be rehabilitated?

Major Lloyd-George: Again, I cannot possibly accept what the hon. Gentleman says, because it is not borne out by experience. The fact is that good behaviour cannot be the only criterion for the remission of sentence. It may well be, in fact it has often so proved, that a good prisoner is a very different man when he gets out of prison. After all, these people are in prison for the protection of the public. By good conduct, preventive detention prisoners can earn a remission or, more correctly, eligibility for earlier release, of one-sixth of their sentence. That is the normal expectation. Those who are selected exceptionally for the third stage can earn one-third.

Children Act (Local Authority Arrangements)

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he is satisfied with the steps taken by the Herefordshire County Council to keep in touch with children placed by them in the charge of foster parents and, in particular, with the steps taken to keep brothers and sisters in touch with each other; and if he will make a statement.

Major Lloyd-George: Yes, Sir. I am satisfied that in exercising its functions under the Children Act, 1948, the county council ensures that regular visits are paid, as required by the boarding out rules, to children placed with foster parents; and makes all possible arrangements for brothers and sisters in care to keep in touch with one another.

Mr. Thomas: Will the Home Secretary bear in mind that this is the authority which previously forgot to look at a youngster which it had placed with foster parents, and who became the cause of legislation being passed by this House; and, again, that this authority is the one which allowed a brother and sister to marry in ignorance? If this authority keeps children aware of each other's identity, did not something go wrong?

Major Lloyd-George: Without commenting on the latter part of the supple-

mentary question, I may say that I have caused inquiries to be made so that I may be further informed.

Mr. G. Thomas: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department to what extent he requires county council children's committees to report to him when they place orphan children of the same family in different homes; and how often his welfare officers keep in touch with the young people after they attain school-leaving age.

Major Lloyd-George: Under the Children Act it is for the local authority to provide as it thinks best for a child in its care. No reports are made to me about individual placings; but my inspectors keep in touch with local authorities about their general arrangements, including arrangements for children who have left school.

Mr. Thomas: Would the Home Secretary say when the inspectors lose touch with these people? Is it when they reach the age of 21, or before?

Major Lloyd-George: Speaking offhand, I should have thought it was nearer 18.

Magistrates (Rights and Duties)

Captain Kerby: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will issue to all benches of magistrates a memorandum explaining their rights and duties in respect of sittings in open court and the hearing of evidence in camera, and pointing out in particular that, even if the court is cleared for the hearing of evidence, they may not refuse to disclose the name of the accused, the details of the charge, or the decision at which they arrive.

Major Lloyd-George: No, Sir. I have no reason to suppose that justices are not aware of the relevant statutory provisions. The effect of these provisions is that justices are normally required to sit in open court when trying criminal charges against adults. They are expressly relieved from this obligation when sitting as examining justices—that is, when they are considering, in an indictable case, whether there is a prima facie case for committing the accused for trial—but so far as I know, they sit in private only in exceptional circumstances. I am not aware of any provision which compels the disclosure of


particulars of the accused, the charge, and the justices' decision, but I have no reason to think that on the rare occasions when examining justices might think it necessary to sit in private they would in general refuse to disclose this information.

Captain Kerby: Is my right hon. and gallant Friend aware of the public concern caused recently in West Sussex by the action of the Littlehampton Magistrates——

Mr. Speaker: Order. If the hon. and gallant Member wishes to attack a particular decision of a bench of magistrates he should put down a Motion to that effect.

Mr. H. Hynd: Is the Minister aware that justices in general are well aware of their duties and responsibilities, and are kept fully informed by their own organisation—the Magistrates' Association?

Mechanical Restraints (Prisons)

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department to what extent strait jackets are still used in prisons; and how often they are used for the additional restraint of prisoners.

Major Lloyd-George: In 1953, the latest for which figures are available, the number of prisoners to whom the canvas restraint jacket was applied was 109. The circumstances in which mechanical restraints may be used, and the conditions governing their use, are set out in the Prison Rules. I am sending the hon. and gallant Member a copy of the relevant rule.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Is the right hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that this form of restraint has been dispensed with at Broadmoor for a long time? How can it be done without at Broadmoor and still be regarded as necessary in the prisons for which the right hon. and gallant Gentleman is responsible?

Major Lloyd-George: I suppose that I have responsibility everywhere. The fact is that the governor is the person to decide whether it is necessary or not.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what injuries were suffered by a prisoner at Winchester Gaol, of whom details have been forwarded, after he

had been placed in a strait jacket; and how these injuries were caused.

Major Lloyd-George: This prisoner was placed in a body belt, not a restraint jacket, after being forcibly removed to a special cell following a serious assault on an officer. Shortly afterwards he asked to see the prison medical officer, who found that he had a cut on the back of the head and some bruising of the shoulders. How he came to sustain these slight injuries is not clear. A little later a prison officer, on entering the cell, was attacked by the prisoner, who tried to kick him, and in self defence hit him on the head with his stave. The prisoner sustained two cuts, from one to two inches long, which had to be stitched.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman explain how it comes about that, after being placed in the body belt, this prisoner was hit over the head with a truncheon and sustained two cuts in the head, one of two inches and another of one and a half inches, which had to be stitched? I admit that this prisoner was a difficult case, but is there not something a little repugnant about a man being hit over the head with a truncheon after he has been strapped down?

Major Lloyd-George: I do not think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman quite realises what a body belt is. With a body belt the feet and legs are completely free—as this man found out—and when the officer came in the prisoner tried to kick him. If the kick had landed it would have been a very serious matter. The officer had to use his stave, and that was perhaps the cause of the two cuts which the prisoner had to have stitched. The hon. and gallant Gentleman says that he may have been a difficult man. I would say that that is a triumph of understatement. He was a very violent and dangerous prisoner.

Mr. Smithers: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend inform me whether, as a result of investigations made into this incident—which occurred in my constituency—he can say that no blame attaches to the prison staff in this matter?

Major Lloyd-George: I cannot add to what I have just said. As my hon. Friend will appreciate, there is bound to be a conflict of evidence in cases of this sort.


We have made every inquiry we can, and I have given to the House the facts as they were ascertained. As I say, the prisoner was an extremely violent and dangerous person.

Cross-Channel Day Trips (Passports)

Mr. Teeling: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what shipping companies are being invited to meet officers of his Department to discuss day trips to the Continent without passports; when they are meeting; and if he will arrange for them to visit the ports in dispute.

Major Lloyd-George: In the first instance, Messrs. P. & A. Campbell Ltd. have been invited to discuss the matter, and it is hoped to arrange a meeting this week. I do not see that there is any reason to visit ports at this stage.

Mr. Teeling: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend tell me why P. & A. Campbell Ltd. are the only ones being asked? Is there any special reason for that?

Major Lloyd-George: The only reason is that they are the ones who have suggested a method of getting over the difficulties.

Immigration Officers, Southern England

Mr. Teeling: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department the buildings required for security purposes at ports of south and south-east England, approved for the purposes of the Aliens Order, which are not to be found at Brighton or Eastbourne piers; how many people are employed on security work in these ports, especially at Newhaven; and how many were so employed in 1938.

Major Lloyd-George: I have not made any detailed comparison of the facilities at Brighton and Eastbourne with those at the approved ports. One hundred and twelve immigration officers, including 12 at Newhaven, are employed at approved ports in south and south-east England, the numbers in 1938 being 93 and eight respectively.

Mr. Teeling: Can my right hon. and gallant Friend assure us that—as he promised us—he is eventually going to look into this question of the Brighton

and Eastbourne piers being used once again for these trips, if it is at all possible?

Major Lloyd-George: What I hope to do is to restore the full facilities which we had before the war. When this question was referred to last week, I explained some of the difficulties which confronted us and which we are trying to overcome at the present time. I said then that if I can find a method of working we shall watch it carefully to see if it can be extended.

Road Accidents (Medical Evidence)

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that the powers possessed by courts at the present time in connection with cases of road accidents involving personal injury, to call for medical reports as to whether any physical or optical defects of the parties concerned may have been a contributory cause of the accident, are inadequate; and if he will introduce legislation to increase these powers.

Major Lloyd-George: Where criminal proceedings are taken following a road accident, it is open to either the prosecution or the defence to call any relevant medical evidence, and I am not aware that the courts require any special powers in addition to those which they already possess to obtain a report on the physical and mental condition of the defendant after conviction to assist them in determining the appropriate penalty.

Mr. Janner: Will the right hon. and gallant Gentleman go further into this matter, especially in view of the fact that he must know that a large number of accidents are caused because of these deficiencies on the part of the drivers?

Major Lloyd-George: Yes, but it is not the function of the courts to inquire into the causes of accidents. As I pointed out, it is open to either the prosecution or the defence to call any witnesses to support allegations such as that mentioned by the hon. Member.

Summer Time

Major Anstruther-Gray: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he has now fixed the dates of Summer Time; and if he will make a statement.

Major Lloyd-George: As I announced on 21st October, in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. E. Wakefield),the period of Summer Time in 1955 will be from 17th April to 2nd October.

Major Anstruther-Gray: Has my right hon. and gallant Friend received any strong representations to change these dates?

Major Lloyd-George: I cannot recollect any at the moment other than representations in this House. I think the House would agree that it is far better to stick to one date each year, particularly in view of time-tables. Changing the date from year to year makes difficulties.

Dr. Pontecorvo (British Citizenship)

Captain Kerby: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether Professor Bruno Pontecorvo has yet been deprived of his British citizen ship; if he will now publish the names of those persons in Britain who sponsored the professor's naturalisation; and if he will make a statement.

Major Lloyd-George: The Secretary of State has power to deprive a naturalised person of his citizenship if he is satisfied that the citizen has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty. There has hitherto been no information as to Dr. Pontecorvo's activities which would provide a reliable basis for the exercise of this power but I have of course noted with interest the statements recently attributed to Dr. Pontecorvo in the Soviet Press and am giving urgent consideration to the matter. Dr. Pontecorvo was naturalised on account of Crown service rendered abroad, and it is not the practice to require such applications to be supported by private sponsors.

Incitement to Disaffection Act (Conduct Overseas)

Mr. H. Fraser: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will consider the introduction of amending legislation to apply the Incitement to Disaffection Act, 1934, to offences committed outside the United Kingdom.

Major Lloyd-George: Conduct overseas which, if pursued here, would constitute an offence against the Incitement to Disaffection Act is happily rare, but Her Majesty's Government would not hesitate to take such steps as might be necessary if they were satisfied that the safety of the Realm was becoming imperilled.

Mr. Fraser: Does my right hon. and gallant Friend agree that in this period of the cold war some protection should be afforded to soldiers overseas and to their relatives at home who suffer from the kind of exploitation of grief that we saw in the recent Paper issued on the subject of the Korean prisoners? Is not some action necessary to prevent a recurrence of the dastardly things which happened in Korea, with the appalling exploitation of honest men and women and their relatives here at home?

Major Lloyd-George: I appreciate what my hon. Friend has said. I think the whole House will agree that we should try to prevent such things occurring as were recently reported. I repeat that I shall watch the matter very carefully. If I am satisfied that steps are necessary, I shall not hesitate to take them. In regard to past events, legislation would have to be retrospective, and that is not to be commended in any case if it can be avoided, particularly in criminal cases.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL DEFENCE

Hydrogen Bomb (Circular)

Mr. Swingler: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will issue a circular to Civil Defence authorities, giving the latest detailed information concerning the effects of the hydrogen bomb at Her Majesty's Government's disposal.

Major Lloyd-George: Yes, Sir. Such a circular containing all useful available information is in course of preparation.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the Home Secretary also consider making it available to the House as a White Paper, so that hon. Members and the public may have more accurate and complete information about this vitally important subject?

Major Lloyd-George: I certainly shall consider that.

Local Authorities

Mr. Janner: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many councils have withdrawn support for Civil Defence on the ground that it offered no protection from nuclear warfare.

Major Lloyd-George: Three, Sir: one county borough, one non-county borough, and one urban district.

Mass Evacuation Proposals, United States

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what study his Civil Defence advisers have made of the mass evacuation plans of United States cities, with a view to taking similar precautions in this country.

Major Lloyd-George: The United States proposals for mass evacuation of cities have been closely studied by my advisers. The plans contemplate a temporary dispersal of the population from vulnerable areas within a few hours on receipt of a tactical warning of attack. This is not evacuation as we have hitherto understood it in this country. Neither the lay-out of our cities nor the length of any tactical warning period on which we can count encourages us to believe that corresponding arrangements would be appropriate over here. As the Statement on Defence, 1955, made plain, Her Majesty's Government are at present re-examining all Civil Defence policies, and notably those on evacuation and shelter.

Mr. Hughes: Has the Minister seen the Report in "The Times" of last Monday, referring to a statement made by Mr. Val Peterson—his opposite number in America—from which it seems that Chicago is far more advanced than London in this respect? It is easier to get out of Chicago than London. The difficulty is how to get back.

Major Lloyd-George: That is something which may not be so important—but I still think that the American system is not particularly applicable to the peculiar conditions here. As I have said, all aspects of Civil Defence are being looked at urgently.

Mr. Noel-Baker: As Mr. Peterson has been giving evidence to Congress upon this subject and a great deal of information has been published, will the Home

Secretary consider whether we can have similar information here?

Major Lloyd-George: I shall do my best to give all possible information, as I said in answer to a previous Question.

Major Legge-Bourke: Will my right hon. and gallant Friend pay particular attention to the wisdom or Unisom of using East Anglia—especially that part where American Air bases are situated— for purposes of evacuation, should the need arise?

Mr. Hughes: In view of the anti-American utterances of the Minister, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

Oral Answers to Questions — EDUCATION

Private Schools (Approved Lists)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Education how many private schools have not yet responded to his request to supply lists of their staffs; on what dates the schools in question were first approached for the information; and what action he is taking in respect to those schools that so far have evaded supplying the information.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Mr. Dennis Vosper): Out of 3,808 schools asked for staff lists,288 are known to have closed and all but 124 of the rest have replied. The outstanding cases, of which 103 were approached in September and 21 more recently, are being followed up.

Mr. Dodds: How can the hon. Gentleman be complacent when he knows that for nine months efforts have been made to get this information, and that on 9th December he said that the Minister
is taking action to hasten outstanding replies."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th December, 1954; Vol. 535, c. 1107.]
Can it mean other than that these schools are of a type to which young people should not go? Otherwise they would give the information asked for. Will the hon. Gentleman urgently do something to obtain this information?

Mr. Vosper: The replies received so far represent 97 per cent. of those approached. Since the hon. Member last asked this Question a month ago, 50 replies have come in, and only 3 per cent. are still outstanding.

Teacher Exchange, Canada (Increased Grant)

Mr. Dodds: asked the Minister of Education if he will take action to ensure that financial allowances made by Her Majesty's Government to teachers from this country going to Canada under the exchange scheme are sufficient to obviate the need to take on other work in view of the present unsatisfactory position.

The Minister of Education (Sir David Eccles): My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland and I propose to undertake a general review of the arrangements for these exchanges. In the meantime, we have decided that, as a temporary measure, some increase may be authorised in the amounts to be granted to teachers going to Canada this summer.

Mr. Dodds: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on both sides of the House the statement which he has just made will be received with great approval? He is aware, is he not, that many people have felt a sense of humiliation when people in important educational circles in Canada have made those disagreeable statements about having to take part-time employment to enable them to follow their jobs?

Children's Camps

Mr. Snow: asked the Minister of Education if he will take powers to license and control children's camps in view of the evidence supplied to him by the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth of the unsatisfactory way in which such camps are liable to be run.

Sir D. Eccles: Most camps are well run, and the occasional instances to the contrary do not, in my opinion, justify the introduction of a system of licensing and control such as is suggested by the hon. Member. Local authorities already have power under the Public Health Act, 1936, to deal with the physical conditions in camps.

Mr. Snow: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that as, I believe, this case is still sub judice in the assize court, I am prohibited from reminding him about certain police evidence in this case? Does he not think that some inspection should be made of these children's camps where circumstances arise such as were said to have arisen in this particular case?

Sir D. Eccles: As the hon. Gentleman says, this particular case is before the courts. I have no reason to think that it is other than an exceptional case. If I had reason to believe that there were widespread abuses, I should certainly consider action.

Films

Mr. Wade: asked the Minister of Education what steps he is taking to encourage the use of, and aid the production of, educational films and, in particular, films which will assist the teaching of science in schools.

Sir D. Eccles: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave on 17th February to the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Warbey). I cannot add to that until I have had my discussion with representatives of the local education authorities.

Mr. Wade: Is the Minister aware that at present, owing to lack of funds, no educational films are being made and that in this respect this country compares unfavourably with a number of other countries? Is he aware that if a grant were made to the Educational Foundation for Visual Aids it would enable films to be produced which would be of considerable advantage to, and play an important part in, educational work?

Sir D. Eccles: I think that this must be talked over with the local education authorities to see whether they consider that this is a teaching aid of which they should bear part of the cost. The hon. Gentleman may know that there is by no means unanimous opinion on whether these films are really an aid to teaching or not.

Spastic Children (School Accommodation)

Mr. J. Johnson: asked the Minister of Education whether he is aware of the domestic unhappiness consequent upon the lack of sufficient schools, day and residential, for spastic children in the counties of Warwick, Worcester, and Stafford; and his intentions in the matter of building further accommodation.

Mr. Vosper: The local education authorities of the counties and county boroughs concerned tell me that on 1st October last 43 spastic children were awaiting places in special schools, two in


day schools and 41 in boarding schools. Schools in course of provision added to those already available should provide enough places for all the physically handicapped children, including spastics, in these areas.

Mr. Johnson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the figures he has just given me do not exactly tally with those given by the National Spastics Society, a highly responsible body? Is he aware that there is a great deal of family anxiety in the Midlands in connection with this matter? Perhaps he would be kind enough to see me afterwards to discuss the matter?

Mr. Vosper: These figures have been obtained recently from local authorities. In the County of Warwick only two spastic children are not in schools at the moment. The other children are in schools in the county area.

School Playing Fields

Mr. Morley: asked the Minister of Education the number of projects submitted by local education authorities for the development of school playing fields to serve existing schools or establishments of further education, to the latest convenient date.

Sir D. Eccles: Since I issued Circular 283, authorities have made 21 such proposals.

Teachers of Welsh

Mr. Gower: asked the Minister of Education how many teachers, qualified to teach Welsh, have taken teaching posts in England; and how many posts in Wales for teachers of Welsh are still vacant.

Sir D. Eccles: This information is not available in my Department.

Mr. Gower: Will my right hon. Friend say what steps are taken to assist teachers who are qualified to teach Welsh to obtain teaching posts in Wales?

Sir D. Eccles: I have always understood that Welsh local authorities are very active in that matter themselves.

National Service Men (Illiteracy)

Brigadier Rayner: asked the Minister of Education whether his Department will undertake an education case

history of every National Service entrant to the Army who is found unable to write his name and address on a form.

Sir D. Eccles: I am arranging with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to investigate a sample of the cases to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers.

Oral Answers to Questions — QUESTIONS TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Sir I. Fraser: asked the Prime Minister if he will arrange to answer Questions addressed to him not later than No. 40 instead of, as at present, No. 45.

The Prime Minister (Sir Winston Churchill): Questions to the Prime Minister have begun at No. 45 for very many years now, and I would not wish to change lightly an arrangement which appears to have worked more or less satisfactorily for so long.

Sir I. Fraser: Is my right hon. Friend aware that Question Time has undoubtedly slowed down a bit since years ago, though I make no complaint about that, and in view of the public interest, the unique interest there is, in Questions to him and his answers to them, will he reconsider this matter?

The Prime Minister: The House must always keep these matters under review. Personally, I find it rather exciting to see these close events.

Oral Answers to Questions — DISARMAMENT

Mr. A. Henderson: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the recent official statement by the American President expressing willingness to go as far as any other country in disarmament provided that a satisfactory inspection and control system could be agreed at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, he will make a further statement on British policy in this regard.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the answer I gave on Tuesday to the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Sorensen) or to my remarks made later that day during the defence debate.

Mr. Henderson: Would the Prime Minister make it clear that the ultimate aim of the Government to secure world


disarmament, as referred to in the White Paper on Defence, does not mean that the Government are not regarding world disarmament as their immediate aim, provided an agreement can be arrived at for the purpose of reducing existing armaments?

The Prime Minister: I do not feel myself in disagreement with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman has said.

Oral Answers to Questions — UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT, BRITAIN (CONSULTATION)

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the Prime Minister if he will state the precise terms of the agreement between President Eisenhower and himself whereby United States aircraft based in Britain will not become engaged in operations of war without the prior consent of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: I would refer the hon. Member to the statement I made in reply to Questions on this subject on 23rd March last year. I am sending him a copy of this.

Mr. Robinson: Would the right hon. Gentleman confirm in addition that this agreement will continue in force so long as the bases exist? Will he also give an assurance that there are no circumstances in which the consent of the Government may be presumed in advance?

The Prime Minister: Well, I suppose an immediate, destructive, surprise and treacherous attack with the hydrogen bomb upon this island might possibly be acted upon by our allies in the United States almost immediately without further or prior consultation.

Mr. Paget: Is not the difficulty that if that happened there would not be any air bases left, and has not the time come when, with regard to our American and Commonwealth partners, our bomber bases ought to be much farther off, where they cannot be surprised, as was Pearl Harbour?

The Prime Minister: Those are very special questions which I wonder the hon. and learned Gentleman did not get an opportunity of raising in the last two days of debate.

Mr. Paget: It was not for lack of trying.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Attlee: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he will state the business for next week?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 7TH MARCH—Committee and remaining stages: Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill.

Public Works Loans Bill.

Motions for Addresses relating to two Double Taxation Relief Orders (South Africa).

TUESDAY, 8TH MARCH—Supply [4th Allotted Day]:  It is proposed to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on Army Estimates, 1955–56, and to consider Votes A, 1, 2, 8, 9, 10 and 11 in Committee.

WEDNESDAY, 9TH MARCH—Supply [5th Allotted Day]: Report stage of the Civil Vote on Account, 1955–56.

A debate will take place on the present position of the cotton industry.

Thursday, 10th March—Supply [6th Allotted Day]:  It is proposed to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair on Air Estimates, 1955–56, and to consider Votes A, 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 11 in Committee.

FRIDAY, 11TH MARCH—Private Members' Motions.

Mr. Ernest Davies: Could the Leader of the House tell us when time will be found for a debate on the Report of the Chambers Committee of Inquiry into London Transport, in view of the fact that it commends London Transport for its efficiency and offers some pertinent criticisms of the present Government's transport policy?

Mr. Crookshank: No, Sir; I have no suggestion to make today on that subject.

Mr. Stokes: Can the Leader of the House say how soon the Government will be in a position to give a reply to the recommendations made by the Select Committee on House of Commons Accommodation?

Mr. Crookshank: Not today, Sir.

Mr. Swingler: May I ask the Leader of the House a question which I put to him last week, namely, whether it is the intention of the Government, on the Service Estimates, to permit discussion on the particular Votes put down on these Estimates? Or is it their intention, according to the practice of last year, to move to report Progress after the discussion on Vote A? No doubt the Leader of the House will be aware of Mr. Speaker's Ruling last year about what is in order on a general Estimates debate. I submit that it is important for hon. Members to know whether it is the intention of the Government to allow Committee discussions in the Estimates debates, because, otherwise, hon. Members are forced to put all their Committee points into the speeches which they make on the Estimates.

Mr. Crookshank: I have looked into this in the light of last year's debate, and what I think will happen is that, at a reasonable hour, we might report Progress after completing Vote A. In the meantime, we shall have consultations through the usual channels about opportunities for discussion at a later stage on such of the money Votes as the Opposition may wish to discuss. In think that if we work on those lines, perhaps we will reach the most satisfactory conclusion.

Mr. Stokes: May I follow up what I asked the Lord Privy Seal earlier? Does he not remember that, at the beginning of November last year, the Prime Minister stated that the Government had the matter under consideration, but were not at that time in a position to make any statement? Will he at least look into the matter again, and let us know when the Government will be able to make a statement?

Mr. Crookshank: Yes, Sir; all I meant was that I could not off-hand say when.

Mr. Harold Davies: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will be prepared, after the Foreign Secretary's return from South-East Asia, to provide the House with a White Paper on the Bangkok Conference? Can he assure the House that we shall have an opportunity of discussing our foreign policy in the Far East as soon as possible after the return of his right hon. Friend?

Mr. Crookshank: I think we had better wait until my right hon. Friend does

return before we start making any arrangements, tentative or otherwise, about a debate. On the hon. Gentleman's point about a White Paper, that is not a matter which comes within my own personal competence; but I will see that the hon. Gentleman's suggestion is noted.

Mr. Wigg: If the suggestion of the right hon. Gentleman to consider the form of our debates on the Service Estimates becomes a permanent feature of our debates, and we report Progress after discussion of Vote A, may we take it that further time will be given for discussion of the subsequent Votes? Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to consider, between now and next Tuesday, the great importance of giving a firm reply to the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler)?

Mr. Crookshank: I thought I had indicated that we were having consultations on that matter. I am not today trying to lay down the law for all time. I am merely seeking how best we can meet the convenience of the House, remembering that last year, on two of the days when Mr. Speaker was moved out of the Chair, the debate went on until nearly 7 o'clock the next morning.

Mr. Wigg: No reasonable hon. Member in any part of the House would disagree with that, but it just is not good enough to have discussions between the two Front Benches. I am not saying that discussions should not take place through the usual channels, but this right of the redress of grievances in Committee of Supply is something which affects every back bencher on both sides of the House. I therefore thought that the right hon. Gentleman, in discharging the functions of Leader of the House, would be mindful not only of his obligations to the usual channels, but also of his obligations to back benchers in all parts of the House.

Mr. Crookshank: Yes, but I should imagine that the usual channels, just as much as the hon. Gentleman and myself, recognised the rights of the House.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Following up the question just put by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), may I ask my right hon. Friend what minority of figures the official Opposition has to


reach before it loses its right to select a subject for debate in Committee of Supply?

Mr. Strachey: Will the Leader of the House recognise that the purpose which I think he has in mind, which we all support, will only be served if there are assurances given to every hon. Member of the House that, if an hon. Member does not raise what are called Committee points by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) on Vote A, there will be the fullest opportunity to raise them on a subsequent occasion, because otherwise that purpose will not be served?

Mr. Crookshank: That is exactly one of the matters under discussion, but we must not exaggerate the matter. This difficulty only arose last year and the year before. On previous occasions—and I think this is probably true of the time when the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) was Secretary of State—all the money Votes normally went through in under an hour.

Mr. Dugdale: When the Leader of the House talks about the discussions that are about to take place, I am sure he realises that there is to be a debate on the Navy Estimates today, and that the same trouble arises there. Can he tell us whether a firm decision can be arrived at which will relate to the Navy Estimates as well as the others?

Mr. Crookshank: I had in mind that the Navy Estimates were one of the three

concerned in these discussions. If I am in a position to say anything later in the course of the day, I hope I may be permitted to intervene.

Mr. Mellish: Will the right hon. Gentleman take note that on Friday next, when Private Members' Motions will be considered, there is due to be discussed a very simple, sensible, straightforward and honest Motion which merely asks the Tory Party to publish its accounts? Would he be good enough to use his influence with his hon. Friends, who are interested in the first Motion on the Order Paper for that day, to enable those who wish to talk on the second one to do so?

BILL PRESENTED

HOTEL PROPRIETORS (LIABILITIES AND RIGHTS)

Bill to amend the law relating to inns and innkeepers, presented by Sir C. Taylor; supported by Mr. Renton, Sir P. Macdonald, and Mr. Erroll; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 11th March, and to be printed. [Bill 50.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)

Ordered,
That this day the Business of Supply may be taken after Ten o'clock and shall be exempted from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[3RD ALLOTTED DAY]

Orders of the Day — Navy Estimates, 1955–56

Order for Committee read.

Orders of the Day — MR. J. P. L. THOMAS'S STATEMENT

3.39 p.m.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. J. P. L. Thomas): I beg to move, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."
The House will already know from the Defence White Paper and from my own Explanatory Memorandum that for the coming year the Admiralty is slightly reducing its demands on the defence budget in much the same proportion as the defence budget itself is reduced. The gross cost of the programme which I present to the House is forecast as £391,550,000, or about £12 million less than this year's programme.
There is a corresponding reduction in the net amount of £340,500,000 which I have to ask Parliament to grant, after making allowance for receipts of all kinds. The receipts include an estimated £6½million of defence aid generously granted by the United States, and some additional United States aid will be provided in support of the research and development programme. In the current year we made provision for £14 million of defence aid.
The House will have noticed that this year I have put much of the material which I should normally use in my speech into my Explanatory White Paper. I am grateful to the hon. Members for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) and Aston (Mr. Wyatt)—although I totally disagree with everything they said about the Navy during the debates of the last two days, I have an unbounded admiration for their judgment of literature—for their kindly reference to my White Paper for the present year.
I decided to do this for various reasons. Since last I presented the Navy Estimates to the House, the coming of the hydrogen bomb has added, as we have debated over the last two days, a new and horrifying significance to the nuclear age. As the House was told in the defence debate, the Government had to examine afresh the

effect on the traditional Services of the Crown. While this was being done—and it was a very thorough process—the prophets in this country got going, and many of their prophecies predicted doom for the Royal Navy. Many people—and many distinguished people—said, in the vernacular, that the Navy had "had it," while the official spokesmen for the Navy were forced to keep silent as long as this examination was going on. These prophecies and the uncertainty which they produced have, I admit, caused much uneasiness throughout all ranks of the Service.
Now that the Government have heard and accepted the opinions of the scientists and strategists that the Navy has a vital part to play in the nuclear age, I thought it wise to give the reasons to the country at greater length in the White Paper than this House could endure in a speech, so that matters could be viewed in a proper perspective during today's debate, and also during the two days' defence debate which we have just finished.
The reaction from the public and the Press to the Explanatory White Paper to the Navy Estimates has been encouraging, but one criticism has been pretty general, and it is a fair one. It says, "This new type of Navy sounds all right but so much of it is in the future. What happens if war, and perhaps conventional war, should come before the guided weapons and the new naval aircraft are ready?" I will try to answer this question today in the course of my speech, although, heaven knows, the path of the prophet is as full of pitfalls today in matters like these as it has been throughout the ages.
The Russian Navy is a powerful one and is quickly growing in strength. Can the allied navies stand up to it now—if it should become necessary—and fulfil the unchanging task of all navies: to destroy the enemy's ships and prevent him from using the seas; to protect our supplies and communications; and to provide air support for operations ashore and afloat in those areas where it cannot readily be given by shore-based aircraft?
I said the "allied navies" and I stress those words, for after the extraordinarily successful way in which the navies of the allies have been knitted together with our own Navy and with those of the Commonwealth, frankly I have little patience


with people who talk as if we may stand alone in any future major war at sea. It may hurt the pride of a great seafaring nation to realise that we can no longer control the seas alone but it ought not to do so, for there is no single navy in the world today that can do so in these modern times.
What it is up to us to do surely is to see not only that our contribution to that allied naval power is worthy of this country but, also, that it will meet our own world-wide commitments in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Our contribution, of course, will be worthier still as the guided weapon ships come along, but I do not want to belittle what the position is today. Our five latest aircraft carriers are among the most modern in the world and the inventions which make them so up-to-date are all British inventions.
Since the previous Government began the rearmament programme in 1950, which has been carried on by the present Government, over 120 new or modernised ships have either joined the Active Fleet or are in readiness to do so from the Reserve Fleet.
People are apt to complain that these are only small ships and no answer to the new Russian cruiser, the "Sverdlov"; but the main answer today to the "Sverdlov" is the carrier and its aircraft. Our smaller ships—the fast escorts, anti-submarine frigates and minesweepers —are indispensable for combating the submarine and the mine and for enabling us to carry out one of the main duties of the Navy, which is the protection of our supplies and communications.
There have been some suggestions in the defence debate that the Navy is spending too much money on these anti-submarine ships and on our mining forces. But the Russian submarine force which could menace our trade routes is a considerable one, and although the mine danger may not have the same super-priority as it had before the coming of the hydrogen bomb, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Russians are still concentrating on mine-laying.
Let me also say something here about our own submarines. The numbers in the White Paper may not seem large enough, but I would remind the House that it is never customary to give the particulars of or numbers of operational submarines

until they have been launched. All I wilt say is that we are building modern submarines—some with high submerged speed—and more midget submarines are coming into service.
But, as I have said in the White Paper, our cruiser fleet is ageing. This does not mean that they cannot give a good account of themselves if a hot war should suddenly materialise and, of course, they still perform a most valuable service both in peace, in supporting our foreign policy and in patrolling the seas, and in any cold or warm war which may occur.
But the Admiralty has been criticised for not building more conventional cruisers. I should say at once that the present Board of Admiralty, even if it had the money, would not do so but would prefer to concentrate on the guided weapon ship which is in sight. This ship will be something over 10,000 tons: and an obvious successor to the cruiser.
In the case of the "Tiger" class cruisers, however, we have made an exception. For some time I have been asked by all parties in both Houses of Parliament why we have not finished the three "Tiger" cruisers. I have replied that we were awaiting the latest gun armament. This is now ready and, as I said before, the new guns are almost entirely automatic and fire a new design of shell at a very high rate. We therefore decided to finish building these three cruisers.
We shall get for the money we spend in completing them, three cruisers for roughly the price of one new one today. In summing up my answer to those who ask about our present strength, I would say that if we continue to make the same contribution towards the total N.A.T.O. naval strength, the combined allied force provides today a very formidable deterrent.

Mr. James Callaghan: What is the cost of completing the three cruisers?

Mr. Thomas: It will cost about £18 million, which is equal to the price of a new cruiser today.
So far as aircraft are concerned, by the end of this year we shall have completely re-equipped our front-line with jet and turbo-prop aircraft in the day fighter and all-weather fighter rôles and in the strike and anti-submarine rôles. The Fleet Air Arm will be equipped with the Sea Hawk,


which can carry a 2,000 lb. bomb load, the Sea Venom, the Gannet and the Wyvern—the strike aircraft about which I shall have more to say in a minute; and the Whirlwind helicopter, which is showing the great possibilities of the helicopter in the anti-submarine rôle.
We cannot, of course, rest content with this. New aircraft are planned to replace all those which have been in front-line service this year. As the House knows, substantial orders have been placed for a new single-seater day-fighter—the N.113 —which will replace the Sea Hawk and is designed to carry a guided missile.
We have now also placed orders for an all-weather fighter, the D.H.110, to replace the Sea Venom. I have already assured the House that we are entirely satisfied that the D.H.110 is a first-class aircraft for our purposes. This aircraft has been subjected to intensive tests since the accident at Farnborough in 1952. As a result of these tests it should enter service with far fewer latent troubles than other aircraft, and I repeat that the experts consider it will be an absolutely first-class naval aircraft. It is also designed to carry a guided missile, and I hope that these aircraft which I have mentioned will have a smooth passage in production and will come into service as planned.
The Whirlwind helicopter and the turbo-prop Gannet are in service today and squadrons have been formed. The Wyvern, as the House probably knows, was the first military turbo-prop aircraft, and, therefore, it was to be expected that it would have an unusual quantity of teething troubles—and it certainly has; but the latest report, which I have received this week, is reasonably hopeful that it will shortly be cleared for operation from carriers. As I said in my Explanatory Statement, however, we are planning a much more advanced replacement for it. All these new aircraft will be expensive but some of our new plans and developments will bring about, as one of their results, substantial economies in aircraft.
Our practical experience with the angled deck and the mirror sight in H.M.S. "Albion" has convinced us that there should be in future a very marked decrease in deck landing accidents. This will not only substantially reduce wastage of aircraft but, more important still, will

increase very greatly the safety of our pilots and observers.
The conversion of most of the R.N.V.R. fighter squadrons to jets is planned to take place this year, and within the next year or two we expect to give the R.N.V.R. Air Divisions Sea Hawks, Gannets and Seamews. At the same time, we shall have to reduce the R.N.V.R. establishment of these costly aircraft by about one-fifth and there will also have to be some reduction in aircrew.
I hope that by the account I have just given, I have shown our determination that the Fleet Air Arm shall have the best aircraft and equipment that we can provide and the best training we can possibly give it. It is also intended that from the training point of view, so far as possible squadrons ashore will in future always work from the same airfields and will know from the time they form which carrier they will join and when.
I doubt whether the House would want me to spend much tune today in raking over any more the embers of the controversy about the aircraft carrier, about which quite a lot was said during the past two days. Perhaps I may deal with the subject in two sentences and say, in defence of the aircraft carrier, that it proved its value for all to witness during the Korean War. There may be more wars like the Korean War.
The expert advice given to the American Navy and to our own fully supports the carrier battle group in a war of nuclear weapons as a self-protecting, largely self-contained mobile airfield.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: What about Montgomery?

Mr. Thomas: I am talking about the naval experts in America and this country and not about Army field marshals, however distinguished they may be. Such a battle group is described in the White Paper as compact, hard-hitting and, at the same time, flexible and elusive.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the expert advice given to the American and British Navies. Is the expert advice naval advice?

Mr. Thomas: It is the advice of the Chiefs of Staff, which includes the Navy.

Mr. Shackleton: The Army and the Air Force?

Mr. Thomas: It is the total Chiefs of Staff advice. They speak as one voice, as the hon. Member must know.

Mr. Ivor Owen Thomas: If the advice tendered to different Departments differs, on what advice does the Minister of Defence take action?

Mr. Thomas: If there is any difference between the Chiefs of Staff, the Minister of Defence and, after him, the Cabinet come to their conclusions, having taken both points of view into consideration.
A great deal has been said about the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier in the last war. I would remind the House that of the 226 carriers used by all sides, only 39 were sunk. Of these, only four were sunk by shore-based aircraft, three of them by Japanese suicide aircraft. As for a future war, the carrier battle group as a mobile target, with its screen of fighters and its early-warning aircraft, might well be relatively immune from some of the most formidable of modern weapons.
As I have told the House in my White Paper, the guided weapons are now far enough advanced for us to begin to prepare the ships for carrying them. These ships will replace the cruiser fleet as it ages and goes out of active service. From now on, the programmes for ships, their equipment and guided missiles are geared to come together at the proper time.
I would warn the House that the expression "laying down a ship" is becoming a bit of an anachronism in these modern days.

Mr. George Wigg: Are the guided missiles which these ships eventually will carry yet in production or development?

Mr. Thomas: If the hon. Member will wait, I am coming to that. I hope to answer his question.
As I have warned the House, the expression "laying down a ship" is becoming something of an anachronism, because in these modern days the equipment requires a longer time than the hull. So far as these guided weapon ships are concerned, a good deal of research and development work on the equipment has been completed, and we aim to order much of that equipment this year for the first ships so that building can proceed.
The ship-to-air missile itself will be tested at sea next year in the experimental guided weapon ship "Girdleness," which, I think, answers the hon. Member's question; but until those tests have been successfully completed, I do not feel that the House would expect me to try to predict today when our first operational guided weapon ship will come into service.

Mr. Wigg: What the right hon. Gentleman has not said is whether the types of guided missile which are being produced are prototypes or have gone into development and production. There is an important difference.

Mr. Shackleton: And ship-to-air missiles.

Mr. Wigg: Yes, and ship-to-ship.

Mr. Thomas: My answer is that the first ship-to-air guided weapons will be ready in time when these ships come along.

Mr. Wigg: Prototypes or development types?

Mr. Thomas: Development types—when the ships come along; but I cannot give a date.

Mr. Percy Wells: Will they be British-produced?

Mr. Thomas: They will be British.

Mr. Speaker: We should get on better if there were many fewer interjections. The habit of interjecting questions has been growing lately and slows down proceedings. Although we have plenty of time before us today, that is also an argument why hon. Members who are interested in the matter should defer their questions until they get an opportunity of making a speech; otherwise, we simply spend time with these interruptions.

Mr. Wigg: We always value these opportunities, Mr. Speaker, if the Minister is willing to give way, to clear up the points as we go along. We are dealing not only with matters of debate, but also with important matters of fact.

Mr. Speaker: There is no doubt about their importance. I am only suggesting that the habit of rising to ask questions in the course of a narrative slows down proceedings. I am not saying that it is always wrong or anything like that, but


in my opinion there has been far too much of it lately.

Mr. Thomas: During the two days of the defence debate, I was asked questions about merchant shipping. As is well known, the co-operation between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy is very close indeed, and continues to be so. As I have shown also in the earlier part of my speech, a considerable part of our naval building programme with its emphasis on escort ships is for the safety of the Merchant Navy. During the defence debate, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Barkston, Ash (Sir L. Ropner) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West (Mr. Maclay) asked certain detailed questions. All I can say in reply today is that the Admiralty is working very closely with the General Council of British Shipping on all questions of shipping defence, including the very problems raised by my hon. Friends during the defence debate.
I come now to the manning of the Navy. Before I deal with this grave and important matter, I hope the House will remember when we face the present serious difficulties in the Navy that, unlike the other two Services, the Navy is more than 90 per cent. composed of volunteers and the average length of engagement in the Navy is still over ten years. We therefore have an entirely different problem from the other two Services. In my Explanatory Statement of a year ago, I gave some account of the Navy's problems of recruiting and engagement. In my Statement this year, I show that those trends, unfortunately, developed further, particularly in the seamen and stoker mechanic branches and in the Royal Marines.
Everyone will have his own ideas of the importance of the various reasons which have gone to make this new situation and I have discussed certain of them in my White Paper. I certainly do not accept any suggestion that men are leaving the Navy or staying out of the Navy because morale is low. That is certainly not the case. My colleagues and I have carried out several tours of inspection, both at home and abroad. I myself went to the Far East last autumn. We talked to large numbers of all ranks, ashore and afloat. So far from finding low morale, we found that the men, apart

from small grouses or "tooth sucking" as it is more elegantly called in the Navy, were happy in their service, though there is no doubt that the attractions of civil life are very great.
We are satisfied, too, that the men in the Navy today are every bit as good as those of the past. But the decline in our numbers goes on. We cannot take any dramatic steps to bring about an increase overnight in our numbers of Regulars, but we are always watching living conditions and the conditions of service of the ratings—a subject which no doubt will be dealt with more fully when we debate the intervening Amendment today. We are doing all we can to preserve and improve the best features of life in the Service, and to make sure that the Navy offers, as it has done in the past, an attractive career.
I do not want to cut across the Amendment which the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) will move later on, so I will only say that the advantages of the general service commission introduced almost a year ago, which means shorter service abroad and leaving ships' companies for a longer time together, have not yet had full effect. Although I warned the House in the last debate on the Estimates that it would take a year or so for this plan to settle down and that during the first year conditions might be tiresome, although they would bring great benefits in the end, nevertheless the position of manning is sufficiently disturbing for the Admiralty to start a full inquiry into problems of recruiting and manning.
Against this background I am glad to be able to say something about the Naval Reserves. There, the position is generally very sound. I have sometimes seen figures given as the strength of the Naval Reserves and Auxiliary Forces, which are confined to men having a training liability and to National Service Reserves. Actually, we have available on call an immediate and highly trained First Reserve of over 80,000 officers and men and a much larger list of Emergency reservists, all of whom have had considerable experience of service in the Navy.
I have something important to say to the House about the entry, training and careers of naval officers. The House will have read in my Explanatory Statement


what we are doing about cadet entries. This afternoon, I want to deal with the systematic review of the officer structure of the Navy which I mentioned to the House last year. Although we have had the manning structure of the lower deck always under review, it is thirty years since there was a review of the officer structure. This is now well under way and because they know that this review is being held, there must be a certain understandable anxiety amongst officers as to its outcome. We have already taken certain decisions which in time will change the shape of the officer structure.
So far, the review has brought forward three major problems. This matter is a little complicated for those who have not served in the Navy to understand, but I have done my best to make it clear and my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary will do his best to answer any questions at the end of the debate. The first problem is that in nearly all branches the base of the career pyramid has become too large to provide a satisfactory prospect for those who reach commissioned rank through the Cadet Entry and the Upper Yardman schemes. Secondly, there is a problem of giving executive officers enough time in command at sea to make certain that the operational direction of the Navy will remain first-class. Thirdly, we have to ensure that the higher direction of the Navy includes officers with first-hand knowledge of aviation. There must be officers at all levels who are both qualified as pilots or observers and also qualified to take command at sea.
We are beginning to tackle these three problems. First, in the matter of careers, our plan depends on cutting down the rate of entering cadets. As a result, the smaller number of young men whom we enter will have a better chance of promotion to commander and above. On the other hand, another result will be that there will not be enough cadets and upper yardmen to fill all the appointments for lieutenants and lieutenant-commanders.
To fill some of these posts we there-for expect to tap three sources. First, there will be scope for increased numbers of officers of the Branch List, that is the officers who before 1948 were warrant officers or commissioned officers from

warrant rank. Secondly, we shall offer longer periods of service and improved chances of a permanent commission to officers who take Short Service commissions for specialised flying duties. Thirdly, we may, if necessary, recruit officers direct from civil life for other specialised duties, much as we now do for flying. A career will be open for a good proportion of these various specialised officers up to the rank of lieutenant-commander and up to the age of 50, and eventually the best of them may go on to commander. I must emphasise that the new requirements for officers employed on special duties will not arise until the lists of junior officers are substantially reduced, and this will take time.
Next comes the question of giving to officers who may one day command fleets or squadrons sufficient practice in command of ships as commanders and captains. We can no longer rely on the experience they obtained during the war, and if we try to give all executive commanders and captains the necessary practice, none will get enough. The only solution is to limit the number of officers who are given sea commands, dividing executive officers at a certain point in their career into two lists, the sea-going or post list, and the general list. We have gone back to the use of the word "post" because, as the House will remember, "post" ships were ships of the line of battle and post captains were the officers who commanded those ships.
Officers on the general list will be needed in command of establishments and on staff and administrative duties. Many such appointments call for the highest abilities and will qualify their holders for further promotion right up to Flag rank in appointments where recent experience at sea is not considered indispensable. This important change is coming into force now for commanders and captains of certain seniorities.
I come now to the need to increase the proportion of permanent officers who are qualified pilots or observers. We do not want to do this by having a vast number of cadet entry officers devoting themselves exclusively to flying. This would cause a shortage of general service officers and also, if there were too many flying specialists they would not be able to get the broad experience needed for the higher ranks. Therefore, we intend


that a number of these pilots and observers should leave the Fleet Air Arm after seven years and go on as general service officers, with the advantage of their experience of operational flying. For those who remain in the Fleet Air Arm we shall arrange one commission at sea in a non-flying appointment in the rank of lieutenant and another in the rank of lieut.-commander. This will help to keep these officers qualified for sea-going command.
Another important problem concerns the Engineer, Electrical and Supply and Secretariat branches. It is more than ever essential today that intelligent young men should be attracted into these branches, and that we should be able to give them proper scope for their talents in the higher ranks. We are working out how best this can be done and the long-term entry and training arrangements necessary. I cannot say more to the House today, but I can show the direction in which our minds are working by telling hon. Members that we have decided on changes in the rules governing what are called "marks of respect", so that the differences in treatment between senior officers of the executive and non-executive branches will largely disappear.
We have also decided that the coloured distinction cloth at present worn between the stripes of officers of the non-executive branches of the Royal Navy is to be abolished except in the Medical and Dental departments, for, under the Geneva Convention, the latter must be clearly recognisable as non-combatant.
I have been told that there are rumours that a number of officers are likely to be axed. In personnel matters it is difficult nowadays to look far ahead, but I want to say definitely that nothing that I have seen in the course of this review gives me any reason to believe that it will necessitate any measure of this kind. I hope that what I have said about the officer structure as a whole will show the Board of Admiralty's determination not to stick stubbornly to the past but to come well into line with modern thought and modern times.
I have tried to show in my speech that the Board of Admiralty has realised fully that during the arrival of these thermonuclear weapons there has been a period of public doubt and of great anxiety for

all those concerned in the Navy, but now that the Government have affirmed beyond any doubt that the Navy's tasks in the thermo-nuclear age are of vital importance to the nation, I trust that this confidence in the Navy's future may be reflected in the debate today.

4.10 p.m.

Mr. James Callaghan: This is the fourth occasion on which the First Lord has presented the Navy Estimates and, once again, I should like to congratulate him on the agreeable, pleasant and courteous manner in which he has done so. This year, as always, he has not failed in his responsibility to answer the questions that have been asked. He and the Parliamentary Secretary and the Civil Lord have batted unchanged since 1951,and in my own dealings with them I have found nothing but the utmost courtesy and helpfulness. They have been long enough in office to get the credit of the fruits of their long tenure. They have also been there long enough to take responsibility for anything that may go wrong; indeed, the First Lord has never tried to shirk his responsibilities.
I remember how he talked about the clean bill of health he gave the Navy the first time he spoke in the Estimates after he became First Lord, and what I have to say this afternoon will I hope be a fair appraisal of the First Lord's responsibilities. He will, no doubt, be able to winnow the credit from the blame and the responsibility. There is some of both.
I must confess that I was agreeably surprised to see the Explanatory Statement begin with an interesting essay. It is certainly far better than the other two Services have been able to put up, but I am bound to say that that effort at composition seems to have exhausted the First Lord, because we have heard singularly little about the rôle of the Royal Navy in this age of thermo-nuclear weapons. I wonder why. I hope that this is not just a prospectus which is designed to be a reply.
Field Marshal Montgomery and other distinguished field marshals and air marshals, during the last year, have been busy attacking the Admiralty. The Minister of Defence, who, I hope, will assume a more warlike posture than he has at the moment when it comes to dealing with these matters, complained yesterday


that he was surrounded by retired admirals, field marshals and air marshals who were busy attacking each other.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I did not say that at all. I said exactly the opposite.

Mr. Callaghan: By retired field marshals who were——

Mr. Macmillan: No.

Mr. Callaghan: The right hon. Gentleman says he said the exact opposite.

Mr. Macmillan: If the hon. Member will do me the honour of reading what I said, I made the observation that many people seemed to think that I was surrounded not by retired but by officers, admirals, and so on, who were quarrelling with each other, and that I was afraid I could not confirm this romantic picture. In point of fact, it was the exact opposite.

Mr. Callaghan: And the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that it was retired field marshals and admirals who were busy doing the attacking. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] It is not important. The right hon. Gentleman should not get angry before we start. This is the first time that he has been here. In the past, we have had very pleasant debates, and I hope that the Minister of Defence will not introduce a nasty note into our deliberations. It would be most uncalled for, if he did.
Over the last twelve months I have seen the First Lord delivering a few shots himself in response to some of these attacks. I was delighted to see it. I think I did complain on one occasion that he had not spoken enough about the rôle of the Navy, and I certainly would not prevent him from entering into combat if he had a good case to make against anybody. I only say that it is a remarkable state of affairs when the First Lord of the Admiralty is to be attacked by a serving field marshal who is responsible for his views to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Such confusion of policy does not reflect very great credit on those who are responsible.
The object of the debates on the Navy Estimates is not only to peer into the future as far as we can, but also to review what has happened so far. I should like, if I may, to make one or two observations about the position of the rearmament pro-

gramme which was launched by the Labour Government in 1950–51, because there is no doubt that it has fallen far short of the expectations of that time under the administration of the present Government.
A programme of 26 new frigates was announced in 1951. They were laid down during the following three years. It was not expected that they would be completed within that time, but it was expected that most of them, at any rate, would be completed within the first half of the present decade, namely, by the end of 1955. This is the position about these 26 new frigates. I think it is right. Fourteen of them are still on the slips, 12 only have been launched and none is in service. So far, not a single frigate laid down in the 1951 programme has joined the Fleet. This is a sorry record.
I do not know to what extent the industry would claim it was over-taxed, but if the matter is looked at in terms of tonnage, 26 frigates at 2,000 tons each mean 52,000 tons of shipping in yards which are capable of building 1½ million to 2 million tons a year without overstraining themselves. It seems to me that there has not been the pressure behind the frigate programme that there should have been to complete it in time. Nought out of 26 is not a very good score four years after the programme was launched.
Now I come to the conversions that were decided upon at the same time. The programme was to convert 45 destroyers to anti-submarine frigates. I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary whether he will be good enough to say what is wrong with the arithmetic I have worked out, because I cannot make the sum quite right. Page 7 of the Explanatory Statement on the 1954–55 Estimates last year stated that the conversion of 10 destroyers into anti-submarine frigates had been completed. This year, in paragraph 40 of the Explanatory Statement, we see that eight more conversions have been completed, bringing the total up to 27. But, to me, 10 plus eight is 18. Where have the other nine got to?
Of the programme of 45 conversions only 27 have been done—I accept that total, though I do not know how the figures add up—and that is a little more than half the programme. This does not seem to me to show the drive, energy and


vigour that one would have expected from a new Administration coming into power determined to get ahead with the rearmament programme which was launched at heavy cost and has taken a very heavy toll.
I want to ask about the Fleet Air Arm. Has the rearmament of the Fleet Air Arm with jet and turbo-prop aircraft been completed? The First Lord may have said so, but some of the things he said in his speech went over our heads a little quickly. I did not gather all the information he had to give us, and I should like an answer about that.
Let us look at the fighters in the aircraft carriers. We have at the moment mainly the Sea Hawk, the Sea Venom and the Attacker. I listened to what the Minister of Defence said yesterday—I hope I get him right this time, or else we shall have more interruptions—and I thought he said that we must not play at party politics about this matter and that we must all join together. But I have to say what I think about the matter, and not only what I think but what a great many other people think.
The truth is that neither the Sea Hawk nor the Attacker, which are the main fighters we are relying upon at present, are regarded as satisfactory. Neither of them is capable of meeting or overtaking and intercepting the aircraft that it would have to meet. If they were pressed into service as strike aircraft—and I shall say more about strike aircraft later— they would not have the range, nor could they carry a reasonable load of bombs or rockets. I state this as a simple matter of fact. I am not scoring points. I want to lay the facts before the House and, if they are open to contradiction, have them contradicted.
We are told that they are to be replaced by the N.113 and the De Havilland 110. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has severe strictures to make on the DH 110. I am not qualified to make those strictures and I know nothing about its performance —I say that straight away—but these doubts exist. The First Lord has done his best to clear them up. I have no doubt that my hon. Friend will make certain observations in this debate——

Mr. Wigg: What is the point of waiting? These aircraft were originally

submitted to, and examined and flown by, the Royal Air Force, and then turned down by it, and the Navy is taking second best because there is nothing else. I hope it is not true.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: The DH 110 met with an accident and it was withdrawn for further tests. Meanwhile the Javelin came along and the Royal Air Force took that. It was too heavy for our carriers. The DH 110 then had its full trials and has now emerged as a first-class machine.

Mr. Callaghan: No doubt my hon. Friend will continue his argument later, but in all these matters, as a House of Commons and as a country, we are very much in the hands of the Government. There are few of us who can know the exact facts about these aircraft and, therefore, the responsibility upon the Government is the heavier to give this House an accurate assessemnt of the performance of these planes.
I am not complaining that the First Lord is not doing that; I merely say that the weight of responsibility is focussed upon that Bench opposite. The rest of us are not in a position, until afterwards, when we hear the results of the use of these aircraft, to be able to pass judgment upon them. May I ask the First Lord this question about those two aircraft, remembering that they are to take the place of the Sea Hawk and the Sea Venom, which are admittedly on present-day standards not satisfactory; when are we likely to get them into squadron service? What date is estimated for this?
I now come to strike aircraft. Heavy aircraft carriers have a wider purpose nowadays than merely to fly off fighters for self-defence or for defending a convoy. They have a strike rôle,and the Navy ought to concentrate a great deal of its attention upon an advanced type of strike aircraft to fly from the Ark Royal, the Eagle and the Victorious. I say the Victorious because she has been practically rebuilt since 1950. It has amounted to almost a 100 per cent. rebuilding at a very heavy cost—in my view, much too heavy a cost. I take my share of responsibility for that, because I signed the Minute for the work to go ahead, but I am glad to say that I stopped the conversion of any more, and the conversion of the other five has not gone ahead. I am


sure that the decision not to proceed with them was right.
I understand from the First Lord that we have no more than two squadrons of Wyverns, which are the only strike weapons that the Navy has to distribute among those three heavy aircraft carriers. Neither of those two squadrons of Wyverns is yet embarked, as I understand the Minister, though he hopes they may be embarked at an early date. Is it really satisfactory that in any set of circumstances the Navy's major strike weapon from heavy aircraft carriers should be limited to two squadrons of Wyverns, neither of which is yet embarked?
As I understand, these are the only aircraft today with the approach range of those that will be operating from the United States fleet. If, therefore, we were to be working with that fleet the role of the Ark Royal, the Eagle and the Victorious in present circumstances would be limited to putting up fighters. I cannot think that the Wyverns would play any large part in any strike force that might be got together, and I say that this is a serious situation from the point of view of the First Lord.
The Wyvern has had a sad history. I thought that the White Paper on the Supply of Military Aircraft rather glossed over it in paragraph 34:
Up to date it has not proved successful for its designed purpose …but work is still proceeding with a view to remedying its defects.
I doubt whether any work that is done is likely to remedy the defects of this plane and make it one that will be fit to operate from aircraft carriers such as the Eagle and the Ark Royal.
Since 1946, when it first flew, it has been dogged year after year by technical trouble and production delays. When I was at the Admiralty, I was told about them too, and in all fairness I think one can pass this judgment now, that the Government have clung on too long, hoping that the Wyvern would be converted eventually into a satisfactory plane. A plane that was started in 1944, and is still getting over its teething troubles, is obviously obsolescent before it ever gets aboard a carrier. Paragraph 46 of the Explanatory Statement indirectly recognizes this, because it says:
For strike operations, a. replacement is planned for the Wyvern.

I ask the Parliamentary Secretary, what does the word "planned" mean in this connection? There are long stages between the planning of an aircraft and its appearance in an aircraft carrier. How long before the plan takes practical shape? When can we expect a modern strike aircraft to operate from these three major carriers? At the moment we have not got a major weapon of that kind, and I would hazard the guess that, with the best of good luck, with all the vigour possible, it will be 1962 before we shall get such an aircraft.
I want to ask this question also: Can the Wyvern replacement operate from the Hermes Class carriers? I hope the answer is yes, but if not, what is the rôle of the Hermes Class carriers to be? In view of the history of naval aircraft, we have a right to be sceptical about the possibility of producing new aircraft rapidly that will suit the form of the Navy, and so I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to devote some attention to this matter when he replies to us later.
I now turn to another aspect of the past. I am for the moment reviewing the past; I hope to come to the future in a very few minutes. I want now to deal with the question of stocks of stores, fuel and ammunition.
In 1953–54,the Explanatory Statement stated that the Fleet would be using some of the existing stocks of fuel, stores and ammunition that had previously been built up, and they were used. In 1954–55,no provision was made for replacing those stocks. In this year's White Paper the figures show that further reductions are being made, and the Explanatory Memorandum says that:
… there is to be a further run down in the level of reserves.
Where is the Admiralty getting to on the question of stocks? I well remember that when I was at the Admiralty for a very short period, only 18 months, I read the history of the post-war days, when the stocks of the Navy were deliberately run down in order that civilian stocks could be built up. It was a calculated risk and one worth taking. However, there has been a drop now of nearly £6 million in the stores of torpedoes, mines and ammunition. I should like the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to say how many months' stores of fuel, ammunition and torpedoes are held at the


present time. Has the total gone below what should be the minimum safety level? Will he assure us that it has not been reduced to a level lower than it ought to be according to common prudence?
I should like now to say just a word about manpower. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) will speak on this matter later; the Principality is well represented in these debates. However, paragraphs 51–54 of the White Paper all show that recruitment and re-engagement are both falling and that the Government have not been able to arrest the decline in recruiting which has taken place. I am glad to hear that an inquiry is to be held, but what is the inquiry to do? What purpose will it fulfil? What sort of questions will it ask, and how will it get its information? We have had a number of inquiries into the subject—almost as many inquiries as we have had recruits—but what will the new inquiry do that has not previously been done? The First Lord should not allow himself to be fobbed off by another inquiry into believing that the problem cannot be solved until it has reported and that his obligation is removed until we have had some sort of report from a committee of this sort.
I was disappointed yesterday when the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary replied to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) that it is not possible at present to introduce legislation to amend the Naval Discipline Act. Why is this so? Another inquiry was held into the subject years ago. When I was at the Admiralty in 1950, I was the chairman of a sub-committee which went through the whole of that Committee's report and started to draft legislation for early preparation and placing before the House four years ago. Why is it not possible now to produce a Bill of this sort? It is not as though the time of the House is very heavily occupied with a great mass of other legislation. We are dissatisfied with the answer given by the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, and we hope he will tell us why it is not yet possible to produce such legislation.
We must have time to consider what is proposed in the case of the officer struc-

ture, but a number of anxieties have been expressed. The General Secretary of the Society of Civil Servants has been in touch with me about the matter. He says that his organisation and members are disturbed about the possibility that the splitting of the list may mean that naval officers will be taking over a number of posts which have hitherto been reserved for civilians. He points out that the promotion of naval officers is accelerated in their early days because they are retired at a comparatively early age in order to keep open a clear channel of advancement, and if this is so and they then switch sideways to take over civilian posts against civil servants who themselves come up fairly slowly because they have a long career, there will be some feelings of disquiet among the membership of this organisation. I should like the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to tell us whether it is the intention that the division of the officer structure will result in some Civil Service posts which would normally be regarded as Civil Service careers being taken over by naval officers.
I now want to say a word about the Corps of Royal Naval Constructors. The Corps is not happy, and it has not been happy for a number of years. These are the men who design and build the ships and the equipment. Until we have seen the details of the officer structure, we cannot tell how they have been fitted into the new set-up, but I put it to the First Lord that there is a very strong case in the opinion of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors for integrating them with the electricians and engineers in some form or another and seeing whether it is possible to remove the great feelings of frustration from which these 200 men are suffering. I know of it because I served during the war with some of them who have since become personal friends of mine. I assure the First Lord that it is a matter which is well worth while looking into.
I wonder whether the House would pardon a digression for a moment if I comment on the publication which was put out by the Admiralty during the year on the prospects of escape from submarines. I am sorry that it did not receive more publicity at the time, but I think that this is an appropriate moment to bring it to the notice of the House because, thank goodness, we have not had


such a disaster for some time. Anyone who has been at the Admiralty during such a tragic occurrence knows the intensity with which the public, the relatives and those who are working cling to hope of survival up to, and, indeed, beyond, the moment when such survival is possible. The facts which were brought out by the First Lord's inquiry and were published ought to be given some publicity.
There are certain definite and particular restricted limits to the chances of survival of any submariner. He understands them, and the public should understand them. I gather from what was issued that if men are trapped at a depth no more than the length of the submarine itself, and if conditions are ideal for both their escape and their rescue, their chances of survival are still no better than even. The history of the last 30 years shows that in the chapter of accidents that we have had the chances of survival have been no better than one in 10.
I think that these facts should be made known and should be appreciated. They are well known in the Service; they are understood and the risk is taken by those in the Service. The First Lord and those who surround him who have to take responsibility when one of these accidents happen should have an informed public opinion behind them as to what it is possible and what it is not possible to do on these occasions.
I should now like to turn to the future and make some comments briefly upon the rôle of the Royal Navy in the age of thermo-nuclear weapons. I have said before, and I repeat, that the Navy has no right to exist merely because it has always been there.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear.

Mr. Callaghan: I am glad that I have said at least one thing which finds favour with my hon. Friend.
The Navy has a right to exist only if it can show that it is serving a useful and continuous purpose. The first purpose that any Navy must serve if it is to survive is to show that it is in a position to protect the merchant ships that come to and go from these islands. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) referred yesterday to the £50 million to £80 million worth of

supplies that we import. I quite understand that if the view is taken that in the thermo-nuclear age any war will be over for this country in 36 hours, then clearly the Navy has little case for any claim upon the nation's resources for that purpose.

Mr. Walter Edwards: Nor has the Army.

Mr. Callaghan: As my hon. Friend says, nor has the Army. Indeed, the absolutists would say that one should rely on the thermo-nuclear weapon and that the other Services should disappear. I am not an absolutist in this, nor do I see how any Government can be absolutists in these matters. It would be imprudent so to be. So the Government must devote some resources to the weapons that will properly safeguard our merchant ships as they sail to and from these islands in any period of hostilities; they could not plan on any other basis.
The second rôle that the Navy has is as a deterrent. There the case would rest on whether the Navy could show that it could provide a launching platform sufficiently mobile and economical in comparison with what the other Services could provide. That would form a deterrent on which the Government could properly spend money. That is the job the Navy has to do and the case it has to make out, if it is to have any chance of securing long-term support from the public and the taxpayer.
I am bound to say that I thought that the First Lord had been stampeded into the completion of the Tiger Class cruisers. I am completely opposed to what he is now doing. Pressure has been brought to bear upon him by a number of retired officers in debates in another place from both sides, as I well know.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: And by my predecessors.

Mr. Callaghan: I readily accept all that, but if I may say so, this pressure was brought to bear at a time when neither he nor the Government had produced their conception of what thermonuclear warfare would be like.
He tells us that the cost of completing these cruisers will be £18 million. Will he have a bet on that? If he keeps to £18 million, it will be the first time in the history of the Third Sea Lord's Department. If he gets them for less than


£20 million, it will almost make me put a Motion of congratulation on the Order Paper, but it would not be unreasonable to assume that the cost will be £25 million when they are finished. That was the case with the Victorious, as I know to my cost.

Mr. Wigg: And the taxpayers' cost.

Mr. Callaghan: My hon. Friend is in very formidable mood this afternoon—and the taxpayers' cost.
The First Sea Lord is building ships that will be obsolete when they are completed, and it is a waste of money that he should do so. These ships were laid down in I941 to 1942. Work was suspended on them as soon as the war was over. The first one cannot begin its sea trials until 1959,or will it be 1960? But the First Lord has told us that he hopes to have a ship-to-air guided missile in 1957–58. If those two facts are put alongside each other and alongside the Prime Minister's statement that in his view a major war is unlikely to come within a period of three or four years, then I say that the First Lord of the Admiralty has made a gross miscalculation.
The right hon. Gentleman ought to have saved his money. If he had wanted to spend it on anything, he should have advanced some of the guided missile ships about which he has been speaking this afternoon. As far as I know, he has only one in mind, the Girdleness, a maintenance ship which has been converted. The United States Navy has already converted to experimental guided missile ships a battleship, an aircraft carrier, three cruisers and submarines. So why now complete the three Tiger Class cruisers as conventional ships?
It is not too late. Let the First Lord think about this again and see whether he ought not to alter his programme and stop the expenditure on these ships, even though they can be equipped with the latest guns of which Whale Island and everybody else is capable. By the same token, I take grave exception to the refitting of the Vanguard. If she is to be refitted, it should be as an experimental guided missile ship. There is no case for anything else. This year the Government are asking the House to commit itself to the expenditure of some £55 million on new shipbuilding. I wonder how much of that expenditure will be replaced.
I come to the question of Commonwealth defence. I very much regret that the Australian Government changed the pattern of their defence a year ago without prior consultation with Her Majesty's Government. I should have thought that such consultation should have taken place and that the First Lord would have tried to be present, or at any rate represented, when a major change on naval policy was undertaken by a Commonwealth Government, because we still take the lead in this.
I want to put these particular points to him. If it is the case that the Commonwealth countries are drawing away, this is the worst moment in our history for it to happen. I want to make these suggestions to him. At the moment our Fleet and reserve ships are clustered in our crowded harbours and anchorages exposed to the full force of the hydrogen bomb. Would it not be sensible—I would have regarded this as valid if it had been contained in the proposals—to establish major bases in Australia, in New Zealand, in Canada, bases that could be supported by the migration of skilled fitters and tradesmen from this country?
That would give support to our heavy aircraft carriers and other major units over there. In advance of that, I see no reason why, as I have said earlier, part of the reserve fleet, the smaller ships, should not be out there already. I suggest to the First Lord that he ought to take up this matter. If I may comment on one particular hangover, it is the almost incredible proposal contained in paragraph 105 that there is to be an extension of the Royal Dockyards.
Apparently they are going to take over more land and tear down houses in Portsmouth and, for all I know, in Chatham and Devonport to make the Royal Dockyards bigger. That is absolute foolishness, and the First Lord should devote his energies to establishing these resources in other parts of the Commonwealth. Not only would he have a greater degree of safety, but it would arouse in the Commonwealth an interest in the essential lines of communication that bind us together—if there is any survival.

Commander C. E. M. Donaldson: The hon. Member must know that there is a great awareness in Canada about these matters. That interest is already there and the dockyards are there and the facilities are


there, and I hope that he keeps that in mind before he adduces this argument too far and causes some hair-raising by hon. Members in the Canadian Parliament.

Mr. James Hudson: May I ask if my hon. Friend will include among the proposals he is listing as requiring serious consideration that, alongside the emigration of trained personnel for the purposes he has mentioned, there may also be the emigration of the whole of the civilian population in the towns concerned?

Mr. Callaghan: I doubt if that could legitimately be placed upon the Navy Vote——

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Why not; they are taken by ship?

Mr. Callaghan: My hon. Friend says that they are taken by ship, but is he not a little out of date? At the present time most movements are made by air craft——

Mr. Silverman: Mr. Silverman rose——

Mr. Callaghan: No, I cannot give way to my hon. Friend——

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: I hope that my hon. Friend will not be encouraged to put it on the Air Force Vote.

Mr. Callaghan: I have yet to deal with the last intervention but three, and I wish to say that if I seemed to be going too far in that matter, the intervention of the hon. and gallant Member for Roxburgh and Selkirk (Commander Donaldson) corrected me. I think that there is a case for the Commonwealth countries taking a far closer and greater interest in these matters than I have seen exhibited in some directions hitherto.
My hon. Friend will be glad to hear that I come now to my last point. I think the time is overdue for reviewing the relationship between the Services, and particularly between the Navy and the Royal Air Force. Nothing which has occurred in the last 12 months has led me to change my mind about that. The rôle of the aircraft carrier is being increasingly challenged. Some people try to smooth it over, and I am quite sure that everyone works harmoniously together inside the Ministry of Defence.

But the Minister of Defence cannot prevent the discussion of these matters. Such discussions are going on, and an answer must be given. That is why I took it upon myself to bring the matter to the attention of the House last year. Since then there are those who feel that in a few years' time the Royal Air Force itself is likely to become obsolete; that the piloted bomber will give way to the inter-continental ballistic missile, and the piloted fighter will give way to the guided missile.
I am not pronouncing on any of these matters, but I say that the time has come to consider whether there should not be some rearrangement of the functions of these Services; more fusion between them in due course, starting at the top level, in order to get the maximum economy for the nation and a proper strategic approach to these problems. If I may say so, I was impressed and delighted by the maiden speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett). I am quite certain that the experience of the hon. and gallant Gentleman at the Admiralty must have led him to some of these conclusions.
I think that a strong case has been made out against the aircraft carrier, but I do not believe that a final case has been made out. To those who do so believe, I would say, as the First Lord said in other words, how can it be that a mobile launching platform may be more vulnerable than a fixed runway? I have never quite understood that. I appreciate that it may disappear rather quickly and that its replacement may be expensive, but it has to be found. Even with modern resources in electronics no one should make a fetish of the aircraft carrier, as twenty years ago we made a fetish of the battleship. If take-off planes become an accomplished fact, merchant ships may well be defending themselves within the next two decades. I hope, therefore, that the aircraft carrier will not become, for those on either side of this controversy, a symbol which has to be defended to the last man. It would be ridiculous were that to happen.
I wish to say a word about something which is not strictly on the subjects which I have been discussing. The more I study these problems and live with them—not in such great detail as does the First Lord—the more certain I become that the


only secure pathway for Britain is to peace. We cannot boast of our strength. We have no secure base from which to operate. The imagination recoils at the horror of another war. But that does not relieve us of our duty to examine these Estimates as conscientiously as we can and from doing our duty by them. That is what I have tried to do this afternoon.
I know that if we embark upon another war. what we are discussing this afternoon cannot save the civilian population of this country, and that fact should be constantly in the forefront of our minds. In the long run, arms cannot save us. The most pressing task, the most noble work and the highest statesmanship for Britain is for peace.

4.56 p.m.

Captain J. A. L. Duncan: The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) is always an attractive speaker, and today, when discussing transport at sea, he was even more attractive than on the occasions when he discusses transport on land. I agree with some of the things he said and disagree with others.
I venture into these somewhat uncharted waters of the Navy Estimates for the first time in my Parliamentary career, for various reasons. The first is that on Saturday I celebrate the 30th anniversary of my entry into public life, and I thought it a suitable opportunity to make a speech on a subject of intense interest, not only to myself but to everyone in the nation. The second reason is the appalling situation which I visualise as the result of reading the Defence White Paper.
For the first time this country is committed to producing the hydrogen bomb and to use an atomic counter-offensive, even though the offensive against us may be on conventional lines. Thirty years ago, these things did not happen. This year for the first time this great event of terrific moment to the nation has occurred, and we have to face that situation, on land, in the air, and on the sea.
I recognise that in the preparations against this terrific menace we must have a system of priority. I agree with what is stated in the Defence White Paper, that the Royal Air Force is to have first priority. But I am a little disturbed at one statement:

Some provision, though on a lower priority, must therefore be made for continuing operations after the initial phase, particularly at sea.
I take the view that there should be high priority for the conditions envisaged, particularly at sea, and I wish to develop that point. In a hydrogen bomb war we should have about two hours to counter-attack, or we are completely sunk.
If, for some reason or other, we fail to achieve a trenchant counter-offensive within that very limited period of time we shall be completely finished. Even if we are ready to defend ourselves and the defence is effective, the attack may nevertheless be sufficient to put out of action our defences. On Tuesday my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister dealt with the question of building up the deterrent against attack, but if that deterrent itself is washed out the counter-offensive cannot take place. It is that frightfully important period, which may be minutes or hours, which I want to stress this afternoon.
The present basis of Her Majesty's Government's policy is to prepare the deterrent from fixed bases, but if those fixed bases are all knocked out the whole of the deterrent goes. My plea, in asking for higher priority for the Navy, is that some of the deterrent should be at sea.

Mr. S. Silverman: All at sea.

Captain Duncan: The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East talked about the aircraft carrier. I believe that, at the moment, it is the only vehicle upon which the war can be carried on, the counter-offensive delivered, and with which we can continue to fight. I agree that in five or 10 years' time there may be some other vehicle from which to deliver the attack, but at the moment the aircraft carrier, especially the heavy type, is the only vehicle from which a hydrogen bomb attack can be kept up.

Mr. R. T. Paget: What makes the hon. and gallant Gentleman think that there is an aircraft today which can take off from an aircraft carrier and is also capable of carrying a hydrogen bomb? Neither the Americans nor ourselves claim to possess one or to have seen one.

Captain Duncan: The hon. and learned Gentleman anticipates what I am about


to say. If he will exercise a little patience he will get an answer. I want to make out a case for the aircraft carrier because there are many people who do not believe in it.
A group of aircraft carriers at sea has unobstructed radar vision. The location of the base of the counter-attack is mobile, unpredictable and secure. Aircraft carriers may seem big when they are in port, but they are jolly difficult to find in the wide oceans and, being mobile, they are almost secure from guided missiles fired from fixed sites. It is true that one aircraft carrier may be hit, but provided a battle group—to which the First Lord referred in his Explanatory Statement—is at sea I think the group would be fairly safe. It would not be worth the enemy's while to drop a hydrogen bomb in order to wipe out one carrier.
Individual ships could defend themselves quite well without being found by bombers. It is probable that an aircraft carrier, especially if covered by suitable supporting craft, can defend itself from bombing. Against guided missiles. Such a ship would be almost wholly invulnerable.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: The hon. and gallant Member he said that the aircraft carrier could defend itself from bombers. How does an aircraft carrier in bad weather and at night defend itself from a bomber flying at between 30,000 and 40,000 ft.?

Captain Duncan: The bomber has to find the aircraft carrier.

Mr. Shackleton: It has radar.

Captain Duncan: I hope that the hon. Gentleman, who is an air enthusiast, has had experience of trying to find a small ship in a big ocean.
I am glad that the Explanatory Statement of the Admiralty says that in the Eagle and the Ark Royal we are fulfilling our responsibilities to N.A.T.O. I realise that they are the sort of ship which we want for this purpose. I am also glad to know that a third ship, the Victorious, is also capable of doing it. I should, however, like the First Lord to examine the question whether we should not do something about modernising the other four heavy aircraft carriers, so as to be ready in case of need.
I now turn to the aircraft, because aircraft carriers are no good without them. I am glad to know that the Gannet, the Sea Hawk and the Sea Venom are coming into squadron service, and the Navy is anxiously awaiting delivery of the DH.110 and also want to know more about the N.113. There has been a certain amount of trouble with these interim aircraft, and I agree that they are not wholly satisfactory. We must hope that these two new aircraft, which are to replace the Sea Hawk and Sea Venom, will prove as satisfactory as the First Lord has said. As for the Wyvern, may I quote again from the Statement on Defence,
up to date it has not proved successful for its designed purpose as a carrier-borne aircraft, but work is still proceeding with a view to remedying its defects.
From what I hear, the Wyvern is nothing but a headache, and always has been. Whether it can be made a success is still a matter of doubt. Until we get strike aircraft which are really good the argument that I have been addressing to the House is ineffective. I want to stress most particularly the absolute necessity of getting strike aircraft capable of carrying the atom bomb.
I now turn to the question of bombs. I do not know the weight of an atom bomb, nor the weight of a hydrogen bomb. On Tuesday the Prime Minister knocked the sides of the Dispatch Box and appeared to imply that a hydrogen bomb could be contained within it.

Hon. Members: No.

Mr. S. Silverman: The Prime Minister said plutonium.

Captain Duncan: From such information as I glean, the hydrogen bomb can be very big.
If we develop a counter-offensive from the sea we should make bombs that aircraft can carry. We have a chance of getting ahead of the Americans here. Every explosion I have read of in America or in the Pacific has been from a fixed point on the ground. It looks as if the Americans have not produced a bomb that can be dropped from an aeroplane. Let us concentrate on an atom or hydrogen bomb which we could drop from an aircraft.
When the time comes for the guided missile to be the answer to attack, not only must the warhead be small enough


to be delivered from a platform, whether this is an aircraft or a cruiser, but it must have a range of at least 1,500 miles. It is clear, looking at the future, that the Navy will have a great task. Not only has it the duty in peace of policing the seas but it will have the duty in war, when the air bases have been knocked out, of feeding our people through the beaches and of continuing the counter-offensive in order to keep Britain alive.

5.13 p.m.

Mr. John Dugdale: I wish to make two propositions, with the first of which everybody will agree, while the second will not find quite so much agreement.
First, I will repeat what the First Lord of the Admiralty has said, as I think that it is necessary to say it again. The Navy still has a vital rôle to play. That may seem a stupid and trite observation, but many people, not so much inside this House but outside, are anxious to show that the Navy has no vital rôle to play and no reason for existence. It is, they say, obsolete and should be thrown away.
We have heard what may happen during the time after an atom or hydrogen bomb has been dropped. It is said that the whole country, or a very large section of it, will be instantly destroyed. If that is so, and the bomb is dropped there may be no use for an Army or Navy, and the pacifist view may well be correct. For those who do not hold the pacifist view, and who believe that something can be done in spite of the hydrogen bomb, the Navy has just as vital a rôle to play as the Army. There might even be a greater place for a Navy than for an Army, if one had to choose between them.
What reasons are advanced by those who would scrap the Navy? The first is that the United States Navy is very large, and is capable of doing all the work. The same could be said about the United States Army and Air Force, although that is not said by the people who use the argument which I am examining. It would be mean and contemptible for us to rely entirely upon the United States Navy. We would have no right to say to the Americans that we do not always agree with their foreign policy. If the Americans were to bear the whole brunt and do the entire work of both navies, we should have much less right to speak in defence of what we think is the right foreign policy.
The second argument is that the R.A.F. will do the job. I do not intend to follow the argument of the hon. and gallant Member for South Angus (Captain Duncan) about the delivery of atom and hydrogen bombs, but to say something about what I think still to be the main duty of the Navy—the guarding of convoys. Here I speak with great diffidence, because I have not the necessary naval experience, and I should like to get confirmation from others who have.
Convoys are liable to attack from bombers and submarines. Let me deal first with the submarines. It is all very well to say that we can just drop a hydrogen or an atom bomb on top of a submarine. Obviously the vessel has to be located, and the bomb should not also destroy the convoy that is in the neighbourhood of the submarine. We cannot throw a large bomb into the middle of the sea and hope for the best. I understand that bombers have great difficulty in locating a submarine. They can do so when it is on the surface but not when it is below water. They have to depend on ships to locate the submarine. I do not know whether coordination is possible between ships and bombers by which the latter can be led on to the submarine, but I think it is doubtful. The depth charge is a very much more suitable weapon against the submarine than any which a bomber could produce.
What about the enemy bombers who will attack the convoys? Can they be dealt with by fighters? A shore based fighter would find itself in considerable difficulty. Here I speak subject to correction, but I understand that a fighter needs to be directed on to a target by someone on the "ground" within 100 or 200 miles. That rules out any possibility of using fighter bases in this country or in America for the protection of ships in the middle of the Atlantic. Shore based fighters can only protect convoys if these are reasonably near the shore. It is clearly necessary that convoys should be protected, and if this work cannot be done by the R.A.F. it should continue to be done by the carrier-borne fighters.
I now come to the second proposition which will not command so much agreement. It concerns the kind of Royal Navy which the First Lord appears to intend to give us—a kind of Navy not


capable of doing this work. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) has referred to what he called the First Lord's "prospectus." I should be in some difficulties with the Chair if I were to express in what I should deem adequate words what I think of that prospectus. Companies sometimes get into trouble for issuing prospectuses of a certain character which they cannot live up to. I think that that is the position in which the First Lord may be today.

Mr. S. Silverman: And the Prime Minister yesterday.

Mr. Dugdale: And the Prime Minister yesterday, indeed, as my hon. Friend says.
So I shall not use my own wording but the wording of "The Times" newspaper, which, in an article on Japan's navy, said:
The Navy Estimates themselves reflect a more modest prospect for the British Fleet than the accompanying glowing forecast by the First Lord of the new and 'revolutionary' vessels which, in time, are to replace the old. In the immediate future the Navy will still be mainly marking time.
That, I think, presents the position quite accurately. The Navy will be marking time and will not be able to engage in those wonderful operations that the First Lord would have us believe it will.
The First Lord has had a dream, a beautiful dream. He has dreamed of a wonderful Navy which he sees in the future. He has great imagination, as well as charm of manner, in describing this beautiful Navy that is to be developed. It seems, however, to have very little relation to reality. Where, for instance, are all these ships armed with guided missiles, ships incorporating all the latest developments, the ships we heard about in his statement?
I understand that the American Navy has such ships—at any rate, one ship— like that, and we have the statement by the United States Admiral Carney that
You should see what happens to an approaching aircraft when the modern surface-to-air guided missile sallies forth to extend its greetings.
It may be that the Americans can see what happens, but I fear we cannot see what happens because we have no such ship with any such guided missile to sally forth to give its greetings. It is for the First Lord to supply such a ship before

he can expect us to have confidence in his Estimates.
The First Lord has been extremely fortunate. Owing to his skill, diplomacy, and charm, he has managed to get from the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Minister of Defence a greater sum of money than many people expected he would. I shall not complain about that, because in the past I have said that whatever the slice may be, the Navy should have a reasonable share of it. All I would say is that the Navy, having got this large slice, is apparently not going to use it properly. What can it do with it? The obvious thing to do is to build those ships which the First Lord has talked about.
What is he going to do? As far as I can understand, he is going to carry on with the old Navy much as it was. The First Lord frowns, but if he is to spend a larger sum of money on building he can do so only by reducing the sum of money he spends on something else, and that something else, above all, is manpower. If the First Lord wants to use this money for building all the ships which he ought to have, and which we think he ought to have, he must have fewer men in the Navy while that rebuilding process is taking place. He cannot have at once a large manpower and enormous expenditure on rebuilding.
The Army—and here again the First Lord has an advantage which he has not used—has a big rôle in the cold war. The Army is occupied today in Malaya, Kenya, and other places. The Navy is not nearly so much occupied in the cold war as the Army is. It is true that it fulfilled an important part in the Korean campaign; and it has a certain amount of operational work to do. Of course it has, but it is not occupied to such an extent as the Army is in the cold war. It, therefore, has more opportunity to reduce its immediate work, and to concentrate on the provision of an adequate Fleet for the future.
What sort of Fleet shall we have, judging from the Estimates? According to Vote 8, £200 million is to be spent on the re-equipment and modernisation of the Fleet. The only sign in the Vote that I can see of anything towards making a great modern Fleet is one guided weapon ship to be delivered at some time. When, I do not know. For the


present, for this great expenditure of £200 million under Vote 8, we appear to have remarkably little to show.
We have to choose between two things, and the First Lord has, I fear, made the wrong choice. We have to choose between a small, compact modern fleet and the larger, and now old-fashioned, sort of Navy we had in the past. We are not a rich Power in the sense that the United States is. We cannot produce the large fleets which we used to have. We have, therefore, to build a small, compact Fleet, efficient, up-to-date, well equipped with all the latest weapons.
It looks as if, instead of that, we are to have a large, ill-equipped, and out-of-date fleet. I hope that the First Lord will think again, and will provide us with a small Fleet in peace time capable of expansion in war, with much of it in reserve. I hope he will do that rather than provide us with a large and un-wieldy Fleet, but I fear that we shall have the second alternative, and that at the end of the First Lord's tenure of office he will leave us, not with a better Fleet than we had, not with the modern, up-to-date Fleet that we hope to have, but with a Fleet which will be old, out-of-date, and incapable of the uses to which it should be put.

5.27 p.m.

Mr. F. A. Burden: There was a great deal in what the right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) said with which I found myself in complete agreement. There was quite a bit with which I heartily disagreed. I think that many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite find themselves in their present difficulties because they do not understand that the estimates for the programme of naval expansion must be based on what is considered to be the time of danger.
There is no doubt that we are now entering what may be termed the transition period of naval weapons. It is an extremely difficult period. If hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite would think a little on the subject they would not envy the Chiefs of Staff or my right hon. Friend the job of deciding the exact time when to go ahead with the production of weapons on a large scale, for that decision involves producing weapons at that stage of development to which they

have been brought by that time, and there are always criticisms.
The party opposite is in a very difficult position, because during the defence debate the hon. Member for Ashton (Mr. Wyatt) said that he considered that the Navy was as dead as Nelson. I was very interested to see him in his place today. I hope that he will now agree, having listened to his hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), that the Navy has a very important part to play in the future.
It is a policy of despair that is advocated when hon. and right hon. Gentlemen, no matter where they may sit, say that there is no future for the Navy. Nothing that I have heard or seen sustains the statement that the Navy has no rôle to play, and that we should abolish the Senior Service. As far as I can see, the Navy will have as important a part to play in any foreseeable war as any which it has played in our past history. I believe indeed that just as our very life depended on the activities of the Navy in the last war, so far as we can see now our existence will continue to depend on the efficiency of the Royal Navy in the years to come.
I believe that we must have a Navy of such strength that its concentrated strength is capable of destroying in battle-any enemy who seeks to dispute our control of sea communications, and with such dispersed strength as is necessary for the control of those communications: which bring us our food and keep us-in contact with the outside world. The Royal Navy has a variety of duties, and many of these duties continue whether we are engaged in a major war or not. In peaceful conditions during fairly recent months, the Navy has brought succour and comfort in a series of disasters, has brought assistance where suffering has occurred in the Ionian Islands and in Crete, and has extended the influence of this country.
There are, however, occasions when there are local disturbances which might well grow into much more serious affairs, but when conditions may rapidly improve on the appearance of a British cruiser or destroyer. Who would deny that the support of the British Navy in Korea and in Malaya was of great benefit, not only to our own land forces, but to the Commonwealth land forces and those of the N.A.T.O. Powers?
These events, of course, take place under conditions which are not those of major war, and I submit that no consideration of our naval problem is valid unless the probable major enemy is considered. If we are to reach the peak of preparedness at the right time, it is essential not only that we should consider who the major enemy is likely to be, but also that we should know when and where that enemy is likely to strike, so that we may be fully prepared at the moment of danger. I believe that if we act on that assumption, our naval forces will not only be a great deterrent, but will ensure our survival if the worst should happen.
The Prime Minister has information that is denied to practically every other hon. Member of this House, and certainly to those of us who are not in the Cabinet, and he has said, no doubt on the most reliable intelligence, that there is no danger of war with Russia within the next three years; and that, until then, the deterrent power of the hydrogen bomb in the hands of the Allies alone is such that the Russians would not go to war.
I do not think that, even if the Russians possess the hydrogen bomb in three years' time, that necessarily means the end of the usefulness of the Royal Navy. I do not think that it is inevitable that the hydrogen bomb will be used. I like to think that, because of the very horror of the weapon when it is in the hands of both sides, the sanity of statesmen will prevail. A similar situation arose over the diabolical use of poison gas in the last war. When it was realised that the retaliation would be dreadful, gas was not used. If we accept that, I would suggest that we cannot but face firmly the fact that the Navy is absolutely vital to the future of this country.

Mr. Shackleton: Does the hon. Gentleman consider the hydrogen bomb and poison gas to be fairly similar in nature?

Mr. Burden: I do not think they are similar in nature at all, but I think that the revulsion from the fact that they can be used with such diabolical effect would be a deterrent. I believe that the fact that gas is so diabolical a weapon, which inflicted tremendous casualties in the First World War, to say nothing of the gases that have been subsequently developed and would certainly be more dreadful in

execution if used, are facts which act as a deterrent if nations actually possess these things.
I submit, therefore, that until there is general disarmament, which surely must be the aim and constant endeavour of any Government of this country, the Navy, equipped with what may be termed the traditional weapons, though with the great advances which scientific development has brought, is still essential to our country. I believe that a strong and well-equipped Navy is absolutely indispensable' to our security, but the Navy must be capable of effecting its traditional tasks, and I believe that those tasks will still; remain very largely traditional. They must enable us to remain at sea; to impose our will upon the enemy, deny him the use of the sea, and safeguard our own communications.
It is true that, if engaged in a major war, we should have the assistance and support of the United States Navy, but here I join with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for West Bromwich in saying that I believe it would be unwise for us to depend or rely upon' the United. States Navy carrying out the duties which. I believe we should carry out ourselves, This is no disparagement of the United States or of its Navy.
I believe, however, that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that a powerful British Navy, as befits a free sovereign Power and leader of a. great Commonwealth, with all its maritime commitments, is available to us in peace and in war. We must plan our future Navy so that it is capable of engaging an enemy wherever he might be and in whatever force he may be able to bring against us.
The Russians have a powerful fleet, They are building a still more powerful fleet, and that, I submit, is the best possible argument that could be given to those hon. and right hon. Gentleman in this House and to others outside who say that the end of the Royal Navy is in sight, or that the Navy is no longer useful and necessary. The Russians obviously do not think so, for they are building a, still greater one.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, in the debate last year, referred to the Russian Navy and its potential strength. He said, and we all know it, that the "Sverdlov," which many of us saw at


Spithead, was a magnificent cruiser, and he said that these cruisers of between 13,000 and 17,000 tons are the equivalent of most of the United States heavy cruisers, and that they are building eight more. How many are the Russians likely to have in four years' time, when it is felt that the danger may be acute?
We are told, or at least I have gathered, that the Russians have about 300 submarines, and we know that, at the end of the last war, the Germans were developing entirely new methods of propulsion for completely submersible submarines which give them a speed of 20 knots under water. We must assume that when the Russians went into Germany, they took over or extracted from the German Admiralty and the submarine building yards much of the information that was available to the Germans.
I think we must assume that many of the Russian submarines are capable of a speed under water of 20 knots. We must accept the fact that they will be able, because of their construction, to proceed to their battle areas undetected. I think we must accept the possibility that they might carry out prolonged operations entirely unsupported, in oceans which are very largely under our control. They are likely to be far more difficult to detect and far more effective than any submarines which we had to combat in the last war, and they will certainly be used against our warships, to attack our convoys, and for mine laying.
I believe that the pattern of likely Russian naval strategy is fairly clear. I think that the heavy cruisers of the "Sverdlov" class will be used for raiding purposes and that their submarines will conform to the general strategy which was employed in the last war but, because of their greater performance, they are likely to be more difficult to combat, and far more dangerous.
In addition, I think we must assume, for the sake of argument, that the Russian Fleet, because of its power, might in certain circumstances put to sea in force, but we are told that the Russians have no carriers. We know that they have 4,000 land-based naval aircraft. This lack of carriers, I submit, confines the Russians to an area of operation where they have the umbrella of Russian naval shore-based aircraft, and in my view that makes it

extremely unlikely that a naval battle on that basis would ever develop, because we are unlikely ever to engage such a force unless we have air power equivalent to or greater than any which could cover the Russian Fleet.
We therefore arrive again at the basis of cruisers acting as raiders and of mainly submarine attacks. I believe that in the case of combating the surface raider air will play an absolutely vital part. It played such a part in the last war. It was aircraft, whether land-based or carrier-borne, which sought out the enemy raiders, crippled them with their torpedo and bombing attacks, and enabled the surface vessels to come up and finish the job.
Of one thing I am convinced—that air power will play a vital part in our future naval strategy. Sometimes there will be shore-based cover but at others, if we are to have the control of the sea which is vital to an island people, that air cover can operate only if it can operate from carriers. That, I believe, will be the general position for some time to come, but I do not go as far as some of my hon. Friends or as far as the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East in saying that the R.A.F. should be entirely integrated with the Navy. I think the Army would have a lot to say about that, and certainly the R.A.F. would have a lot to say about it.
When we argue that the R.A.F. should be permanently tied to one Service we are inclined to destroy that which I believe is elementary to the successful operation of the R.A.F.—target priority. I believe that if we tied it to one Service we might well do a lot to destroy the overall effectiveness of the R.A.F.
There may well come a time, however, when the aircraft carrier will be replaced by the guided missile, but I would remind the House that it was only last year that my right hon. Friend the First Lord, speaking from the Dispatch Box, said:
It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that guided weapons will be in general service at sea … Air defence by carrier-borne fighters and by guns still remains essential for some years to come."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 9th March, 1954; Vol. 524, c. 1953.]
It is true that we are developing the ship-to-air guided missile. It is fairly certain that that will come into operation before very long, and that, I submit, is


the answer to the point made by the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) that it would be impossible for ships at sea to combat bombers flying at 40,000 feet at night. I suggest that the answer is the ship-to-air guided missile, which is now in the process of development.

Mr. Shackleton: Not today—in 1960.

Mr. Burden: But modern naval aircraft, if they are to be flown from aircraft carriers, demand great development in aircraft carriers. Speed, landing speed, and the difficulties of take-off and landing are such that they can operate only from the bigger carriers, and I believe that we must accept that, as long as it is essential for us to have carrier-borne aircraft, we must have effective and efficient aircraft; and if that involves heavy expenditure on aircraft carriers, I believe that the nation must face it.
I am a little worried about the position regarding the smaller escort vessels because of the speed which we are likely to encounter in many of the new submarines. It is evident that many of the old frigates and the former escort vessels of the last war are not good enough for the war of tomorrow or that of four years ahead. If they are to be effective in repelling attacks from submarines which can travel at 20 knots under water, then the surface vessels— destroyers, escort vessels, and frigates— must have at least a speed comparable to that of the submarines which they are likely to encounter. We are informed that the "Daring" class has been a great success, and I hope we shall have many more ships of that class.
My final words are about the other sphere of attack which we are likely to encounter—that is, by mines. I do not think we should underestimate the danger of enemy mine-laying. Nor should we underestimate—and I am sure that the Admiralty does not—the complications of modern sweeping. I see from the White Paper that we have 165 mine sweepers, and I hope that many of them are not of the category of the converted fishing vessels which we had at the beginning of the last war, because they would be quite incapable of carrying out the obligations of modern sweeping and effectively keeping the seas swept in a future war.
This period of transition is a difficult period. I hope that when they are assessing what my right hon. Friend is doing at the Admiralty and what the Admiralty is doing, hon. Members opposite will realise that it is essential to assess when the danger is likely to be greatest and where it is likely to be greatest; and that at that time and place our greatest effectiveness should be reached. I am convinced that the Admiralty can produce the weapons, and of one other point I am also certain: although the hon. Member for Astonmay say that the Navy is as dead as Nelson, I am quite sure that the Nelson tradition still lives in the personnel of Her Majesty's Navy.

5.49 p.m.

Mr. A. G. Bottomley: It affords me great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden), for we both have the privilege of sitting in Parliament as Members for the Medway towns.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) started by congratulating the First Lord and I, too, should like to pay my tribute to his courtesy and charm. I want also to take this opportunity of congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East on his most excellent, well-delivered speech. It was supported, as we know, by great experience both in administration and in operational service.
Later, we shall have a contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. W. Edwards), who has not only had great administrative experience but was also the first Civil Lord to come from the lower deck. I think that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East, are a formidable combination, and that I speak for many people in the country when I say there are many regrets that they are not in charge for the Admiralty on this occasion. Indeed, I go so far as to say that that view, I think, is shared even by the members of the Board of Admiralty. They like serving able men.
Not that I want to go on record as supporting that august body. I take the view that the Board of Admiralty is not in keeping with our usual democratic Parliamentary procedure, and I say that for this reason: I do not think any elected representative of the people should sit in a junior position to paid servants of


the Crown, for it savours to me more of a Soviet system than a Parliamentary democracy.
My justification for intervening in the debate is that I sit for a dockyard constituency, and I claim—and I am sure I am supported—that the dockyards are just as important as all the other naval matters we have been discussing today. I want to pay tribute to the men in the dockyards. Of late there has been some criticism because of even suspected sabotage, but in each case where that fear has arisen investigation has shown that there was no justification for it.
Yesterday I put a question to the First Lord about H.M.S. "Grenville." Some sand had been put into the port main-gearing machinery. The First Lord told us that fortunately there was no damage, and that he is investigating the matter. I recall that recently there was another case which, as the House will remember, had nothing to do with the man in the dockyard, for the trouble to the ship had been caused by somebody serving on it. I think it can be said of the dockyard workers that they follow the motto of the Borough of Chatham—they are loyal and true.
In the Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates, there is a paragraph on dockyard modernisation and extension. I am not going into the question whether extensions are necessary, but there can be no doubt at all that modernisation and re-equipment is vitally necessary, and I want to make the suggestion to the First Lord that something must be done about that.
He will, of course, ask, "Where is the money to come from?" I told him last year that, during a period when we seemed to have a sunshine economy, he should make bolder claims to contributions from the Treasury for servicing the Royal Navy; but this afternoon I can again show where he could have spent money very usefully and where he has wasted public money—I would say wilfully wasted public money.
I refer to the fact that the Royal Marines moved from Chatham five years ago, and that the barracks there have remained empty ever since. They are in a terrible condition. As a result of neglect, the cost has gone up. I understand that the original estimate was about

£135,000. It went up to £500,000. I wonder what it is now. Perhaps the First Lord can tell us. My own estimate is that it is considerably above £500,000.
I know that the First Lord will say that the barracks have now been transferred to the Army. I thought that that had been done, but shortly before the end of last year the Under-Secretary of State for War said in the House that the War Office would take over the barracks if the negotiations could be satisfactorily concluded and provided that the negotiations included a careful scrutiny of what was offered.
I know that an independent investigation is being undertaken by the Ministry of Works. I shudder to think what its report will say, but I want to know from the First Lord of the Admiralty what is to be done about the barracks. I have a hunch that the War Office is so satisfied with the site and with the service that it gets from Chatham that it is anxious to retain the barracks and might even consider rebuilding them.
In the light of the comments which have been made by the Under-Secretary of State for War, I express the view that the First Lord of the Admiralty still has the responsibility for the barracks. It is up to the righthon. Gentleman to tell the House and the constituents whom I represent why this public money has been wasted. To give satisfaction in the Medway towns, an independent investigation is required, and I go so far as to say that the town council and other local public organisations ought to be consulted as to its constitution. At any rate, Parliament should demand an inquiry because, I repeat, there has been a shameful waste of public money.
In his Explanatory Statement the First Lord of the Admiralty says that the invention of thermo-nuclear weapons, although calling for a change in strategy, does not diminish the need for navies. As the right hon. Gentleman says, to those of us who live in an island dependent upon sea-borne supplies, the need for the Navy is all the greater. That being so, the need for the Royal naval dockyards is just as great. I suggest that if we are to keep the Royal naval dockyards, they must not only be fully equipped, but there must be work for them to do.
There has been the danger that work has been drifting away from the Royal


dockyards. Chatham possesses, I think, the only ropery, the only place, where the Navy can make large cables and towing hawsers. The amount of work now going to the ropery is being continually cut down because the standard of production that is required is not as high as it used to be. That need not in itself cause undue fear, because the standards of production are up to those required by the British Standards Institution, a very authoritative and responsible body, but it shows that there has been a lowering of the standard. I claim that nothing but the best should be given to the Navy, and if the best can be made in the Royal dockyards, it ought to be made there.
On the other hand, one is entitled to say that if public money can be saved by cheaper production elsewhere, we should take advantage of it. I agree, within certain limits, remembering always that the private contractor may go out of business or may become bankrupt or find something that is much more profitable. It is essential, therefore, to have at least one ropery in the Royal dockyards, and in my opinion it should be at Chatham. If it was re-equipped, the ropery could more than compete with private contractors.
In fact, the present ropery was built in 1763,and I am told that the manufacturing dates of some of the machinery in the laying department are 1813 and 1815. How can the Royal dockyards compete with outside contractors when the Admiralty does nothing whatever to bring such establishments up to date?
Last year, I talked about apprentices. In connection with the ropery, I am told by the trade unions that no apprentices are coming forward. Consequently, this vital craftsmanship may be lost, and it is hard to replace. On the question of apprentices generally, as the First Lord will know there has been some unfortunate publicity in my constituency about their behaviour. It was quite unfounded, and was due, not to the Press, but to the retiring Admiral Superintendent, who, at a social gathering, said some unwise words about apprentices. I make a very strong suggestion that these matters concerning staff should be discussed in the Whitley Council, and not elsewhere.
After having said that, I should like to compliment the present Admiral Superintendent, who very wisely handled the

matter at once and gave me all the help that he could, with the result that one of the local papers has not only featured apprentices at work but has given the best possible write-up, which has had an admirable result in ensuring that morale is maintained and that the recruiting of apprentices is carried on.
I should like to speak again of work at the Royal dockyard. Last year, I complained about work from the Chatham Dockyard being given to outside contractors. I was able to show that the cost outside the dockyard was higher than the cost of work done in the dockyard. I should like to thank the First Lord for taking note of that and putting the matter right.
My own views were heavily fortified by the Comptroller and Auditor General who, in introducing a report and discussing shipbuilders' profits, disclosed that there were substantial differences between conversion costs in the Royal dockyards and the charges made by commercial shipbuilders. He was able to show that the ships converted by commercial shipbuilders cost as much as 50 per cent. more than those converted in the Royal naval dockyards. I hope that my observations will receive equally sympathetic consideration on this occasion. If they do, I shall have the pleasure next year of again thanking the First Lord for his action.

6.2 p.m.

Captain Robert Ryder: If I may briefly add a few words on the subject of dockyards, I should like to refer to the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). This is a subject which may seem a small matter in the broader picture. In the past we have continually troubled the Admiralty about the position of the Royal Corps. Then certain improvements were made and we have been waiting to see how they worked out. I can bear out from all the information that reaches me that the position of the Corps is most unhappy. If the Admiralty wants the Corps to continue as such it must see that something is done to put the affairs of the Corps in better shape.
Now it is our habit, in the course of this annual event, to show the Admiralty how to run its business. On this occasion,


however, I shall try to exhibit a most unwonted restraint, and adopt a slightly different tone. The Admiralty and the Navy have suffered a good deal of criticism and disparagement from one quarter or another recently, and it is about time that some of these criticisms were effectively answered. They come from all quarters, some of them well-intentioned, including people who hope that by criticising the Admiralty they will get a little more for the Navy; and some of the criticism also comes from ill-informed quarters.
If this criticism is not answered vigorously and effectively it is bound to have a serious effect on the Fleet, and it is bound to influence public opinion and so, in the long run, distort our counsels and ultimately, perhaps, our defence policy as a whole. I should like, therefore, to come straight to the point and deal with two aspects. I should like to speak first of the Admiralty in the conduct of its broad policy since the war, both under the régime of the Labour Government as well as under the present Board of Admiralty.
What has been the main feature of Admiralty policy? First, it has been to cut back the main building programme in respect of the larger ships. Surely that was wise, for it freed the shipyards to get on with merchant shipping urgently needed. Then the Admiralty has concentrated on escort vessels, and surely in view of the existence of the large submarine fleet, that was wise and sensible too. It has concentrated also on the minesweepers, which again I think is a reasonable and sensible order of priority. Finally, by finishing aircraft carriers which were under construction and modernising others it has consolidated the carrier fleet. I will refer to carriers later.
Suggestions that the Admiralty has been dithering and uncertain of what to do in its broad policy are not borne out by a study of the facts. We all have our criticisms of the Admiralty to make in one way or another, but, broadly speaking, its policy in this respect has been sound and shrewd, and time will bear this out. But inevitably, this policy has meant that the Navy would have to go through some hard, lean years, and it is not easy for a Service to see no new construction coming along and apparently a halt to development taking place.
All this was bound to have its effect upon those who are serving. It has also given an opportunity to opponents of the Navy to come forward to try to belittle the prospects of the Service, to disparage it in the eyes of the public and, generally speaking, to make out that there was no future for it at all.
We have had a very interesting speech from the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, with a great deal of which I cordially agreed, but it was a very different story from what we were told about the Navy from the Opposition Front Bench during the debate on defence. I do not want to be hostile or to make a party point, but it would be a great pity if the official policy of the party opposite were to be one of doing away with the Navy, or words to that effect. It would be unwise, because the idea that owing to the hydrogen bomb there is no need for a Navy is a thoroughly unsound proposition.
If I may offer a little advice or, perhaps I should not put it quite in that way, but if I may make a suggestion to hon. Members opposite, I would say that they should go to one of the seaport towns. Perhaps the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East could take some of his hon. Friends to his constituency, let them get up on the hustings and say, "Look, chaps. We have got the hydrogen bomb and therefore we can do away with the Royal Navy." I think they would find that it was not a vote-catching or a popular cry.
It would be a great pity for the Service if a situation developed in which one party was in favour of the Navy and the other was in favour of doing away with it, and I do not think that that really is the case. Opinion on that side of the House is probably divided, as perhaps opinion is divided on this side of the House. I should like hon. Members opposite to think that there is a future for the Navy, and I suggest to them that when they hear people say otherwise they should tell them that they are talking absolute rubbish.
Comments have been made by the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt), the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackle-ton) and my hon. Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr. Dudley Williams) which perhaps were not intended that way, but which I thought were likely to cause a certain amount of ill-feeling between the Services. I will not repeat those remarks,


but I thought that the general trend of their speeches was likely to cause offence in naval circles because they were putting forward what seemed to me to be a very partisan point of view on behalf of the Royal Air Force.
It is partly for this reason that I and some of my hon. Friends, including my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett), who made such an excellent maiden speech the other day, supported the suggestion which the lion. Member for Cardiff, South-East put forward, that it is no good approaching this matter from a partisan point of view, and that we should try to seek something which really would effect an improvement. It is rather idle to suggest that there is no ill-feeling or worries on this score. There is as is evidenced from the speeches to which I have referred.
The suggestion which we support is that an examination should be made to see if some kind of fusion could be achieved between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy. Nobody suggests that that is going to be done suddenly or even necessarily a complete fusion. It may be that some kind of compromise measure can be found, but we are saying that an examination should be made.
I would put this forward, not only for the reasons I have given, but because of some of the technical problems which are coming along. There is, for instance, the question of ground-to-air guided missiles which are now being put under the control of the Air Ministry. But what is going to happen in the case of the ship-to-air guided missiles? After all, some of the problems of the identification of distant aircraft and so on are much the same. Are we to have the Royal Air Force mounting these new "guns" of the Fleet, or are we going to have guided missiles at sea under the control of the Navy and so work contrary to the decision made on land.
It is a difficult technical problem, which would, of course, be more readily solved if there were a closer degree of fusion. When we have made this suggestion I hope that others will not go around saying that we are trying by some backhand means to nibble away somebody else's empire. That is not my intention at all.
There is one other point while I am referring to the speech made by the hon. Member for Preston, South. He referred to rumours, the accuracy of which he said he had not been able to verify, concerning the future First Sea Lord, and remarks which he was alleged to have made in Malta. Colour was lent to that by some remarks made earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Exeter. I think it would be very unfortunate if hon. Members used their privileged position here to spreadrumours calculated to undermine the confidence in these high-ranking officers who are, after all, not in a position to answer. I do not think myself that that was in the mind of hon. Members at all. They were no doubt faced with certain rumours and they wanted to get clarification.
I have made certain inquiries, and the reason why I did so was that I have served under Lord Mountbatten, and I have great confidence in him. A boastful sort of remark like that is something which is so unlike him that I decided to check it up. I am informed that there is no truth in this rumour at all. What happened, so I am informed, was that Lord Mountbatten, before leaving the Mediterranean Fleet, held a private meeting of his staff officers to discuss what points of interest there were for him to take home. The question of Coastal Command was very naturally discussed, among a great many other things. He never made the supposed remark, nor was it made by anybody else.
I should like to ask the hon. Member for Preston, South, to check up on the origin of this rumour, because it seems to me that somebody—I am not blaming any hon. Members here, but somebody— started this rumour somewhere. I am not sure that it did not appear in the Press, but the malicious starting forecourts is a very serious matter, and I should like the hon. Member, as he mentioned it here, to see if he cannot find out anything more about it and throw some light on its origin. Perhaps later on he will have a chance of saying something to clear this matter up.
Earlier, I mentioned that I would say something about aircraft carriers. I do not want to be dogmatic on the subject of carriers. In the past I have often been a little sceptical of the future of carriers, but a great deal of uninformed criticism


is being bandied about the country by the opponents of carriers who wish to discount their effectiveness. They find it an easy task, because the general public, through no fault of its own, is inclined to listen to the rather over-simplified view put out which is inclined to portray the carrier operating singly—by itself—unsupported in places like the Mediterranean.
Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, quite unwittingly no doubt, did exactly what I am trying to indicate. He said:
It seems very doubtful whether they can operate in the narrow seas…. "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 2178.]
He was not intending to mislead the public at all, but that is the sort of remark which people unwittingly make, and I should like to deal with it.
The picture I have described is not the real picture at all. Nobody suggests for a moment that carriers would operate unprotected in narrow waters. The real picture is of powerful carrier groups operating in support of each other, each group with probably at least four carriers closely screened, the screen being in depth, and with pickets and so on lying out some 40 miles or more from the screen, and with modern radar equipment ready to give early warning of oncoming aircraft and capable of controlling the interceptor aircraft.
These carrier groups will be wandering about in uncertain places. They first have to be found before a well planned attack can be mounted, and I say that they will be formidable formations to approach. That is the general outline to bear in mind—a very different picture from that commonly imagined.
I do not think that the general public is aware, either, of the technical advances that are taking place and have taken place. Notable in such matters is the detection and destruction of submarines. That has a very great bearing on the operation of such forces. Then there are striking developments in radar, airborne radar, and so on. All these technical developments are never fully or clearly understood, and I have no doubt that I am also now out of date. For these reasons, I say that it is a mistake for people to make sweeping deductions as to whether carriers are or are not of any

use. That is why I am not myself prepared to be dogmatic.
I have given my views on the offensive work of the carrier, which I admit can be disputed. On the defensive side, however, there is a different story. Talk to one of the crew of any merchant ship, and he will emphasise that in protecting a ship against air attack it is no good having the vital shore-based fighters some 100, 200, or 300 miles away. They must be on the spot. There is nothing to replace the carrier. Whether it will be effective enough or not is another matter, but if it is taken away, the ships will be completely vulnerable.
When the carrier ceases to carry interceptor aircraft no doubt it will carry guided missiles and helicopters. Indeed in the light of these technical developments, which are of an uncertain nature —guided missiles in particular—the position of fleets at sea may be completely altered. Therefore, it is unwise for people to say that the carrier is ineffective.
Let us not forget also what will happen if the hydrogen bomb is never used, in cases like Korea. The task of a fleet is important also in peace-time in maintaining our prestige and in supporting the position of our friends in far-off places—the Persian Gulf and so on. If we do not support our friends, one by one they will be snuffed out and, in the end, we may find ourselves isolated. So I maintain that there is an important role for the fleet in peace-time as well as in any future war. I urge the country to have confidence in the Admiralty, which has guided the Navy through a difficult time in these lean years. And now, with guided missiles on the way, we are, perhaps, on the threshold of great possibilities. It would be a pity if the Royal Navy were struck down.
I urge the country, therefore, not to try to go in for any simple substitutes, any cheap or easy way out, but to remember that this small island has exerted its influence because it has pinned its faith to mobile forces, forces that could move about the world. Concrete defences have never prevailed in the past. In these I include the big runways necessary for our V-bomber force which cannot be moved. The Martello towers—the Maginot line—the West Wall—all these failed when the time came.
I do not believe that the country appreciates the value of mobile forces for a small country like ours. I hope, however, there will be wide support for what I feel is a commendable White Paper which has indeed endeavoured to explain the position of the Navy in the future. It has done this, I feel, a great deal better than those in the past. My only criticism is that I wish that a better explanation had been offered in former years.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

6.25 p.m.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Harry Crookshank): I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned.
I have intervened for a moment to deal with the business of the House, and, to set myself in order, I have moved this Motion. Conversations have taken place through the usual channels about the arrangements for the discussions on the Service Estimates. It has been agreed that we obtain Vote A of the Navy Estimates tonight, Vote A of the Army next Tuesday and Vote A of the Air next Thursday. The Committee stage of the necessary Money Votes for the Navy, Army and Air Services will be put down on another Allotted Supply Day and, if necessary, discussion can be continued at the Report stage.
I hope that these arrangements will commend themselves to the House and that we shall obtain the necessary Business tonight, and on the later occasions at a reasonable hour—by which I mean in this case, shall we say, about midnight or, of course, if we are more reasonable, it might be earlier.

6.27 p.m.

Mr. James Callaghan: This, as the Leader of the House says, has been done through the usual channels. It is a common belief amongst all except the usual channels that the usual channels make their arrangements to suit themselves and no one else, but I hope on this occasion that it will be thought that what the usual channels have done commends itself to those in all parts of the House wherever they may sit.
As I understand it, this will mean that the Votes which have been put down on the Order Paper today, apart from Vote

A, will not be taken tonight but on another occasion. That I would regard as being the best way of proceeding with public business. As to the time at which we adjourn, that is not within the control of any of us. This is a traditional occasion on which those who have grievances about Supply seek to have them remedied, so no doubt the debate will carry on for a period until those who wish to make speeches have made them. I am sure that there will be co-operation from everybody, and knowing the kind of reply we shall get from the Government Front Bench, it should enable us to call off the battle before dawn.

6.29 p.m.

Mr. George Wigg: Would the right hon. Gentleman be good enough to clear up two points? First, on the Order Paper today there is Vote A and a number of other Votes. I take it that this happens because this arrangement was not concluded until a few minutes ago. In future, that is to say, on the Army and Air Estimates, and in future years, all that will be put down will be Vote A and the other Votes will only come forward on the Committee stage or in accordance with such arrangements as are made through the usual channels. I do not want to confuse the right hon. Gentleman, who looks puzzled, so I will put my other question after he has answered this one. Can I have an answer?

Mr. Crookshank: I think that is correct. Of course I am not dealing with future years at the moment—sufficient unto one year is its troubles—but the hon. Gentleman is quite right: on the Order Paper is Vote A and the other Votes. They will not be taken tonight but they will be taken on another Allotted Supply Day, as I have announced. I do not think there is any difficulty about that.

Mr. William Whiteley: My hon. Friend meant this, that on Tuesday next we shall take Vote A and not the Money Votes, and on Thursday we shall take Vote A and not the Money Votes?

Mr. Crookshank: I understand that is in order. Of course, if it is not in order, we may technically have to put the other Votes down, though we shall not be taking them.

Mr. Wigg: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman, but I am always a little


worried when he looks puzzled and uncertain because, although he is not now establishing what will happen in future years, what we do now will be a precedent. We all hope it will work; I certainly do. Therefore it is important to be clear. May I ask the second question now? You, Mr. Speaker, gave a Ruling a year ago to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) which greatly broadened our debates and did not improve them to my mind, because it brought about a ragged situation. Whilst it is necessary at all costs to preserve the rights of back benchers, would you be good enough to look at the rules of order to see whether it is possible to secure something like a Second Reading debate? The question of broad principle of a Vote A debate by the procedure suggested by the right hon. Gentleman has become a permanent part of our affairs.

6.31 p.m.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: As my hon. Friend says, I raised this matter on a number of occasions last year, and I should like to thank the Leader of the House for his announcement and all those of the usual channels who have contributed to what is a step in the right direction. Perhaps some of us might claim that by our nocturnal activities last year we contributed in a small way towards this step. May I say, too, that I think this is only one step forward and I hope that we shall move forward to the consideration of the question of Committee stages on these Votes for all three Services. What some of us have been concerned about previously is that we should be able to have Estimates debates that are Second Reading debates on the general policies of the three Services, and should be able to take the Votes separately on separate Parliamentary days as a proper Committee stage.
I recognise that this is a step in the right direction, which, as my hon. Friend says, will avoid some of the confusion which arose previously by having general and detailed points raised in the debates on the Service Estimates. I hope, however, that the usual channels will continue to function on this issue, because problems of lack of time are still presented by the immense questions which are raised in the Service debates. In the light of

how the new arrangement functions, it may be that more Parliamentary days may be found so that hon. Members will have a greater opportunity of discussing these matters.

Mr. Crookshank: However that may be, it seems that the suggestion which I have made is agreeable to hon. Members in all quarters of the House. So that we may proceed with the proper debate—

6.33 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: May I say this? I certainly agree with the general sense of the opinion which has been expressed about this arrangement, but do I understand aright that the ideal of concluding the debate at a certain time is only a general hope and aspiration, and that no mechanical means would be employed to ensure that that arrangement should be concluded if there were Members of the House who wished to exercise the rights that they have always had on these occasions?

Mr. Crookshank: Hope springs eternal, at any rate in my breast. As we do not want to start a procedural debate on this Motion, perhaps the House will allow me——

Mr. Wigg: Before the right hon. Gentleman finishes, there is one further point on this important matter. We proceed to reform only by gradual process, one step at a time. As my hon. Friend has said, the right hon. Gentleman has taken a step in the right direction. Now we want him to take one more step. If he and the Government would consider a means whereby we could get rid of the silly business of having a Ballot—I say this in all respect to my hon. Friend who is lucky tonight——

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member has made two speeches already. I do not think that the Ballot is involved in what the right hon. Gentleman has said. He said nothing about the Ballot.

Mr. Wigg: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I was asking the right hon. Gentleman, now that he has taken this step, whether he would look at the whole of our procedure on Estimates in order to bring about this next desirable reform. If he will do this, he will find his place in posterity in a monument in which he is both admiral, field marshal and air chief


marshal, and he would be doing the House a great service.

Mr. Crookshank: In anticipation of all those honours, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

SUPPLY

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1955–56

Original Question again proposed.

6.34 p.m.

Mr. Edward Shackleton: Without fully understanding what has happened, it appears that my hon. Friends have won a considerable victory by the use of conventional weapons. I should like now to turn to the subject of thermo-nuclear weapons. It appears to me somewhat as if we have go away from the original statement by the Government in the White Paper that overshadowing all else in the year 1954 has been the emergence of the thermo-nuclear bomb. Although hon. Members, on both sides of the House, have talked about the thermonuclear bomb, none the less the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) in particular appeared to carry on with his views of naval strategy as if the thermonuclear bomb and the fission bomb had not been invented.
It would be quite wrong for us to discuss the future defence of this country unless we are prepared to say frankly and freely what we think. It is right that we should criticise, and it does not necessarily follow, as the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) seemed to think, that some of our criticism is not only ill-informed, but is malicious. I assure the hon. and gallant Member that all hon. Members, I hope, even when they may indulge in scoring a point here and there in a defence debate, are surely concerned in the long run, not with trying to serve a particular vested interest, but, according to their beliefs, with achieving the best defence for this country and for the preservation of the peace of the world. If I have criticisms to make of the White Paper and of the nature and role of the Royal Navy, I hope that hon. Members who think that I am being biased against the Navy in saying that it should be cut down will listen to the debates on the Air

Estimates, when they will hear also that I have criticisms to throw against my own Service in the matter.
The fact is that the thermo-nuclear bomb has so decisively altered the nature of our affairs that it makes the proposals in the First Lord's Memorandum completely out of date. Indeed, I regard the thermo-nuclear bomb as such a decisive weapon that it seems to me that there is nearly no choice but a position of complete pacificism, and the temptation to move to that position today is a very strong one.
I am sure that my hon. Friends will not think that it is a love of war that makes me not take that course, but if we delude ourselves in talking about the type of conventional war that we have been talking about today, we are confusing the real horror of the situation and are also weakening our capacity for building up the real and powerful deterrent, which is the hydrogen bomb.
My hon. Friends may disagree with me, but I believe—and this appeared to be the view of the Government in the Statement on Defence—that the main instrument today for preserving the peace of the world is the deterrent, and the deterrent in the shape of the hydrogen bomb as at present, presumably, delivered by bombers and in 10 or 20 years' time, or possibly sooner, delivered by rockets.
It may well be that if that policy is successful and peace is preserved, we may even find that in time the hydrogen bomb takes on a social significance, and each nation has its token hydrogen bomb which is regarded as the symbol of peace —I do not know; that might be optimistic. But if the primary strategy of the Government—and I believe it to be the right one—is the use of deterrents by the threat to deliver the hydrogen bomb, it seems to me that we must look very carefully, not merely at its general rôle,but at what particular jobs the Royal Navy has to do. The same thing applies to the other Services.
I fully concede that the Royal Navy has an important rôle in the cold war. I concede that there are a number of jobs to be done and that nobody else, as far as operations allow, can do them more efficiently or more successfully than the Royal Navy. But when it comes to a hot war, I still remember last year's White Paper,


in which it was clearly indicated that the main rôle of the Navy in a hot war would be during the period of broken-back warfare; that was a horrible expression, but it is true, because I believe that there would be a period of broken-back warfare.
When, therefore, hon. Members question the use of the aircraft carrier, we are thinking about it not in terms of whether a carrier, if it exists, is a useful instrument, but whether there will be any carriers or any bases from which they can operate. It may well be that the Fleet puts out to sea the day before war breaks out and then we would have a certain number of mobile landing fields and so on. But it would be very limited, because I. believe that if the hydrogen bomb war breaks out and we do not win it—it is extremely doubtful, and I do not know whether we will——

Mr. George Thomas: Nobody will win it.

Mr. Shackleton: —then quite apart from the rest of the country, there will not be the dockyards to which the Fleet could return.
The conventional anti-submarine warfare about which the hon. Member for Gillingham spoke is not on. If hydrogen bombs and fission bombs are dropped, they will be dropped, among other places, on the ports. One cannot operate submarines for very long without port facilities. I believe that even now the Russians have only limited port facilities, and all hon. Members who know the Submarine Service know that ports are of fundamental importance. The expansion of the German effort in the last war was entirely related to their acquirement of certain ports on the Biscay coast of France. I do not believe that the existing Russian ports are adequate to launch big submarine attacks.
I want to refer to the misleading propaganda—and I use the word "misleading" deliberately—that the Admiralty Public Relations Department put out. In the summer, the Department put out a statement about 500 Russian submarines. The First Lord knows as well as I do that the majority of these submarines must be obsolete submarines, many of which have been shown in "Jane's Fight-

ing Ships" for the last 30 years. If the Russians have any of the new type submarines, they have very few. The hon. Member for Gillingham was talking about the German type 21, or an adaptation of the Walther type with H.T.P. propulsion. The H.T.P. type may be able to put in tremendous bursts of speed for a short while, may be even for 24 hours, but on passage it is a more vulnerable duck than the conventional submarine, and modern developments in submarine hunting can take care of it to some extent.
I come back to my essential point, that if we accept the Government's belief in thermo-nuclear and fission bomb warfare, then the alleged threat at sea will be most effectively met at the ports from which the submarine set out. I believe that a number of hon. Members of naval persuasion would probably largely agree with me about that. There are many points I should like to make regarding the actual shape of the Navy and the question of guided missile cruisers, but my essential point is that the deterrent is the main thing and that £350 million is too large a proportion to devote to a branch of the Services which cannot have a decisive effect in preserving the peace of the world in accordance with the Government's basic philosophy.
If hon. Members agree with me on this —and I hope that a number of them do—we have to look at what is to be the future of the Royal Navy. I think that the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett), who spoke in a very moderate and reasonable way in his maiden speech in the defence debate, is as much aware of this as I am. He will agree that however much we admire the Royal Navy and think that of all three Services it is the one which above all should be preserved because of its traditions, fine qualities and splendid history, it is out of the big league in defence.
If that be so, then we have to look at what the future structure and organisation of our naval forces ought to be. It would be an absolute tragedy if that Service tradition were lost or allowed to fritter away against a background of frustration, disappointment and anxiety. One obvious solution of the problem which must at all costs be avoided is that by a process of surgical operation the


Royal Navy should pinch bits of other Services. I think that all Service empires are inclined to do this—not least the Air Force—and I shall have something to say on the subject of the Air Force's pinching guided missiles.
On this subject, the hon. and gallant Member for Merton and Morden referred to a statement attributed to the future First Sea Lord, namely, that he would not be back in England for two months without getting hold of Coastal Command. This rumour is extremely widespread. I have heard it from a variety of people. It may not be going round the Admiralty, but I have heard it from ranks ranging from air marshal to flight lieutenant at the Air Ministry. I have satisfied myself that it is a very widespread rumour. When I raised it, the First Lord was good enough to write to me to say that the rumour was far from true, which I take to mean that it is untrue. Obviously discussions of this kind take place in Service circles, but I hope that we can be assured not only that the rumour is untrue, but that the Navy would not contemplate such a solution of its problems.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I will not deal with the last few words. So far as the First Sea Lord-designate is concerned, I wrote to the hon. Member today. I have not heard the rumour. I was not in a position to check it during the defence debate, but I have taken the opportunity of checking it in the intervening time. The rumour is far from true, which means completely untrue. Lord Mountbatten had a private meeting with his staff officers before leaving Malta and asked them to suggest matters he might raise at the Admiralty. One of a large number of subjects discussed was Coastal Command, but neither Lord Mountbatten nor anybody else made the remark attributed to him.

Mr. Shackleton: That is a gratifying statement. I am sure that the First Lord will agree that I did not raise that to cast reflection on a very distinguished officer. I hope that he may be the person who may help to solve these difficulties and these Service problems. I am only sorry that the First Lord is not prepared to go further and give a categorical undertaking that no member of the Board of Admiralty harbours such intention in his breast.
I should like to turn to the subject of what the future of the Royal Navy should be, and especially to the theme taken up by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). He will forgive me if I do not congratulate him on his speech. All of my hon. Friends say what a wonderful speech he makes. That seems to be a needless glimpse of the obvious, because I always expect a first-class speech from the hon. Gentleman. His views regarding the fusion—perhaps an unfortunate word—of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, which was also argued with great eloquence by certain other hon. Members, particularly the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East, led me to believe that this was a very strange way to solve the problem and I should like to give my reasons.
The hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East put his case extremely moderately, but I thought that he drew a number of false analogies between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. One of the most important aspects of the Royal Navy is its long and splendid tradition, and I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman would agree that it would be vital to avoid destroying or in any way impairing that tradition. I believe that the basic rô1es of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are entirely different. I think, as I have said, that the basic rôle of the Royal Air Force for the time being is to deliver the deterrent. The Navy thinks in terms of sea power, and the argument which has always been adduced in the past for the Navy taking over Coastal Command is the belief that those who fly over the sea ought to be sailors.
Indeed, the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East himself appeared to be thinking in terms of sea power. He said:
There is a wide field in which the functions of the two Services overlap. The defence against invasion, the defence of our trade routes, the blockade of an enemy, the carriage of troops….
That may be the main rô1e of the Royal Navy, but it certainly is not the main rôle of the R.A.F. The main rôle of the Royal Air Force today is to deliver the deterrent, and in my opinion we should confuse and detract from that important function—which is indicated in the Government's statement of policy—by bringing the Navy and the Royal Air Force into one body.
Indeed, I think it could only be done effectively—in the light of the fact that, as I believe, and I think most people believe, for the time being the R.A.F. has the major rô1e—if the Royal Navy were very heavily subordinated. I do not think that would be a particularly good thing for the Royal Navy. It may be that there are some members of the Royal Navy who think that they would get hold of the Air Force, but I am sure that the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East was not thinking along those lines. He made another statement. He said that there is a lot in common in the training required by both an airman and a seaman.
Both require knowledge of navigation, of radio communications, a ground work in electronics and engineering, etc…."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 1924–25.]
We might also say that most of that applies to a soldier as well. And when we talk of an instinctive eye for the appreciation of relative velocity, I would point out that the relative velocities are rather different. There may be a similarity between the 30 knots of a ship and the landing speed of an aircraft. It is only of the order of three- or four-to-one. But when it comes to the modern development of aircraft and 1,500 miles an hour and 15 knots, I think that the velocity is rather different.

Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett: We have hundreds of naval officers who fly aeroplanes, and many more are testing them, and the same speeds are involved.

Mr. Burden: I am at one with the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) on this. Probably, as former members of the R.A.F., we are inclined to appreciate the difficulties of both Services vis-à-vis the Royal Air Force, much more than an Army or naval man, and we can assess the difficulties of integration much better than they can.

Mr. Shackleton: The hon. and gallant Member now says that it is naval officer pilots. But he was not talking about that. He referred to seamen and pilots.
The basic rôle of the Navy is still obvious today and concerns vessels that go on the sea. I think it would be unfortunate if we had a situation where within the one Service we had two such

different branches. It would be ludicrous. I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman—indeed I am sure that he would concede it—that the complications involved in mounting the delivery of the deterrent on a selected target involves years of training, such as is also necessary if a man is to be able to be a competent commander of ships at sea. There are at the moment two totally different rôles to be played, and I believe that this solution is out for various reasons.

Mr. de Freitas: If my hon. Friend is so certain that the argument will go his way, why is he opposed to an inquiry?

Mr. Shackleton: I am not opposed to an inquiry. I am about to propose one. I have never said that I was opposed to an inquiry. I am opposed to an inquiry on a narrow field.
There is one other argument. I think that the Army would have something to say. If it is thought that by reducing the number of "empires" from three to two we shall improve the relations between the remaining two, I would only say that that is a thoroughly unsound view. I think that the Air Force has a fundamental rôle to play alongside the Army apart from its basic deterrent rôle —which I keep emphasising because it is the Government's own statement of policy.
Let me say what I believe the solution might be. In the short run I think that something has to be done to improve the prospects of those men in naval aviation who are not likely to command ships. They are not basically sailors, but they may be very good pilots. It would not be unreasonable, in my opinion, for the Air Force to open its ranks to them, if they wished to join the Air Force. I suggest that discussions might take place between the Admiralty and the Air Ministry with a view to extending the careers of these men in the Air Force, if necessary. It does not matter which uniform they use, they could be entitled to wear both. But I think that the ultimate solution—and this is where I urge an inquiry—must be the complete reorganisation of what are the functions of the Services and the weapons of defence today.
If someone sat down and planned the defence of this country now, without there being any Army, Navy or Air Force,


I am doubtful whether they would start by creating such Services. There might be a corps of signallers and other organisations of specialists. There might be a guided missile force, but I do not think that we should have the present Navy, Army and Air Force, which I believe is increasingly becoming an obstacle to a sensible approach to proper provisions for the defence of this country.
I do not believe that the unification of these three Services is possible overnight, or within a few years. But I am certain that, within the next 20 or 50 years, the present views held in the three Services will be completely out-of-date, even if they are not out-of-date today. I urge that some inquiry be held into this matter. It should be an inquiry not into the possibilities of uniting the Navy and the Air Force, but into the whole structure of the three Services. If we widen it that far we might arrive at some answers; but the other solution will not prove to be that fundamental solution which we must find in the long run.
One simple thing might be done meanwhile; it has been proposed in many quarters. Movement between the three Services, inter-changeability, particularly between senior officers, should be made a great deal easier. That is one obvious step. I urge the Admiralty to take the initiative in approaching and discussing this with the other Service Departments. I believe that would be the first step towards unification. Meanwhile, do not let us think that we have found the answer to our problem merely by joining the Navy and the Air Force. We must do much more thinking about it.
In the long run we have to think again that if the deterrent is the main weapon —and I hope that in time the hydrogen bomb will become the symbol of peace— the other aspects of war and war-making are ancillary only, and are cold war techniques. In those circumstances there is a great deal of reorganisation to do but we have to think in the totally new state of affairs of absolute weapons, which bear no relation to the warfare of the past.

7.0 p.m.

Commander J. W. Maitland: Each time I take part in these Estimates debates I become far more humble. I feel that I am no longer competent to discuss technical matters. Ten

years ago I had a considerable knowledge of them, but today I have not. I do not want to become one of those hon. Members who are treated with contempt by the Navy, Air Force, and the Army for the nonsense which they talk in Parliament. It may not really be nonsense, but I can assure hon. Members that it is considered to be nonsense by the Services.
I want to discuss the future—and nobody can catch me out there because it has not yet happened—and I start where the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) started. The great fact which has emerged in the presentation of the Defence White Paper and the White Paper on the Navy Estimates is the Government's decision to pin their faith upon the deterrent. We have talked a lot in the past about the deterrent. It was not so obvious when we had only the atomic bomb, but it has become much more obvious during this terrible year, when we have discovered all the horrors of the hydrogen bomb.
This White Paper is a very satisfactory one. Like most other people who are honest with themselves, I have been extremely worried and anxious about the future of the Navy. The White Paper, even if it looks forward only into dreams, at least looks in the right direction. That is where I depart from the argument of the hon. Member for Preston, South. I believe that it will do a tremendous amount to re-establish in the Navy a sense of its own future.
Having said that, I must also say that some of the arguments contained in the White Paper seem to muddle the future and the present. I prefer the statement contained in the Defence White Paper, which says:
The Navy also makes its contribution of heavy carriers to the allied striking fleet whose great mobility and offensive power, to be augmented by guided missiles and by the other modern equipment which is under development, will add powerfully to our ability to hit the enemy either independently or in support of allied land forces and land-based air forces.
That view is supported by the "Economist," in the excellent article on defence which appeared this week. The White Paper also says:
The development of shipborne guided weapons systems is well under way. The success of the recent developments in aircraft carriers and their equipment will make it possible to use at sea heavier and faster fighter


and strike aircraft, the latter being capable of carrying atomic bombs.
When one ceases to be a technical officer one has to rely upon reading or being told things, whether by an admiral, a shop steward or an air commodore. That is not nearly as good as living in the Services and knowing about these matters from one's own experience. One is apt to be biased, and to hear only one side of the argument. I am trying to rely upon the information given by the Government. It seems to me that the idea of carrier-borne air striking forces in an atomic age is a practical one.
Nevertheless, one of the greatest dangers is trying to be strong in every direction. We must decide between an offensive rôle—which is the one that I favour—and a defensive rôle, of concentrating upon small craft to defend our trade routes. I cannot conceive of a situation where, if there were an intense submarine attack upon this country, there would not be a hot war at the same time.
We have to decide upon one rô1e or the other, and it is nonsense to do as was suggested during the defence debate yesterday, namely, to indicate that we shall use the hydrogen bomb only if the hydrogen bomb is used against us. If we pin our faith to the principle of the deterrent, then we must go all out for it. I believe that the Admiralty should concentrate upon the development of the offensive as opposed to the defensive rôle.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) talked about dockyards and their extension. There is a great deal in that, and it may seem madness to extend them now. But I am not so sure. When war breaks out we have to be ready. Everything has to be completed. The extension of the dockyards may be advisable in order to enable the "Navy to become equipped for its rôle, but surely the great lesson which we have to learn is to be ready at any moment. But once war starts all our preparations must be complete. The ships at sea in active commission may be the only ones we have. We must try to reorientate our ideas and have small efficient groups capable of making war at literally an hour's notice.
I agree with the hon. Member for Preston, South that the Navy has a very peculiar and particular task—and great

powers of being able to carry it out—in the cold war. But if the deterrent is going to work we may certainly expect a "hotting-up" of the cold war, and that is another reason why the more ships we can have in the active line the better we shall serve both the purpose of the present cold war and the possibility of a hot war.
I leave that subject now and come to some simple, homely remarks about the Navy.

Mr. Paget: If the Navy is to have an offensive rôle—and I entirely agree with the hon. and gallant Member on that point—the offensive instrument should be the submarine, equipped with a rocket launcher, which can lay off and destroy every enemy port within 12 hours. Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman not going to mention the one instrument of offence which is particularly naval, and which the air cannot use?

Commander Maitland: I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. I have not mentioned submarines, although I had a considerable amount to do with them during the war. They certainly form part of my general theory about the offensive role of the Navy. I was arguing that even though we should like to build up our escort service, that is not the proper way in which we should spend our money. We should, rather, concentrate upon what we need to carry out an offensive rôle.

Mr. Paget: I entirely agree.

Commander Maitland: I should like to talk about more simple things that have not yet been mentioned. This is the first Estimates debate I have taken part in in which we have not talked about an officer or a man until 7.10 p.m. I am going to start to do so, and the first thing I shall do is to speak of the conditions of the junior officer.
There is here an astonishing set of circumstances. Owing to the fact that it is difficult to get petty officers and chief petty officers to stay in the Navy—very largely because of doubt about the Navy's future—those who are there are pretty young. As a result of that we get the anomaly of an officer getting less pay than a man of his own age on the lower deck. That situation causes considerable anxiety among junior officers, and I am not blaming them.
I heard of a case the other day of two young men who entered the Navy as artificers. One did very well indeed and became an officer. The other did well, but not quite as well, and continued on the lower deck. In due course when they were about 22 or 23 years of age, they met in the same ship. One was a lieutenant in charge of a watch,with all the responsibility that that entails, and the other was an artificer. The artificer earned more money than the officer. By any sort of reckoning that is wrong.
If we are to recruit officers from the lower deck and to make the stream of recruits as full and as easy as can be, in the interests of the Service, the question of payment for responsibility should receive more attention from the Admiralty. I checked that point about pay by consulting the Estimates. It is in the First Schedule. It is perfectly correct. Any hon. Member who wishes can do so too.
The other point is promotion on the lower deck and for the officer. I have spoken about this matter before, because I feel very strongly about it. We should never put a man into a position where he has no chance of promotion. It is important that we should always promote the best men. I do not believe in any system in which so many years' service entitles one to promotion. I believe that to be bad. The best man always should be taken, but if a man misses one shot he should not be shut out for ever.
Take the example of the petty officer. He has possibly failed to become a branch officer, and he has no chance now of becoming a branch officer. I do not believe that is good. During the war we promoted many chief petty officers to be branch officers. One of my strongest recollections is that competency and efficiency of a high order seemed to develop in these men after a very short course, and almost immediately after they had changed their uniform. Promotion should never be a closed door. People should always be given hope.
I was very glad to hear that the whole officer structure is to be reconsidered. It is desperate for a comparatively young man of 35 to find himself finished, so far as the Navy is concerned. This is what happens. I know that the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett) during his time in the Service had a particular interest in

this point. It should be possible to keep the opportunity for further service, not necessarily in the highest ranks but in a higher rank, in front of a man at every stage of his career.
That is all I have to say. I have read in the "Economist" the remark that at last the Navy has been given a vital rôle. I believe that to be true, and that is why I welcome the White Paper. Whenever the Navy has been given a job, at no time in the past that I can think of has it not fulfilled it, honourably and efficiently.

LOWER DECK (LIVING CONDITIONS)

7.16 p.m.

Mr. George Thomas: I beg to move, to leave out from "That," to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
this House urges the Admiralty to improve the living conditions of men on the lower deck, with special reference to shore accommodation, and to increase the provision of married quarters.
I am sorry to ask the House to leave the broad issues and to turn its attention to the specific proposals on the Order Paper in my name. The hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) asked the House to consider the human issues of the Royal Navy. In the City of Cardiff we leave these matters to my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). He looks after the Navy, whether he is in office or is out of office, and he will for ever hold office, so far as Cardiff is concerned.
I was sorry to miss a little of my hon. Friend's speech this afternoon, particularly as I understand he made reference to me. Cardiff is one of the greatest ports in the West Country. Her sons have gone down to the sea in ships for generations, and the men of Cardiff have played a not undistinguished part both in peace and in war. The burgesses of the city are never happier than when a ship of the Royal Navy puts in at our port and the city is able to entertain the officers and men.
On Tuesday night this week, the First Sea Lord-designate was the guest of honour of a Welsh organisation. In the course of his address he went out of his way to pay a high tribute to the fighting


qualities of the Welsh men in the Royal Navy. I do not claim to come under the heading of those about whom the future First Sea Lord was talking, but there is no reason why I am not able to propose this Amendment with regard to the men on the lower deck.
Last autumn, because of the kindness of the First Lord of the Admiralty, I was the guest of the Royal Navy at Portland Bill. I went to sea in a submarine and I spent some time—I stayed all night— on the depot ship called the "Maidstone." I met with such kindness, and I learned so many things in the short time that I was there, that I welcome very much indeed this opportunity to pay my tribute to all those who are connected with the Royal Navy, those who have the privilege of being on the administrative side, and those who man the ships.
The First Lord, in his speech today, to which I listened with great interest, said that nobody expected to make life in the Royal Navy a bed of roses. I think that that was the term he used. We realise that to be in any of the Services is not to stay in a luxury hotel, but that is no reason why unnecessary hardships should be endured. The question of accommodation in the Navy is one about which the ratings themselves are not ignorant. They know the difficulties, and they do not expect the same sort of accommodation at sea as they have a right to expect when they are ashore.
I found in the submarine in which I went to sea that almost all the space is taken up by equipment. There is very little space for human beings to move around. Even for sleeping they are pushed to either end—if that is the right expression. [HON. MEMBERS: "Fore and aft."] May I be forgiven? In 1946, the Admiralty issued a circular in which it took note of the fact that during the war equipment encroached on the space of these vessels, and the Admiralty hoped that in the future the equipment would take less and less space and that more would be available for the men. It has not worked out that way. I am sure that those at the Admiralty will agree that they made a mistake at that time.
Shore accommodation is of varied quality. People at the Admiralty were very kind in helping me to obtain what-

ever information I sought, and I am very grateful to the Civil Lord in particular for the help which he has given me. I understand that many of the buildings which are serving as shore barracks were put up in the 19th century, and that they were regarded then as of reasonable standard, but some of them are appalling by present-day standards. The dormitories should be much nearer the washing places. They are old and, from our point of view, antiquated ideas.
These buildings, like old schools, have a habit of lingering on, and it is very hard to get them replaced. I know that the Admiralty is not unaware of this problem. It is specially concerned over the problem of the air stations which it took over after the war. The present conditions of the hutments at some of these stations in which the men are required to live is unworthy of any Service, but particularly unworthy of the Royal Navy.
I want to say a few words about married quarters. I understand—I was very surprised to learn it—that the Navy, far from leading, has followed the lead of the other Services with regard to them, and that it is only since the war that it has considered providing them. The First Lord told us today that the average length of service in the Royal Navy is over 10 years. Bearing that in mind, I should have thought that married quarters were more important for the Royal Navy than for the other Services, because Navy men are ashore in considerable numbers for considerable periods of time.
There seems to be no reason why, if one serves in the Royal Navy, one cannot have married quarters, whereas if one serves in the other Services, and is stationed at home, one finds married quarters available. It appears that the proportion of married men in the Navy who are able to get married quarters is roughly 20 per cent. The Civil Lord will correct me if I am wrong. That is a much lower figure than pertains in the other Services. I think the Admiralty has a responsibility to establish married quarters on at least the same scale as the other Services.
I have had some correspondence from those who know a little more about conditions in the Navy than I do myself. My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Exchange (Mrs. Braddock) would have


liked to raise a question taken up with her in a letter. She handed me the letter this afternoon, and I promised to raise the matter. She apologises for being unable to raise the matter herself. This letter, after paying tribute to the fine reputation of my hon. Friend, gives a list of grievances. I quote grievance No. 8. I pass over the others.
In this letter these words are to be found:
Sick patient had to sleep in draughty passage in a hammock while bed space in the sick bay was occupied by two officers although only travelling as passengers.
This is a letter from H.M.S. "Laertes," a minesweeper based on Harwich. That is as far as I shall go with identification.
This letter tells me that recently, just prior to the review of the Fleet, this notice was to be found on the ship's notice board:
Officers and their ladies, Chiefs and Petty Officers and their wives, ratings and their women….
My hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Exchange takes strong exception to that, as, needless to say, do I. Clearly, so did the seamen who sent this letter.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: So do I.

Mr. Thomas: So does the right hon. Gentleman.
I was sure that everyone here would take the same exception to that sort of thing. It is the sort of thing which, in my opinion, creates unrest, although I think there is very little of it in the Navy. I do not know. However, I think that that is the sort of thing which can make for trouble.
There is another letter which was sent to my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell),the former Minister of Defence. I shall not read it, but just mention it to show that it has safely reached its destination. It contains similar complaints by men who serve in the Royal Navy.
When the Admiralty issued the recent Press release about H.M.S. "Ark Royal," when she was being commissioned, it gave evidence of a new approach to the conditions of service of the men in the Royal Navy. I find that concern is registered about the entertainment of men off duty. It must be a very serious problem where there are large numbers of men on these

great carriers, but it is equally a problem for those who are in the smaller vessels. Of course, I understand that there are other interested people as well as those who help to provide the entertainment; and I want to read now from the Admiralty Press release regarding the "Ark Royal." It says:
In conformity with the best modern practice ashore, the galley, the bakery and the laundry are all electric and contain many labour-saving devices. In the bakery, there are machines for pie-making and dough-kneading, in the galley for dish washing, potato peeling and chipping, mincing and slicing, and in the laundry for washing, starching and both flat work and collar ironing.
There does not seem to be much left for anyone to do in the new "Ark Royal," and some who served the Royal Navy earlier will hardly recognise the Navy of today as it is described in the circular which the Admiralty issued to the Press when that ship was recently commissioned.
I do not want to address the House for long, because I feel that there are others better qualified than I to speak about these conditions, but I do know that these men who serve on the lower deck must be treated, both at sea and on shore, as people with dignity, as people who have rights as well as duties to fulfil. While discipline must clearly be made the overriding factor in any military Service, within the bounds of discipline and within the necessities of the Service, these men must be treated more like human beings than they have been in other days. Their complaints about food, pay and mess accommodation are not, I suppose, topics that would make news, but they remain real grievances on the part of the people concerned. The quarters of all who live on the ship ought to be refurnished along more human lines.
The last point to which I want to draw attention is this. There has been a lot of discussion about the problem of hammocks or bunks, and I understand that bunks are being installed in many ships now. I believe that there is a growing opinion that, on hygienic grounds, the use of bunks should be made compulsory. Hammocks are especially unhygienic when used in the tropics, when they are often just rolled up unaired until used again.
This point has been submitted to me by people who know because they have experience of it, and, whatever may be the


decision of the Admiralty, I hope it will be borne in mind that, like the education service, it must not spend all its time on its show-pieces. In all services at home, and apparently in the military Services as well, efforts are made to have show-pieces which members of the public are invited to see in order to appreciate how well their men are catered for, but the smaller matters ought to receive equal attention. Injustices such as that which I raised one day with the Chancellor about "hard lying money" ought to be rectified. The boys of the submarine which I saw told me that they were putting to sea for 21 days in the following week, and would receive 21s.—Is. a day—"hard lying money." Rather, they should receive it, but, actually, they would get only 14s. because the Chancellor was taking the rest. I think the Admiralty ought to put up a fight with the Treasury in order to see that this "hard lying money," which is small enough in amount, really goes to the men who earn it.
I would end with a word of thanks to all those who put up with the hardships of the sea in their public service to this nation.

Mr. G. R. Howard: All hon. Members of this House will agree that, if it is true that the notice to which the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) has drawn attention was ever put up, it is a disgrace. Speaking as one who had the honour to command three ships in the war and serve with these men, who knew them well and understood the relationship existing between officers and men in the Royal Navy, I should like to say that this is such an extraordinary story that it is only fair to the Service that it should either be proved or disproved as soon as possible.

Mr. Thomas: The hon. Member for St. Ives (Mr. G. R. Howard) may have noticed by the tone that I adopted that I was not seeking to fire any guns myself. I was reading a letter which came from somebody on the lower deck and was addressed to the hon. Lady who represents the Exchange Division of Liverpool. My hon. Friend read it, and specifically asked me if I would read it to the House. Instead of reading out the whole of the letter, I read the relevant and exciting parts, and I am quite sure that, since I gave the name of the ship, it will be pos-

sible for the Admiralty to trace whether it is true, and to issue a statement denying it if that was found necessary.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: I should like to assure the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas), who has given me the details, that we on this Bench certainly deplore this notice, if that is what happened, just as much as does the hon. Member himself.

Mr. E. G. Willis: I beg to second the Amendment.
I am very glad to have the opportunity of supporting the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas). I was rather surprised that my hon. Friend should apologise for intervening in this debate, because I am bound to say that up to the present the debate has seemed to me to be rather unreal. We have heard a very great deal about types of ships, weapons and aircraft and the future rôle of the Royal Navy, but none of these things really matter at all unless we have competent men to use them. Therefore, I was surprised that my hon. Friend apologised for raising this matter, because, not only in my view but also, I should imagine, in the view of the Admiralty itself, this matter is basic to any consideration of the state of the Royal Navy at present.
In the White Paper on Defence, attention is drawn to this point in paragraph 61, which says:
In the Navy, which is particularly concerned that as many men as possible should extend their medium term seven-year engagements, the results so far are not encouraging.
The First Lord of the Admiralty, in his Explanatory Statement, says:
The need of the Navy to recruit and retain regular ratings on long engagements is of critical importance to the nation.
Nothing could be more severe than that phrase—"critical importance to the nation"—but, when we go on to examine what is happening in the Navy, we find, of course, that the number of men signing on for engagement after the seven-year period is disappointing. The words of the White Paper are:
So far however the response has been disappointing, and in consequence the core of long-service men, on whom the Navy depends to provide the majority of supervisory ratings, is much diminished.


What percentage of men are signing on for the second five-year period?
We also find that the number signing on after 12 years is still below 40 per cent. These facts mean that there is an enormous wastage of manpower in the Navy—manpower which it has cost us an immense amount of money to train. Here we have men who have acquired Service habits, traditions and skills of various kinds—and all this is being wasted; and the reasons it is being wasted ought to be probed. There is no doubt, as my hon. Friend said, that the conditions on the lower deck are partly responsible.
I have had no opportunity to take part in debates on the Navy Estimates, because of my absence from the House, since 1949,but on that occasion I raised the question of the conditions on the lower deck of the show-piece of the Fleet, H.M.S. "Vanguard," where there was insufficient locker accommodation, where the bathing accommodation was poor and inconvenient and where the general messing and sleeping accommodation was very bad. There were 51 men sleeping in a comparatively small area. This was on a large ship where there are not the problems associated with the small ships. Nobody on the lower deck expects to be comfortable, perhaps, on a small ship, where the discipline is sometimes not as strict; he does not expect the same spacing and convenience on a small ship. But this was on a large ship.
One of the things which strikes the lower deck rating is not so much the nature of his conditions in themselves as the nature of his conditions when compared with those of officers. I think that is a point which frequently calls for comparison, and he cannot help thinking that, whereas half the accommodation on the ship goes to a small number of officers, the other half is occupied by a very large number of men. That seems to be quite wrong.
I believe there are other reasons, too, and I want to mention them. To do so I want to take the case of the artificer and technical branches. I make no apology for doing so, because these men represent a quarter of the naval personnel today — engineers, electrical officers, ordnance artificers and engine room officers, for instance. The percentage is increasing because the Service is becom-

ing more highly technical and these men are becoming increasingly necessary to an efficient fighting Service.
I can speak from my own experience and knowledge here. We may have a boy who enters the Service at the age of 15 to become an artificer, with great hopes of achieving promotion and looking forward to officer rank. I myself joined at the age of 15½. But 1 find that the status of the artificer apprentices today is lower than it was 30 years ago. The status of the fifth and fourth class artificer is lower than it was 30 years ago when the need for these ratings was less than it is today. We must bear in mind that today one of our clamant needs is to get this type of rating.
Let us consider the pay. Anybody can work it out from the first appendix if he takes the trouble to do so. I find that the pay in these branches is much the same as that of a person of similar qualifications outside the Navy. If anything, the pay is slightly lower. In the 'twenties or' thirties it was higher. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence) knows something about this. The point I want to make is this: how can the Navy expect to retain these men if, when they finish their seven or 12-year period of service, they can leave the Navy and get the same pay—in fact, if they were paid overtime and double time on Sundays they would get much higher pay—without having to undergo the discomforts of long separation from their families and the other discomforts which naturally follow from living aboard a ship?
I cannot understand what policy the Admiralty has pursued in this matter. At a time when we have full employment and when, to be cynical about it, there is no drive of unemployment urging or compelling men to join the Navy, how can we expect men to stay in the Service if we do not offer an incentive? This is part of the conditions into which we must look most closely. I was surprised that the First Lord did not deal with this in greater detail when opening the debate.
Another question is what is to happen to these men after their service—because this is part of their general living conditions and one of the subjects which exercises their minds. What is to happen


to them when they leave the Service? Why should not a great deal more be done to ensure that when these men leave the Service they get jobs more in accordance with their skills and ability? I know dozens of ex-chief engine-room artificers who are museum attendants in Edinburgh. I see them sweeping the snow outside the museum. Not that there is anything wrong with sweeping snow, but the point is that the nation is losing all this skill simply because the Admiralty will do nothing to give these men certificates or some mark of qualifications which would be recognised by outside employers.
I said something about the lowering of the status of apprentices in the Service, and I have been astonished by the number of apprentices whom I have met in recent years whose aim has been to get out of the Navy at the first opportunity. It is a condemnation of the Admiralty that it is unable to instil into these boys a love and fondness for the Navy and the old spirit of pride in the Service. I have met other men who are equally occupied with the same thought and I have seen them, after they have left the Service, working as attendants in museums.
This is not good enough, and the right hon. Gentleman must face this fact—that he will never get the long-service men he wants, whom we all admit he must have, if he treats the problem in this way. We must do something about it.
I have gone rather broader than the Amendment, but I thought it was as well to bring out all these points at once. It gives me very much pleasure to second the Amendment.

7.50 p.m.

Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett: The hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) has done a great service in raising this matter. The subjects which he dealt with are ones on which the lower deck naturally feels very keenly and takes a keen interest. It will cause great satisfaction throughout the lower deck to think that Parliament has turned aside for an hour or two from the great issues of thermo-nuclear bombs and issues of that kind to discuss the conditions under which those men live and serve.
I also welcome the opportunity at the same time to make it clear that very few subjects have in recent years received more attention from inside the Navy and from the Admiralty than have living conditions, both ashore and afloat, particularly since the war. Incidentally, the chief safeguard for the men to get a reasonable deal under the conditions in which they live is the interest and supervision of matters of this sort which is taken by the ships' officers and by the establishment officers. The hon. Member for Stepney (Mr. W. Edwards), whom I see on the Front Bench opposite, can claim seniority over me in the date at which he joined the Navy, but I hope he will agree that, whatever other faults naval officers have had, they have not been at fault in that respect, and that the ship's officer has always taken a good deal of trouble to see that the best use is made of available space and accommodation.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, West gave priority in his Motion to shore establishments. I was rather surprised at that, but I will follow the hon. Member and say a word first about accommodation ashore. The problem is simple from one point of view inasmuch as it is, I should say, entirely a question of how much money is available. The scale of money which has been spent in this direction since the war is considerable.
So far as I can understand the Estimates—they are confusingly presented and I stand to be corrected—we intend this year to spend about £945,000 on improvements to accommodation in shore establishments. The figure may well be higher than that. On married quarters, it is proposed to spend a further £1,892,000 plus; one has always to add the little things which come from other Votes, such as lighting, heating, and so on. Those are substantial sums.
If I were to criticise what has been done since the war, I would say that on the whole the curious thing is that we have spent perhaps rather too much money on the shore establishments in comparison with what we have done to improve accommodation afloat. The reason is that perhaps we have tended to spread the jam rather too thinly.
The hon. Member for Stepney, whose great work will always be remembered in the Service for the improvements


which he effected in the immediate postwar years, was confronted immediately after the war with a large number of people who opened their mouths very wide. He may remember that I was one of them. By an extraordinarily fortunate coincidence, the hon. Member visited the establishment which I was commanding on the day that we gave our first postwar cocktail party. Everybody agreed that within a few months the place had been remarkably well fitted out.
I can give a further example of what I should regard as extravagance without offending one party as against another. I refer to something which was planned by the Coalition Government. The establishment which I commanded immediately after the war had an approved rebuilding and expansion programme costing, I believe, over £1,500,000 at 1944 prices. Very fortunately, it was impossible to proceed with it at that time owing to shortage of materials and labour, and, quite naturally, the housing programme had priority. Accordingly, some semi-permanent steps were taken to get the place working. By hook or by crook —to some extent by crook I admit—we got the place working again for certainly less than one-tenth of the proposed figure —I speak from memory—and it is running very happily and contentedly to this moment.
In considering the question of shore accommodation for the Royal Navy, which is, after all, supposed to be a seagoing Service, the first question to ask oneself is whether an establishment is really necessary. It was always believed in the Navy—with what truth I do not know—that the hon. Member for Stepney had declared that he would like to see the naval barracks blown up. Whether the hon. Gentleman really said it I do not know, but those views gave great pleasure to the sailors at the time. I think that the naval barracks might well have been blown up, but where I differ from the hon. Member is that I am not sure that I should have rebuilt them.
If we want to improve the accommodation where it is needed, we should first ask ourselves whether we are not maintaining it where it is not necessary. Naval depots came into being 100 or so years ago because they were the only practical way of keeping seamen available to man another ship after their previous ship had been

paid off. Since then, however, there have been great developments. The railway and telegraph systems have been introduced, the men can all read and write— they could not in those days—and there are few of them now who have no fixed address, which was not the case 100 years ago.
If the seaman of today is not required for a job at any given moment, I would suggest that the place to let him go is home on leave until he is required. If a telegram or letter is sent to him to join a certain establishment or ship at a given time or place, he is quite capable of doing so without being rounded up by masters-at-arms or regulating petty officers. A great deal of money and effort is wasted by the drafting of men through great depots, which will never be entirely suitable no matter how much money is spent on them, because it is never comfortable to live in something which is rather like a railway station where people are constantly coming and going.
On the other hand, another great development peculiar to the Navy since those depots were built is the enormous expansion of technical knowledge and the like, which has necessitated the building of a large number of elaborately equipped technical schools to which the men at various times in their careers—and officers too, for that matter—are sent for quite long courses.
When that procedure began, an effort was made to incorporate the schools within the various depots, but that has long since failed. Today, in most branches of the Navy, if a man wants to learn, say, electrics he has to go to Fareham, if he wants to learn torpedo and anti-submarine work he goes to "Vernon," at Portsmouth, to learn signals he has to go to somewhere in the Meon Valley, and so on. That being so, it is worth considering whether a man's depot should not be his technical school and whether in this way, and by concentrating our efforts on these schools, which we must have, we cannot produce a much higher standard of accommodation than heretofore, and, possibly, for less money.
Furthermore, we could at the same time greatly increase the possibility of ensuring that when a man is serving ashore— which, as we unfortunately know, nowadays occupies a considerable part of his total service—he is much more likely to


be serving at the same place. That is an extremely important factor. The idea that a man should go back to his home port depot, which was originally conceived in the interests of welfare, nowadays often works against a man. When he is a youngster and not very highly skilled, he goes to the depot, and when he becomes more highly skilled, he finds that he must go to a technical school, which may be somewhere totally different.
We should take the plunge and make these great technical schools the men's depots. That has a very important bearing on the question of married quarters, because what a man really wants is not so much a married quarter as such but a home within easy reach of the place where he is to work when he is ashore. It is not possible for him to have it when he is in a sea-going ship going round the world, but if he knows when he comes to England that he is going to the same station or the same school he is probably better served if, by some negotiation with the local council, he can be given a house of his own for good, rather than that we should have the more expensive process of giving him a married quarter which is only a temporary home.
At the same time, I recognise that the married quarters programme up to date is still filling a need, because only about 20 per cent. of the men are served by it and, of course, there will always have to be a number of men employed where married quarters must be the normal provision.
The thing is to see whether we cannot provide men with homes, just as they would be provided in an ordinary shore appointment, to which they can come back and be close to the place where they will be engaged when they are ashore. If that can be done, it opens a further possibility. We are always talking about the advantages of having people own their houses. We pay a substantial gratuity to a man at the end of his service and it is worth considering whether that gratuity could not be advanced as an interest-free loan early in his service, secured against the title deeds of his house.
I turn now to the question of accommodation afloat, which is more important, because when afloat everyone has to use the accommodation whether he likes it

or not, and whether he is married or single. Here again there are few problems to which more thought and attention has been given for a good many years now, and especially since the war. In fact, from 1945 to 1950 there was a complete standstill on all alterations to our ships, except those which improved living conditions. That is sufficient evidence in itself of the importance that was attached to the subject. I speak from certain knowledge that there has been no diminution of interest in and of the importance attached to the subject, regardless of what party has been in power.
We all agree that it is an important matter, but it is also an extremely difficult one, because the problem is not one of spending money. It is essentially a problem of the space that is available and the amount of weight that one can afford to put into that space. The hon. Member for Cardiff, West quoted an example, which is so often quoted, of people complaining and saying that equipment should be removed to make more room in the interest of the welfare of the men. To some extent that has to be done, but one must remember that equipment can be very important to the fighting efficiency of the ship. If, later on, one has a battle and one has not the equipment one may be sunk. That is very bad indeed for welfare.
I do not want to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis) in his remarks about artificers. Comparisons are rather dangerous. It is quite true that artificers do not think that they have quite as much of the good things of this life as they deserve, but it is also true that large numbers of young chaps who are not artificers think that artificers have rather too much. The hon. Member referred to their re-engagement. In passing, although I speak subject to correction, I believe that I am right in saying that the re-engagement rate for artificers is better on the whole than for the other branches of the Navy and that in so far as they do go out it is because they firmly believe that they will obtain a very much better job outside the Navy. Therefore, if they read the hon. Member's remarks about sweeping snow and being attendants at cinemas, the re-engagement rate may go up.

Mr. Willis: Those were pensioners.

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: I beg the hon. Member's pardon. I thought that he was referring to young men.
One important matter in connection with accommodation afloat is its possible relationship to those numerous cases of malicious damage to which so much publicity has been given, and which are doing the Navy so much harm in the eyes of the public. When they first reached big dimensions, late in 1947 and early 1948,the Government quite rightly suspected that they might be connected with some organised Communist sabotage. We accordingly had all the paraphernalia, which I still regret, of M.I.5 and its detectives who, judging by the Press, move now with considerable publicity in investigating cases. But no case has yet been reported in which there has been any suspicion that sabotage, as generally understood, is to blame. One can fairly describe them as cases of hooliganism.
It has been suggested that these cases are a kind of protest against bad living conditions. I do not deny that if one makes men live under rough conditions they get rough in their habits and that if one provides luxuries one is apt to create a public opinion which would be antagonistic to the hooligans concerned, but I do not think that these cases can be said to be very directly related one with the other. I also believe that if we left these matters to the commanding officers to deal with on their own, by the more sensible method of charging for the damage done rather than the holding of courts-martial, we should hear no more about these things.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, West mentioned the question of bunks versus hammocks. The whole problem of accommodation in ships is whether we should go on with the traditional British method of mess decks and mess deck life, which is a sort of family life in which one allocates such space as one can to a given bunch of men and they use the space for eating, sleeping and recreation. On the other hand, one has the system like that of the Americans of providing an institutional life in which there are dormitories, fixed bunks, separate cafeterias and recreation rooms.
In our big ships we have a kind of compromise. We have cafeterias but we

still combine recreation space and sleeping space in the same area. Personally I have always been pro-bunk, but I believe that we should give the American scheme a greater trial than it has been given so far. Mess deck life depends upon having fairly staid, experienced men in the junior ranks to look after the youngsters, and that is just what we shall not have very often nowadays. However, that is a matter of opinion and I merely mention it to point out that this is a complicated and difficult problem.
In reply to the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East, I do not think that there is much future in trying to improve the accommodation of the lower deck by invading that of the officers. I worked out as I was shaving this morning that if one took all the officers' accommodation away and everybody shared the accommodation in the ship equally, then in a big ship one would add on the average only four or five square feet to the space available for each man. Having done that it is usually found that something is lost, because the officer has a lot of desk work to do and—except for the few important officers—he does it in his cabin. That is the essential reason why officers must be given cabins.

Mr. Willis: I would not question what the hon. and gallant Member has said. The only point I made was that where the officer accommodation is very large—as it is in some of the large ships—as compared with that of the men, a comparison is always in the minds of the men. Even if only a small amount were used for the purposes of the men below the deck that comparison would not be so bad. I know that conditions today are not as bad as they used to be, but they could be better.

Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: I accept what the hon. Gentleman has said. It is quite true that there is a comparison in the minds of the men, but I would suggest that the comparison is on the whole mistaken when one looks into the whole question, for there is little that can be done in transferring from one category to another. What we used to do and what is being done again, I understand, is to accommodate officers in the part of the ship underneath the bridge, instead of aft, and that avoids duplicating the senior officers' cabins. A little is saved by doing that. But in the main, the attacks which


so often are made by comparing officers with the ship's company do not carry as much weight as is supposed.
I must apologise to the House for detaining it so long with this rather complicated subject. I would say in conclusion that the greatest obstacle to improving the accommodation of the men at sea is resistance to change, which is not peculiar to the Admiralty or to sailors.

8.13 p.m.

Lieut-Colonel Marcus Lipton: The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett) has demonstrated that the Silent Service is not so silent as tradition says it is. Although I served in another branch of the Services which is not regarded as so silent, I shall not take up so much time of the House as did the hon. and gallant Member. He referred to cases of malicious damage. I do not know whether he has kept himself up to date in that respect, but perhaps he noticed one of the many Questions addressed in recent months to the First Lord of the Admiralty who stated that 1954 was a very bad year from the point of view of the number of cases of malicious damage. They were higher than for a long time past.
In answer to a question of mine, the First Lord said something which is of the utmost significance. He told us that whereas the number of cases of malicious damage in the early part of 1954 had been fairly high, there had been a considerable drop towards the end of the year. The reason for it was the improvement in pay and conditions.
It seems quite clear that while these cases of malicious damage are not tied up with deliberate sabotage or some ideological kink, they do suggest a link-up with pay and conditions in the Service. So if we improve pay and conditions it seems reasonable to assume that the number of cases of malicious damage will go down.
The fact that there are these cases indicates to me that morale is not good. I was reproved by the First Lord for suggesting that morale in the Navy was not good. It so happened that very shortly after I heard that statement Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton, Chairman of the Navy League, speaking at a luncheon

in celebration of the League's Diamond Jubilee, said that the Royal Navy was run down to its lowest ebb and he thought that the Government were very largely responsible.

Mr. J. P. L. Thomas: Sir Louis Hamilton also made it quite clear in public that he was not referring to morale.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I am quite prepared to accept what the First Lord has said. It is also of interest to note that in recent weeks, for example, the "Daily Mirror," made reference to the fact that there was an urgent need to improve the Navy's morale, which was low, partly due to the uncertainty of the future. I do not think that even the First Lord will be able to dispute the fact that uncertainty as to the future is not conducive to good morale.

Mr. Burden: The present Navy Estimates, in fact, remove all the fears that the men in the Navy feel about the future. It is the hon. Member for Aston (Mr. Wyatt) and others

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): This question of morale and the future does not arise on this Amendment. I take it that the hon. and gallant Member is going to connect the question of morale with conditions and housing accommodation.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: What I am trying to suggest is that bad conditions on the lower deck, poor shore accommodation and the inadequate provision of married quarters are not going to improve morale. I am prepared to leave it at that.
May I also quote an even more distinguished authority than any I have hitherto quoted, and that is "The Times" naval correspondent, who wrote an article on the Navy, in a recent issue of that paper. He referred to the need for improved shore accommodation, and to that extent my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) can invoke most distinguished support for the Amendment he has so ably moved this evening.
It is the opinion of greater experts on naval matters than ever I can hope to be that there is frustration and uncertainty about the future which itself adversely affects recruiting figures, as those in the White Paper on defence show. If the


conditions on the lower deck and living conditions generally, including shore accommodation and married quarters, were improved, I do not think we should witness the continuance of the trend that has manifested itself during recent years. The White Paper on defence reveals that the number of male regular recruits for the Navy fell from 11,100 in 1951–52 to an estimated figure of 8,100 in 1955–56. That is a reduction of 3,000, a very great fall indeed. I am unwilling to believe that this fall in recruiting has nothing to do with the subjects which have been raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West.
Reference has been made to living conditions. I had the good fortune to be allowed to visit the aircraft carrier "Eagle" a few months ago and I was greatly impressed by what I saw. The magnitude of the operations conducted in that vessel was a revelation to me. Everything that could possibly happen in a large industrial town seemed to be happening on that aircraft carrier. There were fitters' shops and carpentry shops, and all kinds of industrial activities were going on necessary for the maintenance of the vessel.
What surprised me very much was that in the fitters' shop, where men were working on machines producing spare parts and so on, because the pressure on accommodation was so great, the men had to sleep in the same place where they had worked all day, slinging their hammocks from the ceiling with the work benches and machines underneath them. It may be inevitable but, as a civilian, I could not regard that as satisfactory. It means that even in these large vessels such as aircraft carriers the need for space for the technical requirements for which the vessel was built is so great that the living conditions of the men, unfortunately, have to be made a secondary consideration.
I throw out these points for the consideration of the First Lord and I hope that serious attention will be given to them. When I have raised matters connected with the Navy during the last month or two, I have been surprised not only at the letters I have received from men serving in the Navy, but at the letters from the parents and the wives of serving personnel, who seemed to be very bitter about the difficulties to which their men were being subjected.
If what the man serving in the Navy says has such a bad effect upon his relatives and friends, it is not surprising that recruiting drops, because the best recruiting sergeant in any branch of the Service is a contented soldier, sailor or air man. He can do far more than all the recruiting campaigns and posters if, when he goes home on leave, he is able to say, "I am doing a good job of work"——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. and gallant Member is getting a little far from the Amendment.

Lieut-Colonel Lipton: I propose to get back to it immediately and to ask the First Lord to accept without any quibble the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend.

8.24 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I rise only to ask a question about the accommodation of the sailors on the "Britannia." I was greatly disturbed by certain criticisms that I saw in the columns of "The Times." The criticism, in effect, was that while a large sum had been spent upon this vessel, the accommodation of the men in the lower deck was totally inadequate. Now that criticism did not come from people who object to the cost of the ship. It came from the naval correspondent of "The Times," and if he is of the opinion that on this Royal yacht not sufficient money had been spent and not sufficient planning had been thought of in connection with the quarters of the crew, it suggests that it will not be a good advertisement for the British Navy when this ship goes abroad.
I am not in any way an authority on naval construction, but when the naval correspondent of "The Times" points out a defect in a ship which goes all over the world, and says that the men have to eat and sleep in the same room, and have not enough room for the ordinary amenities of life, and when considerable expense has been incurred on luxury, that is a criticism which deserves answer.
I read carefully the evidence on this matter in the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts. I found that, on this question, Sir John Lang gave certain evidence and he was examined by Members of this honourable House who are members of that Committee. After reading that Report, I am far from under-


standing the position yet. I do not think that the answers of Sir John Lang were, indeed, very candid. On page 448 of the Minutes of Evidence I found a question put by the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele), who raised the same question as the naval correspondent of "The Times." The reference to this was:
Now the last comment I have to make is with regard to an article which appeared in 'The Times.' The Navy Correspondent of 'The Times' said, 'It is a pity, perhaps, that in this ship, which embodies so many innovations, neither the new bunks nor the new system of cafeteria messing had been included.' That is why I asked you the questions earlier about the 'Eagle.' Can you tell us why you have not brought the accommodation up to date for the crew of this ship?'
The answer was:
I do not know what was the view that led to the non-provision of bunks, because undoubtedly we have been thinking about possibilities of that kind for the last two years or so. Almost certainly, the absence of cafeteria messing is that it is not by any means all that popular in the Navy. We have got a few ships completely fitted with cafeteria messing.
I do not think that Sir John Lang's answers to the questions we requite candid. He rather evaded the point raised by the naval correspondent of "The Times."
Next, this question was put to Sir John:
But they are still sleeping in hammocks?
The answer was:
Yes, except the chief petty officer and petty officers.
Then this question was asked:
Do the men like it?
This was Sir John Lang's answer:
Well, I have been on board 'Britannia' and I have talked to a fair number of the men, both juniors and seniors, and I have not heard a single grouse as to conditions of life on the ship.
The hon. Member for Leith (Mr. Hoy) said:
Did you ask them?
The Chairman then asked:
Do they grouse to you, Sir John?
The answer was:
I have been on board on a lot of ships.
Surely there was something evasive about that. Then the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West continued:
You are not a member of the consultative committee for the 'Britannia,' Sir John?

Sir John said:
No. I have been on board lots and lots of ships in my life. I make it a normal practice to talk to the odd rating here or two or three ratings there, and I have had quite a lot of grouses of one kind or another expressed to me on different occasions. I can only say that the 'Britannia' people did not grouse.
It is rather a queer business if the only person grousing is the naval correspondent of "The Times." I can hardly believe that he is out to cause disaffection in the Royal Navy. Therefore, I suggest that we should have a candid statement from the Admiralty spokesman this evening. Is there sufficient accommodation on the "Britannia" to give the men the ordinary decencies and amenities of life? Do the men have to sleep in the place where they eat? Are they living in a restricted space? Why was the provision of decent, modern accommodation for the men neglected in a ship which has cost such an enormous amount of money and which has caused such a great deal of public controversy?
We ought now to have some attempt to answer the criticism of the naval correspondent of "The Times." There is not only him. There is also the editor of the "Sunday Express"; he has been pointing out the same thing. I hope we are not going to have another statement of the kind——

Mr. W. A. Wilkins: That is a not very high standard, is it?

Mr. G. Thomas: It started on a very high level.

Mr. Hughes: That may be.
In view of the public criticism of the accommodation afforded for the crew, we are entitled, on this Amendment, to have a candid attempt—not the Sir John Lang attempt—by the Minister responsible to assure us that the men have amenities which are necessary and worthy of the ship.

8.33 p.m.

Mr. Walter Edwards: It was a great relief when my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) rose to move his Amendment. After three hours of what we had previously listened to in the debate on the Navy Estimates, it was like a breath of fresh air for us to be able to deal with the human beings who are still with the Navy and who, we hope, will be with the Navy for some considerable time.
The Amendment deals with the Navy visualised in the ensuing year as it is this year; that is, it deals with a Navy with conventional weapons. As long as we have a Navy with conventional weapons we have a duty to ensure that the people who serve in the Navy live in the best possible conditions and have the best possible married quarters or whatever accommodation It may be.
I very much welcome my hon. Friend's Amendment, because I really believe there is need for it. As my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) said, the finest recruiting sergeant for the Navy is the satisfied man. The wost recruiting sergeant for the Navy is the man who comes out dissatisfied, whether he is a National Service man, or has served seven years, or 12 years, or even if he has served his 22 years to get a pension.
We can split the Amendment into three sections—the question of shore accommodation, the question of ship accommodation and the very important point about married quarters. Before I start dealing with those various points, I must say that I was greatly interested in the revolutionary ideas which the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett) put forward. I am sure that it would make all our dear old friends, the admirals of the past, turn in their graves, if they were able to learn what has been said tonight—the sort of approach that proposes to have no more married quarters and no more naval establishments. Certainly if anything calls for a committee of inquiry—and the Admiralty has had a few of those as the hon. and gallant Member knows—it will certainly be revolutionary ideas of that description. I do not propose to answer him on that issue. That is the job of the Government.
The First Lord said today that he was quite satisfied that the men in the Navy were satisfied men, and that they were happy. The position of the Navy today is that we are getting fewer volunteers than ever before, we are getting fewer re-engagements than ever before, and we are getting more people leaving the Navy after serving a seven-year short-service engagement, or a long term. People do not leave unless there is some reason for their leaving. If the Navy were as it should be, and as we should like it to be, we should not find so many

people leaving it. When I was Civil Lord and had to answer for the Government to the debate on the Navy Estimates, I gave as a reason for the larger number of men leaving the Navy the fact that in those years there was full employment. We have to encourage people to stay in the Navy.
I presume that despite what has been said by the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East, we shall continue with Devonport Barracks, Portsmouth Barracks, and Chatham Barracks, for a fair number of years, at least unless something happens which prevents their use. But in any case we are going to use them. When I first visited a naval barracks 36½ years ago, when I joined the Navy, I had a free ticket to go to Devonport Barracks. When I became Civil Lord in 1945, I obviously had to go round barracks, and on two occasions I went to Devonport Naval Barracks.

Commander Donaldson: Did the hon. Member get a free ticket?

Mr. Edwards: I had a free ticket, too. I had a third-class ticket the first time and a first-class ticket the second time.
After those 36½years, those barracks were in a worse condition than when I first went there. One reason was that part of the barracks had been bombed and a lot of the property demolished. But from the end of the First World War until 1945,the Government had never bothered about seeing that the sailor had decent accommodation. They never bothered simply and solely because from 1918 to 1939 they could get all the recruits they wanted, because there was so much unemployment in civilian life. That was the cause of it; and, of course, during the war the Coalition Government obviously could not make up for the loss which had occurred between the two world wars.
In 1945—and I am very proud of the opportunity which was given me to play my part in it—we set out to see what could be done to improve the accommodation in the naval establishments. I am sure the House will agree when I say that although we cannot always give the men the necessary accommodation in the ships, we should see to it that ashore they have the best possible accommodation in order to make up for what they have to endure while serving aboard ship.
I do not wish to bore the House with too many figures, but I will say that we made a very good beginning in 1945,and we kept it going until 1951. The later figures are a little alarming to me. I have taken the trouble to look at the figures for accommodation for personnel at home. If there is one kind of place where work is required to be done it is our home barracks, because of the damage done during the last war. While I was at the Admiralty we had some modernisation schemes for our barracks which we hoped would be completed in, I think, 10 years. I am not certain of that figure, and it maybe corrected if necessary. It is no use continuing with bad accommodation and allowing people to leave the Navy in a dissatisfied frame of mind.
In 1952–53,the figure voted for the Navy Estimates under Vote 10 for accommodation for personnel at home was £384,000. That was as a result of schemes initiated by the late Government. In fact, in 1952–53 the present Government provided nothing at all in the Estimates for continuing the work of improving our naval establishments. In 1953–54, £800,000 was voted and of that figure £742,000 was for work left over as a result of the schemes still in the Department when I left. Only £63,000 was for new work. It is true that the figure went up beyond £1 million in 1954–55, but here again that was for schemes initiated previously, because there were no new works in 1952–53 and only £63,000 worth of new works in 1953–54.
This year, despite the fact that we are not able to retain men in the Service, all we get is £49,000 for new works, which does not give much scope, and £895,000 being spent to complete the work of previous years. That is not good enough. I maintain that the work of making our home barracks more suitable for the men on the lower deck should be speeded up, but it appears to me that progress is likely to decline.
I now turn to accommodation for personnel abroad, which is very often far more important than accommodation at home, because a man cannot get overnight leave abroad. In 1952–53 and 1953–54, no new works were initiated by the Government, and in 1954–55 only £14,000 was spent upon new works. All

the money spent up to then had been spent upon previous schemes started by the Labour Government. For this year there is a total of £24,000, of which only £1,000 is in respect of new works for the future. That sum of £1,000 has to cover accommodation in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malta, Gibraltar, and every other establishment abroad, with a total estimate of £24,000 for future work after having cleared up the schemes.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Wingfield Digby): I am sure that the hon. Member does not want to mislead the House. He knows that work in the first year always progresses slowly. We have to get these schemes started, and when he hears the figures which I shall have to offer I think he will see that far from doing less than he did we are doing very much more.

Mr. Edwards: We can only go by the Estimates.
For new works to accommodate personnel abroad, there is a total estimate of £24,000, and the amount of money to be spent during this year is £1,000. It is true that another £23,000 remains to be spent, and it may be spent next year, but that is all that we are planning to spend in respect of accommodation at overseas bases.
Another very important question is that of temporary accommodation. It was my hope that by now we would either have got rid of the temporary accommodation erected during the war or would have put it into such a state as to be able to make it permanent. That obviously has not been done and is not being done. It is grossly unfair to expect naval personnel to linger in this temporary accommodation any longer than is absolutely necessary.
The question of married quarters is also a very important one for the Service man. It is good for him to know that there is at least the opportunity for his wife to be with him for some part of his service. The term "married quarters" in Vote 10 applies only to those of key workers in England, Scotland and Wales, to ordinary married quarters in Northern Ireland, and to all married quarters outside the United Kingdom. In 1952–53, £172,000 was voted, every penny of which was spent upon schemes which had been started before the Conservative Government came into power. Not one penny


was allowed that year for new works for married quarters at home.
In 1953–54, £152,000 was voted, of which £137,000 came from earlier schemes. All that the present Administration provided was £15,000 for new works that year, involving a total cost of £22,000. What can we do with that sum to provide married quarters? How many can we put up? In 1954–55, £162,000 was voted, out of which £143,000 was for earlier schemes and only £19,000 was for new works.
What do we find in Vote 10 this year, which is
to provide married quarters for naval and civilian officers, ratings and industrial grades in new construction and by conversion of existing buildings. About 15 quarters are expected to be completed during the year."?
This year £90,000 is voted, of which £88,000 relates to earlier schemes, which probably accounts for the new works for the last two years. Only £1,950 is for new works, involving a total estimate of £17,400. What is that for? Eight houses, or fewer than that? In a year's programme, the Navy gets eight houses. I can talk about these figures for a long time, but I have given the House sufficient of them to make it realise that the Admiralty is losing sight of the interests of the men on the lower deck in proper accommodation.
Year after year I have had to draw the attention of the First Lord and the Civil Lord to the declining sums that are given. I cannot see any reason why these sums should go down year by year. It may be said, as was said when I was at the Admiralty, that there is a shortage of labour and materials, but if we are serious about keeping the men in the Navy we must give this matter priority.
Turning to the married quarters under Vote 15, I am given to understand that the Navy's quota out of what is allowed under the Armed Forces (Housing Loans) Act, is 20 per cent. while the Army and Air Force have the remaining 80 per cent. If that is true, the Navy is once again being let down. Those who are in charge of it should put up a good fight to get a fair quota. I also understand that when the present loan under that Act comes to an end the other two Services, because of the large percentage which now goes to them as against the Navy, will have completed their married quarters pro-

gramme, but the Navy will not have completed its programme.
It may therefore be that the Navy will be left with its programme uncompleted, while the other two Services will have completed theirs. If the people in the Navy know that they are to be treated in this way they will not be satisfied, and we shall not keep them in. I hope that the Civil Lord will be able to say that the Admiralty is going to get on quickly with the modernisation of barracks, that it is going to get on with the demolition of temporary buildings and their replacement by permanent property, and that it will do all it possibly can to see that there will be no reason at all for a man to leave the Navy, whether after seven years or 12 or 22 years, because he is dissatisfied with the accommodation provided.
If the Civil Lord can satisfy me on that score, I shall be as happy as anyone else. I am sure he will agree that those who, on this side of the House, have taken part in this debate have not done so with the intention of scoring debating points. We have been taking part because we have as much interest in the Navy as hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite have, and as anyone else in the country has. If there are faults, we shall be as happy as anyone if they can be remedied. I would, in conclusion, thank my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West for moving the Amendment and bringing up this subject.

8.56 p.m.

The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Wingfield Digby): First I should like to congratulate the hon. Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) on the very able way in which he moved the Amendment. Although, as he said, he may not have intervened often in debates on Navy estimates before, I certainly hope he will again, because I think he acquitted himself extremely well. It is very appropriate that he and another Member for Cardiff, the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) should have taken part in the debate today because, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out, Cardiff is an important ship-repairing port with which the Admiralty has had much to do. During the last year no fewer than 10 naval vessels have been under refit and repair there, including H.M.S. "Teazer."
We have had a very interesting little debate on this extremely important sub-


ject. The Admiralty in general sympathises with the terms of the Amendment. However, it must be understood that the Government cannot accept it, and I shall have to ask the hon. Member to withdraw it for reasons of procedure; but we are well aware of the importance of the matter, and, indeed, my right hon. Friend in his speech earlier today announced that he was going to start an inquiry into the whole question of manning and recruiting, which question covers a great deal of the subject we have been discussing on the Amendment. That announcement alone goes a long way towards answering the various questions and arguments hon. Members have put forward.
We realise that in the living conditions of the lower deck there is quite a lot that needs doing. There has been for some time. I can assure the hon. Gentleman the Member for Stepney (Mr. W. Edwards) that we are just as conscious of this now as anyone has been in the past. Although I should be the last to belittle what the hon. Gentleman did when he was in my office at the Admiralty, I shall have to point out later on that as regards shore accommodation we are spending very much more today—I think nearly three times as much in the present Estimates—on accommodation of one kind and another for personnel as was being spent in the last complete year of the Labour Government.
Whether we talk about accommodation ashore or accommodation at sea, we return to the same difficulty of bringing up to date old accommodation. It is very difficult to improve accommodation in the older ships, and so it is in the older buildings on shore, of which we have many. It is difficult to bring them up to a satisfactory standard. However, in the new ships and new shore accommodation we are providing very much better conditions than before. These improvements must, in these circumstances, be of a gradual nature, but I believe that the progress at the moment is pretty rapid. We are spending more money under Vote 10 than we have since the war—at any rate, since the run-down after the war. On married quarters and accommodation for personnel taken together, roughly £1½ million was spent in the year 1950–51, and in 1954–55 £2½million; in the present year, in these Estimates, £3·3 million, taking the two headings together. It will

be seen that we are doing a good deal, and I want to say a little in detail about that later on.
Meanwhile, it is only right that I should refer to one or two other subjects, apart from shore accommodation and accommodation at sea, which have a very great bearing on life on the lower deck. As my right hon. Friend announced in the Estimates last year, a general service commission has been introduced, which will mean that, whereas previously men served a maximum of two-and-a-half years abroad, very often with changing ships' company, it has now been cut down to 21 months abroad. It will mean that in future there will be a maximum of one-and-a-half years abroad for those not serving in ships on the general service commission, and, for those in general service commission ships, the maximum will be about a year. Carriers will be on a two years' commission, and others on one of about one-and-a-half years.

Mr. J. Dugdale: What does the hon. Gentleman mean by in future? Does he mean from now on?

Mr. Digby: It is taking a little time to get into the new system. The period is 21 months now, but a gradual improvement is being made.
When we come to pay, there again there has been progress in the last few years. There has been an increase in the local overseas allowance for married unaccompanied personnel which is equivalent to a daily rate of 7s. 6d. in Singapore, and, more recently, in November, 1954,all sea-going personnel were granted local overseas allowances. The equivalent here for a married rating based on Singapore would be 5s. a day, or 3s. 2d. for an unmarried one. It will be seen that here again something which has been a bitter grievance in the past has now been removed.
On the question of the re-engagement of artificers, which was raised by the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis), I understand that re-enagement is now no less than 50 per cent. If the men are fully qualified, they should not have difficulty in getting skilled jobs outside the Navy.
There is another thing which affects conditions, and that is discharge by purchase, which was reintroduced in March of last year. The number of applica-


tions received to the end of last year was 835, and the number granted was 724, which is a high proportion. As examples of the reasons given for desiring discharge by purchase, which were accepted, I may quote dislike of naval life, a desire to earn more money or a desire to emigrate. It will be seen that a great deal of sympathy has been shown there.

Mr. F. H. Hayman: Can the hon. Gentleman say what was the average time between the application for discharge by purchase and actual discharge?

Mr. Digby: Not without notice.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It seems to me that that is going beyond the terms of the Amendment, which deals with living conditions and accommodation.

Mr. Digby: Perhaps I could say a word about recreational facilities as part of living conditions. There again, we are attempting to improve facilities as far as we can. In regard to the effect of living conditions on health, I am glad to say that our medical branch has been and is continuing to effect an improvement, in particular in cases of tuberculosis, which is obviously something to be guarded against when people are living in confined spaces, and detection is now much earlier than was possible previously, owing to compulsory fluorigraphy.
Let me say a word about food, which is a question which very much affects those on the lower deck when they are in difficult living conditions at sea. As refrigerators have improved, it has been possible to provide more fresh food. During the last year considerable thought has been given to the question of beer on board ships. This is a very difficult question indeed because of the problem of stowage. When calculations are made, even if the beer is kept not in cans or bottles but in large drums, it is extraordinary how much would be required.

Mr. W. Edwards: We could fill one of the fuel tanks.

Mr. Digby: It has been calculated that to provide one pint a man for 28 days for the "Indomitable," stored even in five gallon drums, the beer would weigh 43·6 tons. That gives some idea of the complexity of this problem. I am glad to say that, after careful consideration

of this matter, the Board of Admiralty has decided that it will be possible slightly to relax the restrictions on the issue of beer. This does not mean, I am afraid, a regular issue. I do not want to raise any false hopes. But it means that in certain conditions——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must remind the hon. Member that the terms of the Amendment are to improve living conditions on the lower deck, with special reference to accommodation.

Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: May I suggest, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that living conditions include drinking conditions, too?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is not within the terms of the Amendment.

Mr. Digby: I accept your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, and I turn to the major question of accommodation afloat.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett) pointed out very well the difficulties which we face there. I admit at once that if we make comparisons between conditions afloat in warships and those in merchant ships the comparison is unfavourable to the warships. Anyone who has been over a modern tanker knows how extremely good is the accommodation provided. The reason is that there is plenty of space. Very different considerations apply with warships—considerations of both weight and space; and the progress of modern science has meant that the many new weapons, radios and other equipment which must go into ships, increase the space needed very much more rapidly than the methods which science has found can improve living accommodation.
I am quite sure that this problem is fully understood by all naval ratings, and I am sure none would wish to see a ship filled with living accommodation to such an extent that its chance of survival in war was prejudiced in any way. A new scale of accommodation in ships has been decided upon very recently involving expenditure of about £1¼ million.
I am glad to be able to tell the House that our scale of accommodation in ships of the Royal Navy compares favourably with that of other navies, including the United States Navy. The average area per man works out higher than in the United States Navy. As we have already


heard, bunks will be introduced in some cases in place of hammocks, although I believe this is not universally popular. Cafeteria messing will be introduced in larger ships, in carriers in particular, to an increased extent, and there will be laundries in all new ships. I am sure that that is an improvement.
A great deal of thought is being given to the interior lay-out of the mess decks, and outside advice has been called in by the Admiralty to deal with this question. A new design of furniture was approved in 1947, and that is being carried further and attempts are being made to fit the furniture better to the amount of space available. There are new designs for mess tables, kit lockers and stools. Unfortunately, the fire risk has to be a major consideration. For example, such things as the Dunlopillo type of mattress, which would add greatly to comfort, has had to be rejected because under conditions of conflagration it gives off a tremendous amount of smoke. Destroyers and frigates when modernised will be treated in the same way as the "Daring" Class with regard to this type of furniture, and I believe that there will be a real improvement.
One hon. Member referred to the galleys. They are being modernised and made electric where possible. As the hon. Member rightly said, some of the modern galleys are extremely good. It is not true that officers' accommodation encroaches in any way on that of the ratings.

Mr. Dugdale: At one time the officer accommodation occupied a certain percentage of the space. That percentage was reduced by the previous Government and the percentage accorded to ratings was increased. Has there been any alteration since then?

Mr. Digby: No; the position is exactly the same as it was then. There is some slight help in the case of the aircraft carriers with the angled deck, which provides a little more space which can be used for accommodation.
Another point of difficulty arises when men have to live on board ship during refit. There have been experiments in trying to connect up with the shore sewage system but considerable difficulties have been experienced. At Plymouth, an

L.S.T. which is alongside is at present being used for living accommodation, but every attempt is made to keep to a minimum the number of people who have to live aboard during refit. In a programme which will be completed next year, £500,000 is being spent on modernising the lavatories, and so on in the dockyards. When it is completed, there will be a further programme which will be useful in connection with refits.
Now, let me turn to the large and important question of accommodation ashore.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves the question of living accommodation aboard ship, will he deal with the comments of the naval correspondent of "The Times" on the "Britannia"?

Mr. Digby: I am delighted to hear that the hon. Member is now completely converted to anything which "The Times" says, and I hope that in future debates he will attach the same importance to what that newspaper says as he is doing in the present debate. As the hon. Member knows, the "Britannia" was laid out as a hospital ship, and the accommodation for the crew was designed accordingly. As far as I have been able to ascertain, it has been built to the same standard as is normal in modern naval construction.
I come now to shore accommodation. Unfortunately, however much we may wish to see the largest possible proportion of the Navy at sea, a great many men have to spend a good deal of time ashore. Since the last war, £5 million—or computed another way, £7 million—has been spent in improvements in personnel accommodation ashore. Of this, 90 per cent. has been spent on the accommodation of the lower deck. Another £1 million has been spent on new furnishings.
As to the actual expenditure on shore accommodation, in 1950–51, when the Government, of which the hon. Member for Stepney was a Member, were responsible, the expenditure was £460,000. In 1954–55 it was £1,020,000, which was rather over double that figure. This year we are planning to spend £1,410,000. Therefore, we have trebled the expenditure of the late Government on accommodation ashore. In view of that, it would seem that we certainly are not neglecting this work but rather that we have done


and are doing considerably more, though I would not belittle what was done by the previous administration.

Mr. W. Edwards: Could the hon. Gentleman tell me where he finds this sum of £1,410,000?

Mr. Digby: No, Sir. It is a somewhat complicated calculation. One has to add what is seen in one part of the Estimates to other parts which have to be taken account of as well. The hon. Member knows as well as I do that in the way in which the figures are presented here they are somewhat misleading [Laughter]. I mean that they are somewhat misleading from the point of view of the division of the Votes as to accommodation of personnel and as to dockyards and so on.

Mr. Dugdale: On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman has just said that the Estimates which we are discussing are misleading. May we be informed whether other parts of the Estimates are misleading before we discuss them further?

Mr. Digby: If I had been allowed to finish my sentence my meaning would have been clear.
In 1952, after the present Government took office, a report was made by Admiral Adams on all shore accommodation. He went round all the accommodation and tried to assess the relative priorities between barracks and air stations and so on, and we are still trying to adhere as strictly as we can to the priorities which he laid down. That report has been very useful indeed. Admiral Adams was able to establish where the need was greatest, and I am quite persuaded that the money is being spent there. Occasionally, for one reason or another, one has to depart from those priorities, perhaps because of some sudden demand arising from an operational reason, but I think that the problem of accommodation for the lower deck is being extremely well tackled at the moment. Only the question of money or capacity lies in the way, because the extent to which we can carry out the necessary building and so on is limited.
We have special problems like those arising from the wartime construction of airfields, but here again we are making progress. Barracks have been mentioned. I can assure hon. Members that we are going ahead with the modernisation of barracks and the rebuilding of some of

the blocks. There is a big block at Devon-port to be completed quite soon, and a couple of blocks have been completed at Deal. I will not worry the House with particulars of other blocks. There is a new chief petty officer and petty officer block going up at H.M.S. "Dolphin," and any hon. Member who knows that establishment will realise that it is one where the conditions have been among the least satisfactory.
As to new building at ah- stations, here again we have not been idle. In 1950–51, £27,000 was spent on the air stations. Last year we spent £223,000. We are attempting to modernise those which most deserve it. The air stations at Brawdy and at Hal Far are examples which spring to mind where new blocks have been built. We are pressing on with central heating and we hope that by mid-1961 we shall have central heating in three-quarters of all living accommodation, that is apart from married quarters. District heating is being installed at Devonport and Portsmouth barracks. We have new scales of accommodation now, under which chief petty officers will have single cabins wherever possible and the allowance for petty officers and leading rates below has also been increased, the leading rates to 60 square feet from 45. Overseas we have slightly higher scales dependent on the climate and whether establishments are in the tropics or not.
As to married quarters, as several hon. Members have rightly pointed out, we only started in 1946 under the late Government, and, therefore, the other Services have a considerable lead on us in this respect. Since the war we have built 2,500 at a cost of £7¼ million. We have 1,000 more buildings and we have made 1,700 hirings under the furnished hirings scheme. So we are pressing on fast. The programme for outlying stations, where we began, is more or less complete, and we have moved on with big schemes for the home ports. A total of 3,800 married quarters are planned to be built there, and another 500 at establishments outside the home ports which are not isolated establishments.
There has been some difficulty in acquiring sites because naturally in cities like Plymouth and Portsmouth we have come rather late on the scene to acquire housing sites. I had the chance of going round some of them myself, and I believe


we should get some very reasonable married quarters.
Allocation of these quarters is gone into carefully as between one man and another. There is a preference to be given for cases of long separation—I am sure the House will agree that that is fair—and we are planning a three-year tenure so as to reduce disturbance. Let it not be thought that this is not going to cost money. Of course it is. We estimate even by 1960 that the annual cost of our married quarters will be no less than £900,000.
I think I have said enough to show that we have this problem very much at heart at the Admiralty and are taking all reasonable steps to put it right by spending more money than we were and devoting the resources of our civil engineering department to this end. I must ask the hon. Gentleman for Cardiff, West in a moment to withdraw his Amendment because he knows that that is necessary, but I should like to assure him that the terms of it are something which in principle we can accept.
The First Lord has announced, as I mentioned previously, that he is to have an inquiry of a wide range covering re-engagement and manning so that a number of these topics will probably be considered then. We are doing all we can to improve conditions at sea, but it is going to depend primarily on new ships. Better conditions will be available in them and in the new buildings. We shall press on, and I believe that although progress must be slow, before very long it will be seen that living conditions for the lower deck are considerably better than ever before.

Mr. G. Thomas: In view of the sympathetic reply, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question again proposed.

9.24 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: We were delighted that my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas) was able to move this Amendment. He pressed his case for married quarters and improvement of conditions in the Navy so hard that those who did not know better thought he had a real

self-interest at heart and would very soon be getting married and joining the Senior Service. However, I understand that that is not the case.
There is one feature of these debates which creates difficulties. It is that in the middle of a perfectly good debate we have to break off for 2½hours to consider an Amendment. We have had evidence today that the Leader of the House and others on both Front Benches have appreciated the need for some improvement in the procedure of our Estimates debate, and I suggest that as the years go by we should consider the method by which we break into a debate which I think everyone will agree was going very well. Now, after the 2½-hour break, it is hard to pick up the threads.
As I remember, however, my neighbour in Lincolnshire, the hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) had been addressing the House and, among other points, had made one to which I shall refer in a moment, be cause it impressed me a great deal. Outside this House, especially in the Services where they have specialist know ledge, people tend to say that on these Service Estimates we talk "an awful lot of nonsense"—those were his words as I remember them. They tend to say that because we have to rely so much for our information on White Papers and the information which comes to us from the Government and from——

Mr. Emrys Hughes: "The Times."

Mr. de Freitas: —and papers and periodicals like that.
My first point was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton), who referred to an inquiry into the possibility of a fusion between the three fighting Services.

Mr. Hughes: And the police.

Mr. de Freitas: Earlier the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder) had advocated the fusion of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force without specifying an inquiry. I support the idea of an inquiry into fusion because I am confident that the report would not find that it was wise but premature to fuse the three Services, but I am sure it would find that it was timely to fuse the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.
I am anxious that this inquiry should get under way with all speed. My reasons are as follows. I need hardly argue my first point because it has been mentioned by more than one hon. Member. It is because of the enormous tradition of the Royal Navy and the great amount of good will among the general public for this Service. That is an historical fact and the result of living on an island.
The second reason I want this inquiry to go ahead now is because I fear that within a few years the Government of the day will find that it is impossible to produce the financial and technical resources for maintaining a hydrogen bomb deterrent, the means of delivering that hydrogen bomb, and the three conventional Services. When that happens, the Government of the day will produce an axe. The Royal Air Force will be spared a great deal because it will be the most concerned with the delivery of the deterrent. The axe will also be used on the Army, though it will be spared a certain amount because of its necessary rôle as a policeman in the cold war. I fear that when that time comes the Navy will get the most severe cut of all, so I want the inquiry to take place when the Navy can talk to the Royal Air Force on equal terms.
I believe we have little time. Already—this is remarkable—the Royal Navy is finding difficulty about its Regular recruiting, as I see from the figures. I remember the discussions in 1946 and 1947, when I was at the Air Ministry, about the plans for National Service. It never entered anyone's head that the Royal Navy was doing anything else than just obliging the two other Services by taking a few National Service men.
The time will soon come when the Royal Navy will not be able to talk with the Royal Air Force on equal terms. I should regret that we should have squandered one of our greatest national assets, which is the tradition of the Navy and the good will towards, and respect for, what is at present the Senior Service. I want an inquiry, and I want it pressed forward.
I come to my second point. The hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle referred to the matter of the experts outside the House thinking, and often saying, that on their subject we talk nonsense. Let us face the fact. I can

quote only from my experience of the Service that I know best. I believe that I am the only hon. Member who has listened to most of each of the Air Estimates debates during the 10 years, since the war.

Mr. Shackleton: So have I.

Mr. de Freitas: I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) will agree with me, but I have noticed year after year, in the Air Estimates debates, a decline in the standard of constructive criticism which hon. Members have been able to give to the Services.
Immediately after the war, when a large number of hon. and gallant Members could bring their experience to the debates, the criticism was direct and most constructive, but as the years have passed I have found a decline in the standard. From time to time I am told that it is the experience of hon. Members in other Service debates. Today it was very refreshing to hear the speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett); one of the most important things that he had to contribute was his experience of only a few months ago, for he is fresh from the Service about which he was speaking.
We are today in the great difficulty that, in view of the complexities of the Service matters with which we deal, we are not well enough informed. It is not enough to go on occasional visits to ships or military installations, to talk to generals and even Ministers, and to read, as has already been said, "The Times" or the "Manchester Guardian." Something more is needed. We should consider the setting up of an all-party defence committee as a part of the organisation of the House, in regular session, which could have discussions on matters like the Estimates and consider reports—it would, of course, be in secret—from the Services and the Service Ministers.
An hon. Member opposite shakes his head. It is, of course, completely foreign to our whole system of Parliamentary Government to have such a body. However, so were Questions to Ministers for the first 550 years of our Parliamentary life. It was about 100 years ago that we started our system of Questions so that hon. Members could criticise the Government of the day. Now Question Time


has become one of the great features of our Parliament, and I am sure that every hon. Member will agree that it is most important.
My point is that we are not fulfilling our function of criticising the Service Ministries, and I believe that we are not able to do so because we have insufficient technical knowledge so to do.

Mr. Shackleton: There are hon. Members on both sides of the House who keep in touch through their annual Reserve training.

Mr. de Freitas: That is perfectly true, but the level of that is low. The level at which most hon. Members serve is that of a field officer, or even lower. I want discussions with the Services at the highest level.
That is completely out of keeping with our whole Parliamentary system. When I suggested it in a similar matter a couple of years ago, the Leader of the House dismissed it in a sentence, and said that it was revolutionary. But after all, we are dealing with a revolutionary situation. Our whole Service strategy has been changed by the hydrogen bomb. We are in the position of being asked to vote millions of pounds, but the basis of our whole system is that hon. Members will have a certain amount of knowledge and will be able to criticise. That is difficult to do.
The citizens of my constituency of Lincoln have voted, through their representative in this House in the last three years approximately £7 million for the Defence Services. I estimate that each of our constituencies has contributed roughly £7 million. I cannot say whether they have had value for their money. I cannot put my hand on my heart and tell them that their money has been well spent, because I do not know.
That situation is wrong. I ask that, when we are considering, as we must in the next few years, various aspects of our procedure, we should not merely say "We have never done this," and that our procedure is completely different. Even Canada, which has a Parliament much like ours, they have comparatively recently set up a Foreign Affairs Committee where members of all parties hear the Minister of External Affairs, who can talk to them in confidence. They have

actually got that system. We are certainly the only Parliament in the whole of the free world which votes such a large proportion of its national income to its national defence and votes it blindly, because that is what we are doing.
Every other Western Parliament has some form of standing committee in which members can find how the money is spent. I do not ask for a reply to this suggestion tonight. I offer the suggestion to the Government and to my own party, hoping that it will be considered. We must change our system if we are to justify to our constituents the enormous amount of money which we are spending on defence.

9.39 p.m.

Mr. John Baldock: I am glad to have the opportunity of following the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas). There is a great deal in his point about the difficulty found by hon. Members who have not been able to follow active operations in the Forces for some years in informing themselves of the latest position and yet at the same time being called upon to supervise, on behalf of the electorate, Government expenditure of very large sums of money.
I think that my right hon. Friend the First Lord is to be commended this year in going a considerable way, in the Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates, in endeavouring to give the House as much information as he possibly can —without the cover of secrecy, or confidence—about the new position of the Navy in a world which might find itself involved in a thermo-nuclear conflagration.
I think that many hon. Members opposite must have been impressed with the fullness of the Explanatory Statement, which compares favourably with those issued by other Services and with those for past Navy Estimates. But it seems to me that the Royal Navy has been more affected by the advent of the hydrogen bomb than has either of the other two Services.
There has been considerable anxiety, particularly in the Navy, about the future rôle of that Service. I have been very concerned about this matter myself. It seemed that the Royal Navy was a declining force. Carriers were heavily criticised. It was hard to see that a declining force of smaller ships, escort


vessels and minesweepers could maintain the great naval tradition, or justify an expenditure of the proportion of the defence Estimates which had been the Navy's share in the past. Now I believe that all this has been dramatically changed by what little we know, as ordinary hon. Members of this House, about the aspects and the effects of the use of the hydrogen bomb.
This has been reflected by the Navy receiving a slightly larger proportion of the total expenditure in this year's defence Estimates compared with last year. Like the Royal Air Force, the Navy now has two rôles. It has the conventional task, which it has always had, of patrolling the sea, showing the flag, and taking part in supporting restricted campaigns in a cold war. This is an important rôle in itself as was shown, for instance, in the Korean campaign, when the Royal Navy was the first of the Commonwealth Services on the spot. That rôle still requires conventional weapons, and here I disagree with the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-West (Mr. Callaghan) about the decision of the First Lord to go ahead with the completion of the cruisers.
In the long-term cold war, which most of us fear will be with us for many years to come, conventional weapons, even cruisers with guns, will still be required. No one will wish to start throwing hydrogen bombs or A-bombs about in the minor campaigns which are liable to break out anywhere, or in the course of those police actions which the Navy has so admirably carried out in the past. A good modern cruiser with guns is a very useful instrument in the ordinary minor operations of a cold war.
Now the Navy has a second rôle which has developed so dramatically with the arrival of the hydrogen bomb. It has the opportunity of launching these thermo-nuclear weapons, as they are developed, by aircraft from carriers, or by ballistic rockets, which may be fired either from surface ships or submarines. It means that the Navy becomes one of the two important Services able to project the deterrent against the enemy, only from the sea rather than from the land, or by aircraft which have taken off from a carrier at sea.
It seems to me that this could well be an absolutely decisive card for this country to hold. It might make the

whole difference to a would-be aggressor if he knew that thermo-nuclear weapons could be delivered to him, or over him; not merely from prepared and charted positions—which he would know about—but from ships or submarines which, if intelligence was at all good, or perhaps as a routine matter, could well be at sea when the decision was taken to start a hydrogen press-button war.
Instant retaliation might be difficult from fixed positions, but the knowledge that there were still vessels at sea which had these weapons and could retaliate within a short time could be a decisive deterrent. That fact puts the Navy absolutely in the forefront of modern warfare, and is an argument which cannot be countered in considering the hydrogen bomb aspect of the situation.
In these completely altered circumstances the Royal Navy has a great opportunity of restoring confidence after the uncertainty and decline in morale which may have occurred during the transition period. For the Royal Navy now has a second rôle besides its conventional one.
The other vital point which has been affecting morale is the question of seagoing time. The Navy has always been a profession for sailors. Its attraction has been that it offers a seafaring life and not that it is a uniformed Civil Service. It should now be possible to send a much larger proportion of naval personnel to sea than has been possible in recent years. I cannot see that there is any longer very much purpose in maintaining a large reserve fleet.
Ships are required for their conventional duties of patrolling and taking part in a minor campaign which might break out anywhere at any time. The whole point of the Navy is its ability to be on the spot very quickly after the event, and a ship in a reserve fleet cannot do that. In this thermo-nuclear age ships must either be manned and ready to appear quickly at the place required or in the event of total war, be ready at a few minutes' notice. In either case I cannot see that a vast number of reserve ships, laid up, is of very much help.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East made a good suggestion when he said that some of these reserve ships should be dispersed among Commonwealth countries. That would put them to


good use, but more valuable still would be the fact that a greater proportion of the sailors in the Navy could return to their proper duty of being at sea in manned ships rather than being engaged in the somewhat dull and monotonous duty of maintaining ships in reserve for what I cannot see as a possible eventuality.
Most of those ships were required for prolonged escort duties or minesweeping operations, and I do not think that such duties would be required in a thermonuclear war, because that would assume prolonged hostilities in a hot war, which does not seem to be a reasonable probability. If the reserve fleet could be reduced in that way, money and men could be saved and a greater proportion of the men's service could be done at sea. We could have a harder, more practised and revitalised Service, with less administrative top-hamper.
There have been many suggestions in this debate, and some in the defence debate, particularly in the remarkable speech made by the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett), about some kind of co-ordination of the Services concerned with launching of thermo-nuclear weapons, either from the land or from the sea. I have been attracted by this idea, and have spoken about it in past debates.
There is a good deal to be said for the idea, and I hope that Ministers, the House, and the Services, will give further attention to it. It must be worthy of more thought. Now that this new aspect, this new rôle for the Navy, has emerged, there seems to be added argument for considering co-ordination or fusion of the Services, and I hope that an inquiry can be entered upon to that effect.

9.51 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Moyle: I find that my affection for the British Navy is stronger than for either of the other Services. That will gladden the heart of the hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland). I served in the British Navy in the First World War in a very modest way, but the source from which my affection springs is not quite the same as that of some other hon. Members who have served in the British Navy in times gone by.
I find it easy to recall one or two facts of history which I cherish very much in this connection. My history book tells me that the judgment of the British Navy was correct when it decided to support Cromwell and his Parliament in the 17th century. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) will share that view with me. I recall that the British Navy exercised sound judgment in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688, when it ranged itself solidly by William of Orange.
I may command your sympathy, Mr. Speaker, when I recall that the British Navy is the only arm of our Armed Forces that has never stood between the British people and its fight for liberty. That explains why I have a stronger affection for the British Navy than for either of the other two sections of our Armed Forces.
Having said that, I now wish to ask the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty some questions about the Pilcher Committee's Report. He will recall that in 1949 the Labour Government set up the Pilcher Committee to consider
whether any changes are desirable in the administration of justice under the court-martial system
in the British Navy, and to advise this House what changes might be made to modernise it and bring it up to date. The Committee sat in 1949,and its Reports were published in 1950. The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary knows that on this side of the House we have pressed for the implementation of those Reports.
The standing excuse for the delay that has been periodically used by the Parliatary and Financial Secretary, and indeed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, is that they were waiting for a report from the Select Committee dealing with similar matters in connection with the Army and the Air Force. It is true that there have been certain minor changes made by the Government that were recommended by the Pilcher Committee, but the main recommendations, as I regard them, still remain where they were—recommendations only from the Committee.
What has happened in the meantime is that the Select Committee appointed by this House has considered the existing codes of discipline of the Army and the Air Force and has reported to the House,


and its recommendations have been incorporated in a Bill, which is in process of passage through Parliament, and which, if I correctly judge of the matter, will receive the Royal Assent. Yet although the First Lord has been in possession of the Select Committee's Report for some time, no legislative action has been taken on the 12 recommendations which are still outstanding.
I was astonished at the answer that the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary gave to a Question put to him by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) yesterday. I will not quote from Hansard, but I will give the gist of his reply. He said that it is not possible at present to introduce legislation to give effect to these recommendations. That means that the Pilcher Report will remain, so far as those major reforms it suggested are concerned, ineffective, with no action being taken upon them. I wonder whether the First Lord can advise the House tonight that legislation will be introduced in this Parliament to give effect to those recommendations, and to bring the existing naval code up to date, and to conform with the changes which are being effected in both the Royal Air Force and the Army.
The history of the reform from time to time of the Navy's disciplinary code is not very encouraging. What does one find if one looks the matter up? I find that the first major reform that took place in the disciplinary code of the Navy followed the assassination of the Duke of Buckingham in the early 17th century. The second major reform in the disciplinary code followed the execution of Admiral Byng.

Mr. Callaghan: Where is he now?

Mr. Moyle: The First Lord has been most attentive in listening to the debate, and we are glad to see him back in his place just in time for me to pose a question to him. I leave it to the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to relate to him the history upon which my question is based. The question is, are we to wait for the liquidation of the First Lord before we get reform in the naval code? To relieve the right hon. Gentleman of any anxiety I had better explain that I refer to his political, not his physical, liquidation.
I want to refer to the main principle which underlies the recommendations of

the Pilcher Committee, and particularly to the Minority Report of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas),on the need to bring the whole system of justice now employed by the Navy more in accord with civil law. For example, there is the question of securing a unanimous decision from the court-martial before a verdict becomes operative, as against the existing majority decision. Secondly, the personnel from whom the courts-martial are recruited should be more broadly based than they are now. At present they are recruited from executive officers.
I should like to make the plea that if or when the Minister acts—when, for example, he in giving the consideration that is due to the future constitution of courts-martial—he should give sympathetic consideration to the appointment of ratings to the courts-martial, and I will tell the First Lord why. I think that the more experienced and the more broadly-based the courts-martial are, the more likely we are to get on them people of common sense than we do when they represent only a section of the Service.
I know the argument against that view. It is that the rating would suffer some embarrassment on his return to duty after discharging such an important responsibility as being a member of a court-martial, but I must say that I see no greater embarrassment accruing from such a change than now exists in the present constitution of courts-martial, when we have junior officers aged 21 years or more sitting side by side with very senior officers who play an important part in the prospects of promotion of the very junior officers who sit with them on courts-martial. If there is any disability arising from the appointment of ratings to courts-martial, the same kind of argument can be applied to the appointment of junior officers to courts-martial because of the fact that they may feel embarrassed in expressing their real judgment when sitting in concert with the very senior officers who play such a vital part in their future promotion in the Service.
The main point I want to stress is this. Having regard to the fact that Army or R.A.F. personnel, ratings and otherwise, ordinary privates as well as officers, have the right to opt, if they so wish, to be tried by court-martial, the First Lord


should treat these rights as of major importance, and introduce similar changes in the Navy, so that in all cases of conviction involving imprisonment, dismissal from the Service, or demotion, the naval ratings and other personnel so affected should have the right to appeal to a court-martial.
Those are some of the points which I wanted to put to the First Lord because I think it would be a step towards the ideal, as I see it, of bringing the whole system of justice in the Navy more in accord with our concepts of civil law and procedure.

10.6 p.m

Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. May don: The hon. Member for Oldbury and Halesowen (Mr. Moyle) will, I know, forgive me if I do not follow his arguments.
My right hon. Friend the First Lord made a statement in his speech today which struck me as being important. He referred to it briefly and I am afraid that he spoke too rapidly, certainly for myself, and I think for many others, fully to absorb what he said. He referred to the new officer structure, of which I feel the House ought to have more detail. He gave us a rough idea of the timing of the division between the Post List and the General List, but he left us completely in the dark on the methods of that division.
My right hon. Friend referred to the amalgamation of certain branches. I do not know whether I misunderstood him, and perhaps these points will be cleared up when the Financial Secretary replies. From what the First Lord said, I understood that the various branches would no longer be distinguished by their different coloured stripes, and I felt that he implied that there would be an amalgamation of certain of their duties, although that is a point which needs clarification.
Let us take the Supply Branch. It is difficult to imagine officers, who will presumably be taken from the General List, as it to be, of the new officer structure, who can deal with matters of pay, victualling, clothing, and secretarial work, in addition to other general duties. Perhaps I am rather conventional in my ideas, but I feel that these are specialised duties which should still be left to a specialist branch.
The Supply Branch also deals with stores, a very complicated subject with ramifications extending into other branches of the Navy. Many stores are handled by engineers, and it requires a very careful redivision of store items to see that the store user in general has sufficient control over stores to ensure that he gets the right piece of equipment at the right time, and, what is more important, that it is in a ready and efficient condition to be fitted into existing equipment and used forthwith. I wondered whether this reorganisation of the officer structure envisaged some amalgamation of what I look upon as more specialised branches of the Navy— the Engineer Branch and the Electrical Branch.
We have, too, the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors which in the past, rightly or wrongly, has frequently been under the fire of criticism. There is scope there for considerable reorganisation and, if possible, for getting officers in the Royal Corps integrated more into the active seagoing Navy, so that not only do they get an opportunity of putting their great technical training and experience into practice in actual sea-going conditions, but are able to see the conditions under which material which is designed and fitted under their supervision is in actual use while at sea.
My right hon. Friend the First Lord referred also to a shortening of the base of the pyramid so that the promotion prospects at the head of the pyramid were not quite so remote as they have been in the past. There seem to be considerable difficulties in doing that, and one point which, it occurs to me, could be considered now that this far-reaching step is being worked out is whether we could achieve a closer link between the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy.
If, as I visualise, the entry of cadets for training will be restricted in order to reduce that number of junior officers, there must inevitably be space to spare in the training establishments—for example, the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth. That additional space might well be used for taking in young officers who intend to make their career in the Merchant Navy but who could benefit by some part of their early training being spent in close conjunction with the Royal Navy.
I am convinced that both Services would benefit from that arrangement, not only among the executive branches but also among the more specialised branches such as engineers and electricians. There is at present, as most hon. Members will be aware, a very grave shortage in the Merchant Navy of officers of sufficient technical training, particularly among engineers. Some such scheme as I have briefly sketched might do something to increase the supply of such officers to the Merchant Navy.
After all, we have tonight been considering the tremendous scientific advances which have been made and which seriously affect the future of the Royal Navy. We must never forget that those advances equally affect the future of the Merchant Navy and the men who serve in it.

10.15 p.m.

Mr. Cyril Bence: I was very interested in what the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut-Commander Maydon) said about the co-ordination of the Merchant Navy and the Royal Navy, because I believe that if, unfortunately, we should be plunged into another war, if there is any chance of survival at all for us, it will be provided by a strong and fast Navy and merchant fleet to take out of the country what is left of the remnants of our population rather than leave us here to struggle on in broken-backed warfare.
I believe that the function of the Navy is certainly not ended. It has been said in the course of the debate that perhaps even the first two hours of war would be decisive. It has been said that if there were hydrogen bomb warfare we should be wiped out within 36 hours. It seems to me that the best chance for this little island would be to have a strong, fast fleet. We should need big ships to get something or someone away, because it would be our only chance to get someone or something back later. The function of the Navy has not yet been destroyed by the new conditions of nuclear warfare.
I enter the debate because I am rather concerned about the position on the Clyde. My latest information is that we have six empty berths there. I understand that they are capable of building hulls of up to 8,000 and 10,000 tons. The ship-repairing position on the Clyde

has deteriorated considerably, and as the Clyde is probably the greatest shipbuilding area in the country, every measure should be taken to sustain it. In the Firth of Clyde, Gareloch, Loch Long and Roth say Bay, there are probably the finest anchorages, with the exception perhaps of Scapa Flow.

Mr. Wilkins: That is a better one.

Mr. Bence: On the Clyde, and taking into consideration also the engineering equipment available and the skill and craft of the shipbuilders, there is possibly the best strategic anchorage in this island. There are possibly the best facilities in Britain for ships to enter and for ship repair and maintenance work to be carried out.
Unfortunately, in Scotland there is very little alternative employment for men who are engaged in the shipbuilding industry. Those of us who remember the period between the wars, when there was a decrease in shipbuilding, will also remember that one did not find the shipwrights, platers and riveters moving out of the shipbuilding industry into other industries in our country, even if they were offered jobs. They immediately emigrated. Thousands went into the United States shipyards.
It may be quite a good idea on the part of my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) that if war were certain we should disperse our shipbuilding facilities all over the Commonwealth because we, as he rightly said, are the target in the most danger in the world. But if I were a New Zealander or an Australian I would say, "If they are going to remove shipbuilding to New Zealand they are certain that there is going to be war and that they will be blotted out. If they shift the shipbuilding here we may be blotted out." Therefore, if I were a new Zealander I should disagree with my hon. Friend.
I do not think that it will be very useful to discuss the Navy Estimates from that point of view. If we do, it will be just an exercise in futility and all our plans will be smashed. In view of the fact that the six berths which I mentioned earlier are idle on the Clyde, I make the plea to the First Lord of the Admiralty that in any conversions, repairs and maintenance work that are planned, the Clyde should be given every consideration. Indeed, it should have priority,


because at Gareloch there are fine facilities for ships to lie up as secure as anywhere on the British coast. It will be a serious matter if there is any decrease in shipping activity on the Clyde. I leave the subject there, hoping that we shall have these berths re-occupied very soon.
I never had anything to do with the Navy. I admit I do not understand much about naval affairs, but I read in the Explanatory Statement that we have 182 ships in active service in the British Navy. I have done a little research, and I find that there are 1,024 in active service in the United States. I also find that there were 1,048,000 men in the American Navy and the Marines while we have 139,000, including Marines, sailors and Wrens. I could not get the contemporary figures for admirals in the American Navy, but I got the number of admirals in 1949 when they had nearly 1,000 ships. The number was 28. Now they have got 1,024 ships.
We have only 182 ships, but we have 93 admirals, or one admiral for every two ships. As I say, I have never been in the Navy. I do not know anything about it. I have worked in industry all my life, but I have never known of a manager for every two workers or for every two departments. A manager generally covers a huge area, but here we have a smaller Navy than we have ever had and yet we have all these admirals.
I mentioned this matter in last year's Navy Estimates, but this was passed over because the other matter I raised was more attractive to the journalists. This question may not seem so important, but to me it is, because the First Lord has stated that officers in the Navy need have no fear. They can be absolutely confident that there will be no axing. I have been in the engineering industry all my life, but even though in that industry there were new techniques, new developments, and new lines of advance because of technological progress, I never asked my employer for a guarantee for my particular employment.
But here the head of the Navy, an organisation which is going through a transitional period with new functions and in a new age, gives a guarantee to these 93 admirals, "It is all right, boys, you are all right." I have heard some men say that shop stewards in the factory should

never get the sack and many employers object to that.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: My hon. Friend is not comparing admirals with shop stewards?

Mr. Bence: Certainly not; shop stewards have a constructing function. I would not suggest victimisation for any admiral. I do not want to see them victimised. But it seems to me absurd that with a smaller Navy than we have ever had we have a larger number of admirals. I think something should be done, and we ought to have an inquiry in the Admiralty to see if all these admirals are really necessary. In the American Navy there were 28 in 1949 and, taking into consideration the increase in the number of ships, they should now have 50, so to balance it up a little we should offer them 20 of our superfluous admirals.

Mr. Wigg: Before my hon. Friend leaves that point, I have been trying to follow the argument and have looked up the Estimate. It is true that there are 93 officers of flag rank. Does it mean that they are all admirals?

Mr. Bence: I have been seeking information from some of the retired officers, and they assure me that flag officers are admirals. If I am wrong, the First Lord will point it out, and I hope that when he does so I shall be awake. If we consider these Navy Estimates and, after them, the Army and Air Estimates, accepting the fact, as we have been told, that we have three or four years before we might be engaged in a third world war when nuclear weapons will be used, I think we are indulging in a futile exercise. It has been said on all sides of the House today that with 10 hydrogen bombs dropped on this island all the Navy and Army and everything else would be almost annihilated. Several friends of mine, some in the Navy, some in the Army, have said to me that if they were at sea and a third world war should break out, they would probably be in the safest position of anyone. There is no doubt about that.
I hope we shall build as many carriers as we can, and as we can build ships for carrying passengers which are suitable for conversion to hospital ships, I hope that all the carriers being built will be suitable for conversion either to hospital ships or to passenger ships. I hope also


that the scientists will produce some means of protecting them from radiation. I hope that such ships would be lying well off the coast in that event and that as many as possible would be sent to the Clyde—I live in Glasgow—so that the people of the Clyde shipbuilding area may be rescued.
So I hope that we shall keep on building carriers and keep them away from this island as far as practicable, because should the statesmen of the world be so foolish as to turn their backs on one another and refuse to talk to one another, thus bringing us to that awful situation where we may be plunged into war, all that we are trying to build up would be made nonsense of. Whether we are planning for a bigger Army or a smaller Navy or a bigger Air Force, none of it would matter; we should all be annihilated and this island would be a mass of ruins.
I hope that the First Lord of the Admiralty and all the officials of the Services will think in terms of creating our defence forces on a conventional basis, because to take them into the nuclear sphere is, in my view, merely wasting our time, since this island would be finished within a few weeks at most of the outbreak of a third world war.

10.29 p.m.

Sir Jocelyn Lucas: The statement of the First Lord that no cuts in the Service are contemplated will be a great relief to the officers of Her Majesty's Navy, many of whom were feeling exceedingly anxious. I do not pretend to be an expert on naval strategy, so I shall not attempt to follow those former naval officers who have taken part in this debate. Moreover, in welfare matters I believe that the; dockyard Members should interfere only when asked to do so. The usual channels are usually the best.
There are, however, three points which I wish to raise. The first is the case of the Chargemen's Association. On 9th October, 1947,I was approached by this association to help them. From 1900 to 1946 they had had the right to approach the Admiralty direct on their own problems. In 1946 the then Government took away the right, I believe as part of the Socialist policy of reducing the number of craft unions. I do not want

to talk politics on that, but I think that that was the idea.
I took up the matter with the Admiralty, and in the following November the Civil Lord informed me that any grievances could be put forward through the Whitley machinery. The whole point of the association's case was that it was quite wrong for these people who had charge of men to have to put forward their claims for higher pay or better conditions through the men in their charge. Obviously, it made discipline exceedingly difficulty, and if those concerned were a bit strict, the chaps might well say, "You behave like that and we will not help you."
I arranged to lead a deputation to the Civil Lord on 19th November, 1948. The Civil Lord was adamant, and they lost their rights. This association, which represents between 2,000 and 3,000 chargemen, wants its rights back. I do not press for an answer now, but I should like the Civil Lord to promise to receive a deputation so that these people may put their case, which undoubtedly they would do very much better than I can.
Secondly, I want to mention the case of the dockyard "mateys." People often talk about the chaps in the dockyards and say that they are not always working very hard. Dockyards are peculiar places. Sometimes there is a rush of work when there are repairs to be done, and sometimes there is not very much to do. There is bound to be a certain amount of slack time but, by and large, when there is trouble they always do their job and put their backs into it.
The wage for some of these men is little over £6 a week and that is not very adequate in these days. Another point is that these men work in what we call the bombed cities, and their rents tend to be high. On top of that they have to pay bus fares to travel to and from work. All these make life difficult. In Portsmouth we are trying to improve the conditions by building a satellite town at Leigh Park. If these men live there the fares they have to pay are increased. I hope that the Admiralty will consider whether something can be done to make conditions easier.
Finally, the pensions for all the Services, for former career officers, who have helped to save their country, are far too low, as are the payments to their widows. Nothing can discourage the best type


of young man from going into the Services more than for him to see his father or grandfather on an absolute pittance trying to get along as best he can. In the old days we were used to the colonel retiring from his regiment and taking his batman with him. The batman would have a cottage in the country, look after the colonel's horse, and he was there for life. Now it is pretty well a case of the retired officer having to go as batman to somebody else.
I can mention one case of a former general who served with the Allies in the war. He got away from behind the Iron Curtain, and he is now doing extremely well as a steward in one of the best New York clubs. I hope that the First Lord will press on the Treasury the point of view that if we are to get the best type of young officers, it is not a good thing to starve their parents.

10.35 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot: The central theme of this debate has been concerned with the role of the Royal Navy in the nuclear age, and I propose to make a few amateur observations on that subject a little later on. But there are one or two other matters which I wish to raise first, and, indeed, one of the minor results of the nuclear age is that it makes me alter in certain significant respects the speech which I have made for the past seven years on the Navy Estimates. I am hoping to bring this speech up to date in the light of modern conditions, but there are one or two points which inevitably have to be raised on these occasions. One does not have to apologise for doing that, because there is no other opportunity open to us for doing so.
In his reply to the earlier debate, the Civil Lord referred to the way in which the scheme for reducing the period of foreign service was developing, and we were grateful to him for giving an explanation of how the scheme was working. I hope that the Admiralty will continue to give the House a detailed account of how the scheme is working, and whether, in fact, it is producing results, because from my experience I am sure that the biggest issue which might affect recruitment to the Navy is this question of the period of foreign service. There has been a lot of talk in all these debates

about deterrents, but I would say that the most powerful deterrent possessed by the Royal Navy today is the long foreign service period. I am glad that the Government are attempting to do something about it, and I hope that they will give us some more information on the subject.
Another item in the White Paper to which I wish to refer and which has already meen mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) is the dockyards extension schemes. My hon. Friend said in his airy way that they ought to be be done away with. I can perfectly well see the logical appeal of that demand, but, may be, my hon. Friend ought to inquire in a little more detail about the exact stage which the Devonport extension scheme has now reached.
The White Paper states that there is a proposal further to reduce the original extension scheme. At first sight, those words have a slightly ominous ring about them to those of us in Devonport and Plymouth, because we have already had two reductions in our extension scheme. I am not saying that I want the scheme to be as big as possible, but, obviously, the question of the size of the scheme affects the whole city, because the whole Plymouth plan and all the arrangements of the Plymouth City Council are based on trying to accommodate the desires of the Admiralty in carrying out the scheme.
I am sure that the First Lord and the Admiralty would agree that they have received every co-operation from the Plymouth City Council in carrying out the scheme. I understand that there is now to be another reduction, but I am not sure exactly on what scale it is to be. I am not complaining about it, because, obviously, if there is another reduction— and I gather that the Civil Lord will make an announcement about it—it will relieve some of the demolition of houses which would otherwise have to take place. Of course, we welcome that.
I should say that some 300,000 houses would be saved from demolition, many of them good houses. Therefore, we accept the reduction with equanimity, but there are two points about the new changes which the Admiralty is proposing and which I hope that the Government will consider. The first is that the Admiralty is now proposing to remove


from the extension scheme two or three areas which were previously to be included. In those areas the houses have been rapidly deteriorating during the past five or six years owing to the fact that nothing much has been done to them by way of repairs because it was assumed that they were going to be taken over. Naturally money was not wasted on repairing them, but now the Plymouth City Council has to deal with them. Therefore, special consideration should be given by the Admiralty to compensating the Plymouth City Council and to ensuring that the council does not have to bear the burden of the deterioration of these houses which has gone on in the meantime. I am sure that the; Admiralty scheme for compensating the Plymouth City Council will be fair and take into consideration this new arrangement.
The other point is that I hope that the Admiralty will tell us that this is a final proposal for the boundaries of the extension scheme. I can understand, as can everybody, the Admiralty's difficulties in deciding what to include. It was not easy to settle, but the Plymouth City Council has its problems and the Admiralty should make it clear that this is the final settlement.
The next matter I want to mention is referred to in the White Paper, and that is the modernisation of the dockyards. I have been asking for seven years for more to be spent on the modernisation of the workshops and equipment in the dockyards. It now appears that something is really being done, and that destroys the theory that the Admiralty does not care a fig for what is said in the House of Commons. I am sure that the Admiralty has taken it to heart, which shows that if one blows one's trumpet loud enough the walls of Jericho will not fall down, but one will occasionally make a small aperture.
As I was rather sceptical of the Government's proposals last year for carrying this through, it is only fair to say that in the last 12 months there has been considerable improvement. Considerable credit is due to Mr. Chatterton of the Civil Engineer's Department, who did an absolutely first class job. The Admiralty deserves to be congratulated on starting this work of re-equipment and modernisation which will be required for whatever purpose the dockyard is used. I hope that the Admiralty realises

that if it is to carry through a proper modernisation plan, it will have to be extended over the next three or four years. I hope that that is the intention.
There is another point which I have discussed before and about which we should have some report from the Civil Lord. It will be recalled that, following the Report of a Select Committee in 1951, which repeated almost all the recommendations which the Admiralty had pigeon-holed following a similar investigation in 1927, those of us who had campaigned for more civilian control in the dockyard scored a spectacular triumph—spectacular in the sense that it was the only triumph we gained from all these recommendations.
We persuaded the Admiralty to appoint one deputy superintendent with industrial rather than naval experience, and he is referred to on page 278. He works at Chatham and gets a salary of £2,375. As he is a unique specimen in the whole of our naval history, we should like to know how he is getting on and whether the catastrophes which the Admiralty earlier prophesied would follow such appointments have come about. Have things come to a standstill at Chatham? If not, are things going on more smoothly? Indeed, maybe as a result of that appointment there has been an improvement. We want to know if the Admiralty now has the courage to extend this experiment to other dockyards.
As I said earlier, most of the debate has been devoted to studying whether the Admiralty is applying the principles which the Government has laid down in the White Paper. I know that I am not an expert on the subject, but everybody seems to be able to join in the debate. For instance, if Field Marshal Montgomery can express his views about aircraft carriers, I do not see why I should not be allowed to express mine. I daresay that the First Lord would like to hear what I have to say as well as listen to-the Field Marshal, and, comparing the last two days' debate with our discussion today, I do not think that there is much relation—except for one or two speeches from this side in criticism of the Admiralty—between the principles enunciated by the Prime Minister earlier this week and the policy of the Admiralty as it has been stated from the other side of the House.
In discussion of the rôle of the Royal Navy and the Admiralty, as put by some hon. Members opposite, there is called in aid the example of the Korean war. We have been told, of course, that the Navy discharges a rôle in such a war such as would need to be discharged whether there is a hydrogen bomb war or not. But Field Marshal Montgomery, if I may refer to him again, and General Gruenther, have both said in statements—and all the generals seem to agree—that if there were aggression again on the Korean pattern, that would lead to hydrogen bomb warfare; and that is the statement of the Government, as I understand it, in the White Paper, although the Minister of Defence half wriggled out of it yesterday. If we are to have a genuine discussion as to how the principles of the White Paper are to be applied, it is necessary that we have an answer, which we have not so far had in the debate on defence, as to whether the Government agrees with Field Marshal Montgomery and General Gruenther that we would use the hydrogen bomb first if there were a "conventional" attack. That, of course, would involve a general hydrogen war.
If that is the argument, then most of the opinions about strategy which have been uttered from the other side during today are far away from the facts. There is a rôle for the Navy removed from actual aggression, but there has been no statement about the Navy's rôle as a deterrent, or as a force in fighting what we used to call until recently "broken-back" warfare. There is the defence which has been put forward by the First Lord, and here I would refer not so much to his speech today as to one which he made a few weeks, or a month or two ago, when obviously the big battle between the Admiralty and the other Services was going on. That was when Field Marshal Montgomery thought that he should bring the battle out into the open; when they were having a sort of dialectical hydrogen bomb war.
What I wanted to recall was what the First Lord said at the dinner of the Worshipful Company of Coachbuilders and Harness Makers. It was there that he appropriately made his defence of the aircraft carrier. The defence which he then made was different from that which he now presents. He has found that he must fit the aircraft carrier into his nuclear

prospectus, so to speak. He may have been carried away at the coachbuilders dinner, but on that occasion he explained, quite rightly I think, that we should make all ships smaller. No doubt that remark was applauded at the dinner for its wise sentiment.
But then the First Lord had to explain why he was actually making the aircraft carriers larger. He went on to say that there were three compelling reasons, and he gave them. One was that modern aircraft demanded larger platforms. The second was that small ships could not be made to go fast enough as economically as large ones, and the third reason was that a number of smaller aircraft carriers could not carry the number of different aircraft required today.
None of these compelling reasons for building larger and more aircraft carriers relates at all to the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier. Surely that is a question which has to be answered much more specifically than the First Lord has attempted to do if he is to present his case—if there is a case—for going ahead with the provision of these great and vastly expensive ships, so roundly condemned by other people who have some right at any rate to speak on military matters. I am not referring to myself, of course, but to the field marshals.
Another action of the First Lord which cast doubt on the whole of his programme was referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East—the completion of the cruisers. This does not fit into the nuclear perspective. It does not bear any relation to that or any other conceivable strategy put forward in these White Papers.
Moreover, the First Lord in this same speech to the coachbuilders—I do not know whether this was his peroration and whether he was getting really warmed up—said that we were going to keep the "Vanguard" in commission, and that the "Vanguard" was still one of the most formidable warships in the world. What is the meaning of the word "formidable"? The "Vanguard" is probably the most vulnerable warship in the world— I do not believe the right hon. Gentleman would deny that. What is the use of saying that this is a great and formidable weapon when it does not deceive anyone, but does cast doubt on the whole strategy of the Admiralty? It


is the thirteenth stroke of the clock that casts suspicion on the previous twelve. If the right hon. Gentleman is willing to defend the "Vanguard" and the battleship with the same enthusiasm as he advanced for the cruisers and the aircraft carriers, there is a grave doubt about the whole of his strategy.
Despite the well written introduction to the White Paper, the Admiralty is doing what it would have done if that had not been part of the White Paper at all; if the Prime Minister had not made his speech yesterday, and if we had never had the highly dangerous statement of the Supreme Commander of our forces in Europe, backed by Field Marshal Montgomery, that if necessary we would be the first to unleash the hydrogen bomb and hydrogen warfare. So I do not believe that the Admiralty has made any great advance in dealing with the new situation.
What I think the Admiralty has done —and on this I consider that the First Lord has every right to preen himself— is to deal with the military situation, or the new strategic situation in Whitehall. The First Lord has scored a great victory over the other Service Departments. Considering the meagreness of the strategic arguments he has had, he has done absolutely brilliantly in standing up to the formidable case which might be put by the air marshals—who have been discussing a war which might be settled in 30 hours—and all the weight of the scientific evidence pouring in day by day to their side. We read in the dramatic article in the "Daily Mirror" written by Cassandra the ideas of the Strategic Air Command in the United States, and with all that evidence against him, the First Lord of the Admiralty has achieved a magnificent victory. He deserves every credit for it.
I am concerned about another aspect of this matter, partly because of the general situation, but particularly because I come from a city which would be smashed for certain in a hydrogen war. Most of the other cities of this country would be, too, but mine most certainly would be. I am rather concerned whether the First Lord of the Admiralty will go on winning such victories as he has won this year. He has got for the Navy a bigger proportion of the total defence expenditure this year than the Navy was

able to get in the last two or three years; he has beaten back the pincer attack of the air marshals and the field marshals; he has kept all the different kinds of conventional weapons he was trying to get last year and has added to them the three cruisers; he has done brilliantly this year.
However, I do not think he is going to go on winning, because I believe that the weight of the argument against the power of the Navy as a deterrent force— which was, I think, the phrase used by some hon. Gentleman on that side of the House, though it is not a deterrent force at all—is so strong that, despite the skill and obstinacy and stamina the First Lord has manifested in winning vast victories over his Service colleagues, he will be defeated eventually. Eventually there will have to be a radical change in the way in which the Admiralty conducts the affairs of the Navy, to fit it in with the new strategy.
Therefore, I am concerned about Devonport Dockyard. Besides, I hope— we all pray—that there will not be a war. So I am concerned about the future employment of the people in Devonport Dockyard, because if the air marshals and the field marshals are right—I am not saying dogmatically that I think they are right, and I am not saying that my opinion is worth anything on the matter—but if they are right, as it is possible they are, and if in two or three years' time the First Lord is defeated in the argument and there is a cut in the Royal Navy, that would be a matter of great seriousness for the city which I represent in this House.
The Admiralty owes much to such cities as Plymouth. Cities such as Plymouth give the whole of their lives in one sense to the service of the Government, and the Admiralty especially. Many of the projects which we could have undertaken for the development of our city as a commercial port have been stopped by the Admiralty for various reasons. Therefore the Admiralty owes Plymouth—and Portsmouth and Chatham—a debt which it must always be prepared to discharge. It would not be at all acceptable for the Admiralty to say, "If we have to make cuts we will save a few thousands out of what is paid to the people employed in Devonport Dockyard." I say it is the Admiralty's responsibility, even if it thinks it will win the argument in the


years to come, now to prepare plans which could be put into operation if need should arise for employing Devonport Dockyard in meeting civil needs, lest those cuts have to be made and naval work has to be cut down.
We had some experience after the war of the repayment schemes for the dockyard. It worked pretty well. They were only small schemes. I am sure they were not very much loved at the Admiralty. The Admiralty did its best to do away with the schemes it had as soon as it could, but they were an indication of what could be done. Of course, civilian work could be done on a much larger scale. If, as we all hope, and the Government say they hope, there is eventually some scheme of disarmament, there must also be a plan already worked out for the subsequent use of the dockyard. Therefore, the Admiralty ought to appoint an inquiry at once—now—to see in what way it could use the magnificent equipment in Devonport Dockyard, equipment which is now being improved, for civilian purposes.
I said this a year or two ago before there was the hydrogen bomb. A Conservative Central Office speaker spoke outside Devonport Dockyard. He appealed to the dockyard workers to vote against me, because, he said, I was in favour of world peace, and if what I favoured came about they would be put out of employment. I think that maybe a few more people are now in favour of world peace. It has become quite a general opinion. Therefore, even if there are differences between us on how we should obtain it, I believe it would be very wise for the Admiralty to recognise that they have a duty to discharge to these dockyard towns, and it would assist in discharging it if they produced or prepared now the plan by which there could be the peaceful and reasonable transfer from naval to civilian work; if, indeed, the opportunity should be offered because of a change in the strategy between the Services or because we achieve what all of us wish to see, and that is a more peaceful world.

11.1 p.m.

Mr. J. J. Astor: I am particularly grateful to have caught your eye, Mr. Speaker, after the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), because the hon. Member and myself

share the honour of representing Plymouth, and although I do not agree with him on some of his points, I would join him in pleading that the Admiralty's decision about the future of the dockyard extension this time should, if possible, be final. Although the relationship between the Plymouth City Council and the Admiralty is good, I think the First Lord will agree that the city does deserve a final decision now.
I would ask the House to consider for a moment some aspects of the future employment of the dockyards, and Devonport Dockyard in particular. Much has been said in the last two days, in the defence debate, about the increased destructive power of the nuclear bombs. I can see a direct relation between the increased destructive power of the bombs and an inevitable decrease in manpower in the Services. I am not suggesting that this will happen in a matter of months, but I think it is probable over a period of years. This may not worry the Service chiefs, but it is bound to cause concern in a city such as Plymouth, where the whole labour picture is dominated by the 20,000 men employed in the Devonport dockyard.
In the Plymouth and Devonport area there is no possible alternative occupation in the event of redundancy in the dockyard. As I understand the picture, in the immediate future, in the period of conversion from conventional to non-conventional weapons, it is probable that employment in the dockyard will probably go up rather than down. I understand that there is to be an increase of some 400 men in the industrial staff of the Devonport Dockyard at present, and I hope that the Government can give some assurance that, provided the economic climate and international relations position remain the same, there is no probability in the immediate future of there being any unemployment or redundancy in the Devonport Dockyard.
I would ask the House to consider the future employment in the Dockyards, and although there are many imponderables in this, I hope the First Lord has considered this problem. It seems that it is possible, in five or ten years' time, that there will be a period in which there might be redundancy in the dockyards. I agree with the hon. Member for Devonport that


the only way of getting round this redundancy is to increase the repayment works programme. There is always repayment work in the dockyards; it is going on now, and there is no reason to believe that this Government is against increasing it.
It has been argued by the hon. Member for Devonport, if he is correctly reported in the Plymouth Press—and no doubt this has been read by those who work in the dockyard—that, if there is to be a major increase in the repayment works programme in the future, it is necessary to have a plan now. I draw the implication from this argument by the hon. Member for Devonport that, unless the Government come out with some plan now, they are not fulfilling their obligation in this matter. I am sure the hon. Member is wrong about this. As I understand the situation, with labour, plant and material available, it should not take more than a few months to increase the size of the repayment programme if an emergency arose. I hope that the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary may comment on this in his reply to the debate, for repayment work is the only way of getting round this redundancy problem. But I question whether any action now is necessary.
If, on the other hand, I am wrong and the hon. Member for Devonport is right, I agree with him that the Admiralty should consider this matter now. Where 20,000 men are now needed, in 1960 perhaps only 15,000 may be wanted, but in 1965 they may want 20,000 to 25,000. These isolated pools of industrial activity can only be prevented from withering by repayment work. If that is not done, then I think the interests of the Admiralty would be badly served.
I hope that some mention will be made of these points when the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary replies. I would ask the First Lord to bear one thing in mind. Whenever the finality and power of the unorthodox and unconventional weapon, it is bound to cause concern, as is only natural, to those who have earned their living all their lives in creating conventional weapons or the ships that carry them. I hope he will take the view that it is not only in the interests of those in the dockyards but those of the Admiralty

that there should be continuity of employment, whatever the year-to-year requirements of the Admiralty may be.

11.8 p.m.

Sir Richard Acland: It is almost an impertinence on my part to intervene in a debate of this kind, because I declare at once that I have no technical information on naval matters. But when we are dealing with the fundamentals of our present situation, there are no experts; we are all laymen; and I feel somebody ought to give a little support to my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot), who, not knowing that I was to support him, has unfortunately left us.
My hon. Friend was the first speaker I heard—and I have heard most of the speeches today with the exception of one or two made in support of the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, West (Mr. G. Thomas)—who seriously challenged paragraph 1 of the Explanatory Statement, which seems to me to imply that the advent of the hydrogen bomb affected our strategy, tactics and thinking no more substantially than it had been affected in the previous decade by the advent of the torpedo, the submarine, the aeroplane or radar. There, it seems to me, the Admiralty are most profoundly mistaken.
It seems to me that fundamental to the whole defence position is the proposition which hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House have expressed during the last two or three days; that is, that clearly we cannot defend ourselves, and prepare to defend ourselves, against every conceivable eventuality. The task of prudence is to try to prepare against eventualities which seem, on balance, most likely. It seems to me, with all respect to those who have high technical qualifications in these matters, that very largely in these Navy Estimates we are preparing for one of the most unlikely eventualities it is possible to imagine. Why? Because of the experience which has been implanted on all those who worked in, and have given their lives to, service in the Navy in two world wars within living memory.
In those two wars, what did the Navy do? What really happened to the Navy? There was a relatively small number of spectacular and brilliant naval actions, when fighting ships fought out thrilling


battles against, roughly speaking, comparable fighting ships. Those brilliant events were an exception to the general rule. The general rule was that the Navy, day in and day out, week after week, month after month, kept convoys moving to bring food and raw materials to 50 million people in these islands, and to carry supplies to scattered armies. In the first of the wars this went on for more than four years; in the second, for nearly six years.
These experiences cannot help being implanted deeply on the minds of anyone concerned with naval problems. Thus I think it is that in paragraph 50 of the Defence White Paper we have the sentence:
In a major war, the task of the Navy would be to secure the sea communications without which we cannot for long survive.
I question whether that statement stands up to examination in the light of the major and terrible decision which the Government have taken and announced to the world in this White Paper; whether it stands up to the speech which the Prime Minister made two days ago. My position on this matter is awkward. Frankly, looking back over the years, my position is an inconsistent one, because, in the light of what has happened, I ought to have opposed the manufacture of atom bombs on every possible occasion since I came into the House in 1947. I hope to say a word about that next week when we are considering the Air Estimates and the cost of the strategic bomber fleet to carry hydrogen bombs to their targets.
Roughly speaking, we have adopted the position that we rely on a deterrent to save us from a major war—a deterrent which the U.S.A. has and which the U.S.S.R. has, or will have. The reason we hope not to be subjected to a major attack launched either by hydrogen weapons or by a massive attack by conventional weapons by the U.S.S.R. is that we calculate that the Russian rulers will calculate that the U.S.A. would blow them to pieces with the hydrogen bomb. We take it for granted that the Western world is never going to make an unprovoked action of aggression, but if we were Chinamen, and loyal supporters of the present Peking Government, we might be asking ourselves what is going to prevent

the U.S.A. launching a hydrogen bomb onslaught on China.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Baronet is getting a little far from the sea in his discourse.

Sir R. Acland: With great respect, the area in which thermo-nuclear weapons might be dropped on China is not at all far from the sea. It is all an area concerned with islands, large and small. Nevertheless, without further elaboration, I can make the point that it is the possession of thermo-nuclear weapons by these two giant world Powers which we hope will prevent a major act of aggression from taking place.
It has been well said that while we hope there will not be a major act of aggression, that does not mean there will never be war of any kind. We can have cold war action. The Navy has played its part in the Korean action, and a similar action might be fought again; although the danger of its turning into a third world war fought by major weapons would be very much greater if it happened again than it was on the last occasion. But, at any rate, the Navy does not need to be anything like its present size in order to make its fair contribution to any reasonably likely cold war action.
The question of police force work has been mentioned. Then it is said that we need to have a screen across Europe. The Navy does not come into play very much with that, except to transport men and materials to and fro. And on that I should have thought it would have been better to dig the Channel tunnel. But all of these forms of war—the cold war action, the police work, the screen across Europe—all these, I agree, have to be taken into account as well as the possibility of a hydrogen bomb war.
But I ask in all seriousness is there any hon. or right hon. Member of this House who can foresee a situation in which year after year these islands, and the ships coming to and from these islands, would be subjected to an unlimited attack by submarine, by surface raider, and by bombing aircraft in which the hydrogen bomb would not be used? Will anybody say that that is an eventuality which can conceivably take place?
Despite the ambiguities which were offered to us by the Minister of Defence


in summing up the debate last night, I see the possibility that if some minor aggression is made somewhere in the world—a little frontier incident—obviously we are not going to reply to that with a hydrogen bomb and nor, I trust, are our American allies. But a war in which the overseas trade of Britain is subjected month after month and year after year to an unlimited submarine aircraft attack and surface raider attack, that is not the kind of little incident which we would try to contain by what has sometimes been called a mobile fire brigade action. We would not get a submarine onslaught upon our shipping year after year unless it was part of a major war, a part of a supreme act of aggression.
Now we have made the decision—it is an appalling decision—described by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh) as the gambler's last throw—that we will try to make that kind of major act of aggression as unlikely as we can make it by offering to use the ultimate and unlimited weapon. But if it happens, despite that hope that we thereby make the thing unlikely, that there is the unlimited act of aggression —namely, the only kind of act of aggression which would involve within itself the possibility of sustained submarine and surface raider warfare against our ships—if that took place, then the hydrogen war would be on.
Nobody has answered the challenging statement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) in the debate yesterday. What point is there in carrying 80 million tons of goods a year across the sea to a cinder? If the hydrogen war starts our little country is out. The problem will be to sustain, as it was in the case of Israel in an earlier act of unprovoked aggression by what was relatively to that country an aggressor equally powerful as the Soviet Union in relation to us. It may well be that the problem will be of sustaining a little remnant.
Therefore, if we had Estimates which provided for, shall we say, very fast merchant submarines—not fighting submarines—which might be able to bring in supplies to the battered remnant may be in Cornwall, Pembrokeshire or Caithness, that would be something relevant to a hydrogen war situation. If we had

Estimates for mobile repair yards—small repair yards, highly equipped, which could be mounted on wheels and which could be stationed in Canada so that some of our ships damaged in war might be able to limp to such places to get repair——

Commander Donaldson: Surely the hon. Gentleman must know that there are fully equipped naval dockyards on both coasts of Canada willing and able and capable of repairing any of our ships.

Sir R. Acland: If a hydrogen bomb burst on them? The hon. and gallant Gentleman fails to envisage the sort of situation I am trying to illustrate.

Commander Donaldson: The hon. Gentleman was making reference to towing small repair yards from here across the ocean to Canada, and I informed him that the dockyards and the trained workers are already there.

Sir R. Acland: I am trying in an amateur way, of course, to put some ideas to hon. Members. But we are all amateurs in relation to hydrogen war. There are no experts on the subject. I am trying to ask myself the kind of preparations which a Board of Admiralty might be turning its mind to if it really contemplates that the hydrogen war might break out. I have mentioned the merchant submarine to sustain a remnant that might be left alive in some remote part of this island. If we had any mentioned in the Estimate, I would say that the Government were being realistic in the light of probable events.
I was then envisaging a situation in which the normal repair yards in Britain and in Canada might have been destroyed. I thought that there would be some advantage in establishing in Canada what I described as mobile repair yards which might be able, after the main crunch of the hydrogen war, to set themselves up somewhere on some suitable creek or inlet in Canada. That might be helpful to a damaged and limping Navy in getting some of its ships into some sort of service again.
In the light of the only kind of major war that is now likely to be fought, it is fantastic that we should be spending Britain's resources in preparing a fleet for a long-drawn-out battle against submarines and surface raiders which are


attacking our convoys, as was so necessary and vital in the last war. After all, we have not got unlimited resources, and we are completely neglecting the major Soviet instrument of world strategy which just peeps out in one little sentence in paragraph 14 of this Report. I should be out of order if I developed the subject, but the sentence states:
For this reason economic, social and political progress must be maintained, particularly in the less developed countries.
I should have thought that it would have been the course of wisdom to divert some of the money now being spent in preparing naval vessels for the kind of war which never can happen, or which is so unlikely that it becomes reasonable to say that it never can happen, and to use those resources of money and manpower in doing a little bit on the economic, social and political lines to meet what is, after all, the main instrument of contemporary Soviet strategy.

11.27 p.m.

Mr. Geoffrey Stevens: I have often regretted my lack of imagination, but I confess that my imagination rather boggled a few moments ago at the thought of "nifty" little repair yards, mounted on wheels, being towed from Cornwall across the sea to those parts of Canada which had not been devastated by the hydrogen bomb. We are amateurs, as the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir R. Acland) said, and it would need the imagination of a professor to create such an image as a practical suggestion in a debate of this kind.
I propose to come down from such high flights of fantasy to a relatively small but very important and practical detail. When my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty opened the debate this afternoon he said, in reference to the manning of the Royal Navy, that we must make sure that the Navy offers an attractive career. I am quite sure that we all agree with that. But I think that applies to the officers of the Royal Navy as well as to those of the lower deck, and, in that respect, I think that one of the attractions of a career for an officer in the Royal Navy should be the pension awaiting the 93 admirals and other officers on retirement.
I am not at all certain that under present conditions those pensions are as attractive as they should be. I have in mind, obviously, the example of the officers who retired from the Navy before September, 1950. A good many retired naval officers live in my constituency, and they have read with great assiduity the case which the Government have put up on many occasions when pressed in this House to reconsider the pensions of those officers. Though I have done my best when I have been in my constituency to explain and extend this argument, those of my constituents affected still consider that they have been hardly treated.
My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, South (Sir J. Lucas) referred to the effect upon young men going into the Royal Navy of seeing their fathers hard treated. The Government have advanced two reasons for their inability to meet this demand which has come from all parts of the House.
On the one hand, they say that pensions earned in public service cannot be varied in the light of events after retirement, and their second line of defence that if the concession were granted to retired officers of the Services, then a proportionate adjustment would have to be in respect of a great many other people, including retired civil servants. Just for a few minutes I want to examine these two fundamental reasons, which I do not think are entirely sound.
I think that the first one—that pensions in public service cannot normally be varied after retirement—is fundamentally a sound principle, but I also believe that circumstances alter cases. It seems to me—as between 1938 and 1955, for example—that the fall in purchasing power of pensions of officers of the Royal Navy who retired in 1938 and before has been so substantial that the case demands readjustment to bring it closer to current reality.
In passing, I should say that a good many private firms and companies have created pension schemes for their employees so that when they retire they receive fixed pensions. In many cases these schemes were started before the war, and in other cases the pension is payable from a fixed fund. But I and many other hon. Members know of many cases where these employers have felt in


duty and honour bound quite voluntarily to increase these pensions because of the fall in the value of money.
On the other point—that if the concession is made to officers retiring from the Services a proportionate concession should be made to the Civil Service—I am not sure that that argument convinces me. I admire our Civil Service, which is certainly second to none. But whether in peace or war, conditions in the Civil Service are nothing like so arduous as conditions in the Services.
In peacetime, while it is true that some civil servants have to spend a proportion of their careers—sometimes a very large part—overseas, they are a minority and not a majority. Even if they do so, they frequently take their wives and families with them. Very different in peacetime is the case of the naval officer who has much of his service always to spend abroad. He leads a life of constant change with no settled home.
So far as war is concerned, every speech to which I have listened in the debate has indicated that the slogan of the last war, "We are all in it," will be even more true if there is a hydrogen war. That slogan was not the whole truth. It is a fact that in the last war— and from what the Home Secretary said in the defence debate on Tuesday, it will be so in the next war—the majority of civil servants were evacuated from the target area to relatively safe areas. They will not be completely safe areas, but relatively safe areas.
But the naval officers and ratings will be spending their whole war-time service seeking out the most dangerous spot. Surely there can be no comparison between the lives in war-time of naval officers and the majority of the civil servants. I very much doubt if the civil servants will in any way be jealous if officers' pensions of this kind are increased. The First Lord says that he is the champion of all serving officers; but he is the champion, too, of all retired officers of the Royal Navy, and I do hope that he will not merely knock on the door of the Chancellor but bang very hard indeed and represent in strong terms that many hon. Members on both sides of the House feel that these retired officers have had harsh treatment. I hope that he will try to persuade the Chancellor to apply a suitable remedy.

11.36 p.m.

Mr. Stephen Swingler: I want briefly to raise four points. What is the assumption on which this debate is based? It is, I take it, and the assumption enunciated in the White Paper on Defence, namely, that aggression will be met with overwhelming nuclear retaliation. Throughout the Government's White Paper on defence it is argued that that dread decision is necessary for the purpose of achieving the deterrent value of thermo-nuclear weapons, and to counter-balance the military preponderance in what are called the conventional forces of the Soviet Union.
In the White Paper, that assumption that the Government is prepared to take the responsibility with its allies in N.A.T.O. for the initiation of thermonuclear warfare in the event of aggression is clear and categorical. Because of that terrible decision, with all its unbelievably appalling implications, we should insist on the Government initiating high level talks; but we should also be quite clear and honest with ourselves, and with the rest of the world, as to what is meant by this strategic policy.
Since that White Paper was issued, it seems that some grave doubts have been cast upon this assumption, which affects our whole discussion today on the Royal Navy. For instance, one doubt arises from the failure of the Minister of Defence last night to give a plain and clear answer to some of the questions and suppositions put forward by some of my hon. Friends. A second doubt is cast by the fact that the Service Ministers appear to be carrying on as usual.
As some of my hon. Friends have said, although this decision and this assumption is made in the White Paper on Defence, we can see no real conclusions drawn in the Memorandum of the First Lord, nor did we hear any in his speech today. It appears to me that this leads us to an extremely dangerous situation being created at home and abroad, for if people see the Royal Navy carrying on just as usual, with the same kind of statements, and the same assumptions, this would appear to falsify the strategic and defence assumptions made in the White Paper.
The statement in the Memorandum of the rôle of the Royal Navy seems to me


to have no relevance whatever to what the Prime Minister said about the possibilities or the prospects of thermo-nuclear warfare. What on earth has half this programme to do with a war which might be decided in 30 hours? This country cannot possibly afford to be prepared at one and the same time both for a thermonuclear war and for a repetition of the Second World War. We cannot have a big Navy, Army and Air Force and mobile columns, and the H-bomb. But the statement made by the Admiralty and the speech of the First Lord suggest that the Navy is carrying on on the assumption of the possibility of a long-drawn-out conventional major war. I think it an extremely serious position and that we are entitled to a definite answer.
The Minister of Defence owes an explanation to the House about the strategic assumptions made in the defence policy. It is important, in view of what has been said in the defence debate, to make clear to the Russians, and to the world, and to the British people, just what is involved in this policy. To carry on with the construction of large targets for the atom and hydrogen bombs; to carry on with the same sort of phrases about the role of the Navy, and to make no conclusions about the obsolescence of the equipment of our conventional forces in the light of the assumption that nuclear weapons will be used, is to cast grave doubts on whether this decision has actually been made or would be carried out. That is a very dangerous bluff.
If in fact the N.A.T.O. commanders have decided that nuclear weapons must be used in the case of aggression, it is for the Services ruthlessly to draw conclusions from that; ruthlessly to reorganise their forces and their policy, and to construct their equipment in relation to that dread decision. This, I fear, is a question which will be raised, not only in relation to the Navy, but to the other Services. Like my hon. Friends, I do not pretend to be able to give any expert judgment on the conclusions which should be drawn. But, from reading this Memorandum, and from the speech of the First Lord, I think that any sensible citizen can see that the Government have not drawn the conclusions from their own assumptions.
Quite apart from the role of the Navy in relation to communications and in

local incidents, there are assumptions made of the possibility of major conventional wars and the part to be played by the Navy in them. That falsifys completely what we have been told by the Prime Minister and what is stated categorically and in unqualified terms in the Defence White Paper.
Now I want briefly to deal with three other matters. First, I think it is time that all the Service Departments stopped over-estimating their requirements. In view of the revelations of what has happened in the last few years, it is time that the Service Departments were required to estimate accurately what they are going to spend. Continually we have been asked to vote for each Service more money than could be spent. Once again, in the First Lord's Memorandum, reference is made to the possibility of under-spending. It is time the Admiralty and the other Service Departments estimated their requirements in relation to the economic capacity of industry and the state of the economy of the country, so as to avoid the situation in which each year a large sum of money is voted and the Chancellor of the Exchequer then declares that there is a surplus, sometimes of several hundreds of millions of pounds, out of what was voted to the Services.
Second, the First Lord's Memorandum shows a deplorable state of affairs in recruitment, one which must concern all Members of the House. Many Members have commented upon it in this debate. I am not satisfied with Departmental inquiries into the situation. It is time that a Parliamentary inquiry was established into the position of manpower in the Navy, Army and Royal Air Force, and into the reasons for the decline of voluntary recruitment. This Memorandum shows the unfortunate dependence of the Navy now on conscripts, and its dependence on the two-year period of service. I regard that as a grave breach of faith.
It is time that Service Ministers appreciated that conscription should be reduced. Pledges were given five years ago, when the period of National Service was extended from 18 months to two years, that that extension was simply for an emergency period that was related to the Korean war. The Korean war has been over for some months and the com-


mitments of the Services have been reduced, and it is, therefore, time that the period of National Service was reduced. It is time, too, that the Navy was reorganised, redeployed its manpower, and reduced its dependence upon conscripts and its dependence upon this long period of conscription which, I believe, the country cannot afford.
Therefore, I say that Parliament should now insist upon reducing the period of National Service. It is clear from this Memorandum and from other statements by the Service Ministers that a general inquiry should be made into the use of manpower in the Services and into the reasons for the decline in voluntary recruitment because of this dangerous dependence upon the system of conscription.
Finally, I come to the Admiralty's resistance to reform. It is scandalous that the Admiralty refuses to implement the recommendations of the Pilcher Committee.

Mr. Speaker: We are now on Supply. We cannot deal with legislation at this stage.

Mr. Swingler: In view of your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, I must amend what I have said. I have drawn attention previously to the necessity of carrying out reforms in the Navy, such as have already been carried out in the judicial procedure of the other two Services, and which were recommended in 1950 by the Pilcher Committee. It is, I think, deplorable that we have had no statement from the First Lord of the Admiralty, either in his speech or in the Memorandum, on this situation or on the general question of bringing up to date the Act of Parliament that governs the Naval discipline. I appreciate that I cannot go into the question of legislation, but I hope we are to hear from the Parliamentary Secretary that some action is to be taken by the Admiralty to inquire into the archaic character of the Naval Discipline Act, in view of the admirable work that has been done by the Select Committee on the Army and Air Force acts, so as to bring it into line with the reforms of the rules and regulations governing procedure in the Services.
In this debate many questions have been raised, both big and small, but I should like to come back to the point

with which I opened: that I believe that if the Government are to carry conviction that they have made the decision that is declared in the Defence White Paper, the only way they can carry conviction is if they are prepared to carry out the necessary reforms and consequences in the Services. What has so far been said by the spokesmen of the Navy shows that the Government have a split mind on this issue. That seems to me to be the most dangerous situation of all, in which we might reap the worst of two worlds. I hope, therefore, that in winding up this debate the spokesman of the Navy will show more realism in relation to this and will say that he appreciates what are the consequences for naval forces of the Government's decision to take responsibility for using thermo-nuclear weapons.

11.54 p.m.

Brigadier Terence Clarke: I apologise for speaking at this late hour, and will try to make my remarks as short as possible. I am particularly anxious to touch on three subjects: dockyards, the Navy, and Service personnel, in that order. As the Member representing the Portsmouth Dockyard, I should like to draw attention to the fact that although we have voted more money this year for the improvement of the dockyards, and the Explanatory Statement says that the dockyards are to be redesigned and replanned over a period of four years or more, so far the progress has been extraordinarily slow.
The sums voted, when divided between all the dockyards, do not come to very much for any one dockyard. This year, I believe, the figure is just over £1⁓million pounds. If one divides that between Chatham, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and dockyards in the North, it does not allow for very much reconstruction. I have seen progress made in the dockyards in respect of the machinery which has been put inside these sheds in the last two or three years, but the sheds are in a terrible condition.
I do not think that outside the dockyards the trade unions would allow the workers to work in the conditions in which they are willing to work. Anyway not for very long. Perhaps it would be a good thing if the Civil Lord spent a little time in the winter months going round and seeing the conditions under which these men are working in the dockyards.


In hot weather in the summer these tin sheds can be unpleasant enough. In the winter they are extremely unpleasant, and personally I should not like to work in one myself.
I hope that this programme can be speeded up, and I should like to know how much of the money voted in the last two years has actually been spent in trying to improve conditions in the dockyards in addition to adding new and better machinery to the equipment of the workshops.
Apart from the sheds being out of date, there seems to be an immense amount of money required for the upkeep of the roads and railways inside the dockyards. A sum of money is voted by Parliament, but it is divided between the dockyards and there are quite a number of things on which it has to be spent. I see this in the Navy Estimates under the heading "Dockyards and factories":
For the construction of workshops, the reconstruction of wharves and crane tracks, roads and railways, the construction of further facilities at an explosives plant and instructional facilities, etc., for dockyard apprentices, and improvements to shore electrical services.
That sort of thing, spread over all dockyards, takes up an immense amount of money, and that is why we see so little progress each year in the workshops themselves.
The next point I should like to touch on is the pay of the dockyard workers. The man working in the dockyard, before he has had P.A.Y.E. and insurance deducted, earns £6 7s. 10d. That is an extremely small amount for a man living in a city, particularly if there is no other income coming into the home. There are many of these workers who have to exist on this sum.
I would say they have even less than the agricultural worker when we take into consideration that the agricultural worker gets "perks" in the way of tied cottages at reasonably low rents, while his produce and commodities like that are cheaper in the country than they are in the towns and cities. In addition, the agricultural worker in season gets a reasonable amount of overtime. Overtime in the dockyard, on the other hand, is extremely limited, and many of these people on £6 7s. 10d. a week do not get any overtime at all.
I know the Parliamentary Secretary is going to tell me that these workers have merit awards, a pension and gratuity at the end of their time, but I would point out to him that even if every dockyard worker was 100 per cent. efficient, they cannot all get the merit award. Only a proportion of the workers will get it. There are many men who consider themselves as efficient as the man next door and believe that these merit awards are only given to those whose "faces fit" in certain quarters and not because of merit at all. That is a very difficult situation to overcome. I know the merit award was given to try to help the dock-yards man.
At the same time, there are still a large number on this very low wage. I would remind the First Lord and the Civil Lords that quite an amount of new industry is coming into Portsmouth. I am doing everything I can to try to attract new industry to Portsmouth. I read in our local newspaper the criticsm that the Admiralty is against new industry coming to Portsmouth because it is frightened that workers will be taken from the dockyard.
I believe that the Admiralty has no control over new industries coming to Portsmouth, and I believe that it will find that unless it does something to increase these wages it will lose certain of the skilled workers, and a great number of the unskilled. I think we ought to see more factories coming to the town so that if we get a situation such as that hon. Members opposite have suggested, and we may well do so if ever they come into power, namely, the abolition of the Navy, we shall not find in Portsmouth an appalling state of unemployment and no alternative work for the people.
I ask the Civil Lord to look into the differential between wages of the skilled and the unskilled workers. Although I think that the unskilled do not get enough, I am not sure that a maximum rate of £8 19s. 6d., with little overtime available, is adequate for skilled workers. I know that they get a great deal more money on the outskirts of the city already. In the housing of officers and ratings we have seen enormous improvement, and improvement is still taking place. I congratulate the First Lord and the Civil Lord on what has been achieved.
Let me now deal with the idea that the Navy is finished, and that we are now to have nothing but nuclear war. I feel that if the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan)—who I am sorry is not in his place—had lived 100 years ago, he would have thrown up his arms and said that the end of the world had come, and that everything must be abandoned as there was no defence against the sort of warfare which was developing. There is no defence against the bullet when it is fired at one, and hits one; but ways have been found of getting underground, putting bits of iron and steel between oneself and the bullet, and trying to hit the other chap before he fires the weapon.
The same applied when howitzers and big guns were invented. We did not evacuate Dover because big guns across the Channel pumped shells across. I remember during an exercise in 1943, when we were pretending that we were going to cross the Channel, watching the flashes on the other side of the Channel, counting 10, and waiting for the shell to arrive. We shall need a Navy for a long time, and shall need it because of the chance of someone like the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale becoming Prime Minister of this country—which heaven forbid! If that were to happen we would abandon the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and just negotiate with anyone who liked to negotiate and on any terms they chose.
I see no reason why we should be frightened of nuclear warfare. We saw no hysteria from hon. Members when the former Prime Minister announced that he had developed the atom bomb, unknown to his friends. Suppose that a hydrogen bomb is worth 50 atom bombs —I do not know what the figure is, and I do not think anyone else does—I would still rather have 50 atom bombs than one hydrogen bomb. It is no good killing the same man 50 times. It is all very well for hon. Members to laugh.
I doubt whether a certain hon. Member sitting in a corner on the other side of the House has any knowledge of this subject. He talks in every Service debate, but I do not think he gives the subject matter a single thought. A hydrogen bomb kills everyone in the centre of the explosion literally 50 or more times. All one wants to do in war is to kill a man

once. [Interruption.] That is not funny. It is a fact. The people on the fringe 100 miles away are killed once, but if 50 atom bombs are dropped over a larger area there will be much more damage and the people in the middle will not be killed unnecessarily fifty times.
Let us assume that the hydrogen bomb is a deterrent and that people do not use it, in the same way as they did not use gas in the last war, and that, because the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale is our Prime Minister, we abandon the Navy because it would be of no use. Russia could starve us out without ever having to use the hydrogen bomb. They could starve us out because they know very well that if they do not drop a bomb on us we will not drop it on them when the right hon. Gentleman is Prime Minister. Let us keep our courage up, and keep our Fleet, and forget this nonsense and hysteria about the hydrogen bomb. A means of defence against it will be found just as a means of defence has been found against every other weapon to date. It will be found, so let us keep a Navy.
There are various things I wanted to say about the pensions of officers, but those have been dealt with by my two hon. Friends the Members for Langstone (Mr. Stevens) and Portsmouth, South (Sir J. Lucas), so I will not touch on them tonight, but I may speak on pensions in the debate on the Army Estimates. There are, however, two other points I want to make, and I apologise for detaining hon. Members for an unnecessarily long time——

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The night is young yet.

Brigadier Clarke: The first is about boys' service in the Navy. I have had a certain amount of correspondence with the Admiralty about this matter. I am not sure that we have not got to think again as to whether it is a good thing to get a boy in the Navy at 14 and tell him that he has to like it until he is 30, which is what the situation amounts to. I am all for boys' service because I think we get the best sailors and soldiers by getting them young. But a boy ought to be given the opportunity at the same time as has a National Service soldier or sailor if he wishes to have his release, say at the age of 20.
Make him pay a small penalty if necessary, but it is wrong to take a boy in at 14 and tell him that his service does not start until he reaches his 18th year and that he has to serve another 12 years. I should have been very angry if my father had put me into the Navy at 14 and told me that I had to stay there until I was 30. At 20, the boy should be allowed to think again.
In conclusion, I want to say something about voluntary retirement, a topic which I raised last year. I hope that when my hon. and gallant Friend the Parliamentary Secretary replies to the debate he will tell us how many officers who have asked to relinquish their commission are still held in the Navy, because he has opened that door considerably and I have the feeling that the Navy is a great deal happier on that account. Nevertheless, I believe that there are still quite a number of officers and ratings who are held in the Navy who should be allowed their release.
There are naval officers who, having been held all these years, suddenly find that they have a new job open to them, and they are unable to get out, even to pay their way out. In my early days when I was a soldier we used to pay for our education at Sandhurst just as our equivalents in the Navy paid for theirs at Dartmouth. We could leave the Army the day we got our commission, if we did not like it, because we had paid for our own education, which did not cost the War Office one penny. Now, the education at Sandhurst and Dartmouth is paid for by the State; in fact, the men receive a certain amount by way of pay while they are being trained at these establishments.
If the Admiralty agrees to release officers it ought to ask them to pay some sort of penalty for leaving during the first five or six years. These officers should have the same sort of liability to remain in the Service as has the rating and the other rank. I do not think that the naval officer or the Army officer ought now to be allowed out scot free when he wants to leave, after having got his commission.
This point has not been discussed before. I should like to hear what the Government have to say about it. I am sorry for having detained the House at this late hour, but there were these

matters, important to a naval port, which I felt it was my duty to discuss.

12.12 a.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I should like to congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) on a really wonderful maiden speech. I hope that we will have the pleasure of listening to him a good many times in future. The only difficulty in following the hon. and gallant Member is that there seems no point of contact. He apparently regards the British Navy as one of the laws of nature. He regards it as part of his faith. It is very difficult to apply the laws of logic and reason to the point of view of the hon. and gallant Gentleman.
Apparently he believes that the British Navy was laid down by some Divine Providence and that it will go on for ever and ever and from strength to strength. While that may be faith and devotion to something which I cannot very well understand, I think that we fully appreciate it. I regard this £356,750,564 as a colossal, ridiculous, and unjustifiable waste of public money. I am here to try to do my best to assist the Chancellor of the Exchequer to save some of it.
On these matters I am often a very lonely voice, and we have a sort of gentlemanly coalition between the two Front Benches. There is Masterman Unready sitting on the Government Bench and Mr. Midshipman Uneasy on this side of the House, rather uncomfortable when we get down to fundamental principles. I do not want to improve the Navy. I want to end the Navy. I want to wind up the Navy and give the gentlemen who are now in the Navy something useful to do to justify their existence.
I remember a speech by the Prime Minister which was a far more devastating attack on the Admiralty than any I have ever attempted to make. He knew something about the Admiralty.

Mr. Callaghan: No, he did not.

Mr. Hughes: I remember him being the First Lord of the Admiralty at least twice, and he had some idea of what went on in those sacred precincts. I remember when the right hon. Gentleman stood at and thumped the Dispatch Box when he was the Leader of the Opposition, and talked to us about the horde of officials in the Admiralty whose one great interest


in life was to perpetuate their own jobs and to find jobs for their descendants. That was the most fierce indictment of the Admiralty that I have ever heard in this House, and I would not try to improve upon it.
It is quite understandable that the Admiralty consists of very gallant gentlemen who have served their country according to their lights, and who have done it very bravely and courageously, and so on, but who are quite out of touch with modern thought. They naturally want the Navy to go on and on, and the British Admiralty to go on for eternity, because it means jobs for themselves and for their grandsons and great-grandsons. But when, in the atomic age, they come along and want us to spend £356,750,000 at a time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer is so hard up for money that he wants us to clamp down on hire purchase for perambulators and things of that kind, it is time that the ordinary representative of the British taxpayer asked some questions.
What has been the dominant excuse running through this debate? We have had the mirage of the Russian Navy, and, though we have not heard so much about it this year, I remember that last year the Parliamentary Secretary made the Russian Navy four times more expensive than it was by the simple expedient of taking the ruble at its external value of 2s. instead of at its internal value of about 6d. It is very easy to make the Russian Navy four times more formidable by calculating the rouble at an inflated rate. We have this picture of a great Russian Navy, aggressive, determined, as the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West has just said, trying to starve us out. That is a completely cockeyed picture of the whole strategic situation, because the Russian Navy is comparatively small in relation to the conglomerated collection of navies that will be ready to attack it if war comes about.

Brigadier Clarke: How does the hon. Member know?

Mr. Hughes: I have not done yet.
I have never been able to accept that picture, because Russia is not and never has been a great sea Power. Russia is a land Power, and, if its navy has become such a powerful force within the last decade or generation, that is a wonderful

tribute to what the hon. and gallant Gentleman hates most—Communism. If it has grown to such fantastic proportions and has become so efficient, it is a tribute to the planning and organisation of Communism, about which the hon. and gallant Gentleman is so frightened.
One might be forgiven for thinking that if the Russian Navy has become so powerful, then it is time that we had a little Communism on our side in order that the Admiralty might make a better job of the British Navy than it is doing at the present time. Of course, Russia defends this expenditure on her navy on the ground that she wants it for defence. After all, we have never seen the Russian navy attacking our ports in all of its history, but we have seen the British Navy in the Baltic. I remember sailing up the Baltic and seeing Kronstadt, which the British Fleet bombarded in the early days of the revolution. The Russians argue that they have this gigantic navy for defending the Baltic, and their strategy is understandable.
Then there is the Black Sea. The British Navy has also been there. We had the Crimean war, when the British Navy operated there. After the First World War we had the British and the French Navies——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I think that we are getting rather a long way from the Motion.

Mr. Wigg: With respect, I think that my hon. Friend is in. order. He is criticising the size of the Navy, and it is part of the Government's case that there has to be a large Navy to meet the Russian navy. Surely he is in order in discussing the history of Russia to show what the possibilities are.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That would be in order, but I thought that he was travelling a good deal beyond that.

Mr. Wigg: He has gone back to the Crimea, and is now coming forward.

Mr. Hughes: I am trying to find out something about this huge Russian menace.

Brigadier Clarke: Will the hon. Member let the Russians know that the hydrogen bomb has made their navy out of date and get them to wipe it out?

Mr. Hughes: I should welcome any opportunity of talking to the Russians to point out that the hydrogen bomb is as much a menace to Communism as it is to capitalism. The hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West is quite wrong in thinking that I am an apologist for Communism. I am a good deal to the left of the Communists. I remember being interrupted by an hon. Member who said that I was the voice of Moscow, and I said that I wished to goodness I were.
The hon. and gallant Member misunderstood me. I do not at all apologise for Russian strategy. If I had the opportunity, if the Russians invited me to put a case against their rearmament programme in the columns of "Pravda," I would make a better job of it than would the hon. and gallant Gentleman. In the debate, it has been taken for granted that there is this huge, aggressive Russian navy which we must spend enormous sums of money to be ready to combat.
That is a nightmare and a delusion. We have to deal with a comparatively small navy which has all the navies of the world likely to be arrayed against it, especially the American Navy, which is the greatest naval force that has ever existed. I want to argue that if we are ever engaged in a war with the Russians, the Americans are likely to be on our side, and we are never likely to get into a naval war with the Russians except as a result of some mistake of American policy.
If the Americans have a big navy quite capable of bottling up the Russian navy in the Baltic, or the Black Sea, or the White Sea when it is free of ice, we are not justified in spending this colossal sum of money at a time when we are in a serious economic position. Let us have a look at the American Navy. We are told in the latest report that the paid manpower of the Navy Department now totals about 1,600,000 people; that is, about one per cent. of the nation's entire population.

Mr. Callaghan: How many admirals?

Mr. Hughes: I have not gone into the details about admirals, because, for one thing, I do not think that they matter so much. They do not think anyway.
What I am saying is that at the end of the year, there were 794,440 American naval personnel and 249,000 marines at drill pay stations, and 149,617 "white collar" workers, and 298,861 "blue collar" workers. I do not know exactly what they are, but that is the description which I find in this report. [An Hon. Member: "They had not washed their collars."] Perhaps, but this is the report of the American counterpart of the First Lord.

Mr. Callaghan: His name is Thomas.

Mr. Hughes: I do not know his name, but he states that last year 117 billion dollars was spent on the navy; an enormous sum of money from the national wealth, and representing an enormous number of ships; and when I read that there are in reserve, or in "mothballs" as they term it, no fewer than 2,500 ships, then I do not believe this story about the gigantic Russsian navy being a tremendous menace to the peace of the rest of the world.
Let us not forget that the other nations have their cruisers and aircraft carriers, quite apart from the American Navy, which is so huge and so preponderating that to claim that we, a small nation, have to spend this vast sum of money in order to be prepared against the Russian navy is not, to my mind, realistic at all. I do not know, for instance, why we need a Mediterranean Fleet. That will come as something of a shock and a new idea to some hon. Members opposite, but I really do not know why we need a British fleet there when the Americans have their Sixth Fleet in that area.
I have read in this report of the visit of the battleship "Missouri," which I believe is the largest in the world, to Istanbul. This display of naval strength was used to give dramatic support to the foreign policy of the United States; bandit may be making the United States safe from invasion. But I do not understand why, in all these circumstances, we need to keep an expensive fleet in the Mediterranean when there is this huge American fleet there, equipped as it is with aircraft carriers and all the various vessels.
This American fleet in the Mediterranean is practically independent of any base in the United States; it is an entity in itself, and it represents practically every type of ship there is in the American Navy—hospital ships, refrigerator


ships, depot ships, radar ships, tankers, and submarines—everything except an American "Britannia."
In the last debate on the Navy, the American fleet was completely ignored. It was assumed that only the British Navy would be likely to be called on to operate in defence of what is called freedom. But this American Navy is also a big vested interest. The American admirals, like ours, also have to invent reasons why they should continue, and the industry which supports the American Fleet has to be perpetually on guard against Russian aggression. Not only is there a naval lobby at Washington, but there are various industries which obtain contracts from the American Navy. It will be a difficult thing to persuade these gentlemen to change their habits, and to make them realise that they are redundant and must do something else in order to keep going.
I listened carefully to the speech made yesterday by the Minister of Defence. I stuck it right out, even to the peroration about John Bunyan. The right hon. Gentleman has apparently managed to convince himself that even John Bunyan would be in favour of the hydrogen bomb. In some respects the Minister of Defence is like Nelson—he turns a blind eye to the facts. In fact he is a double Nelson. He turns two blind eyes to the facts. He asked, "What is all this nonsense, this story about quarrelling between the Service chiefs? I do not know anything about it. They work cordially together, and co-operate as a team."
But today we heard that the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Deputy Supreme Commander of N.A.T.O. in Europe have been engaged in a fierce public controversy. I read about it, and for the first time I began to form a good opinion about Field Marshal Lord Montgomery. He went to America and said, "These aircraft carriers are of little use in the present state of the development of the world: why do you not face the facts and scrap them?" That was his opinion, but when we remind the First Lord of that he says, "Oh, he is only a soldier." But presumably Field Marshal Lord Montgomery knows something about the other Services. I think that the Minister of Defence has deliberately turned a blind eye to this controversy, which we have now heard reverberating this evening,

although yesterday the Minister of Defence said that it did not exist.
There is another controversy going on between our Admiralty and the American Admiralty. Let me refer to a newly-found ally, the naval correspondent of "The Times." He tried to find a compromise between the American Admiralty and Field Marshal Lord Montgomery. He came to the conclusion that the American Admiralty was going too far because the American Admiralty wanted aircraft carriers of 60,000 tons—I think it was, I do not know—but, at any rate, naval correspondent of "The Times" came to the conclusion that aircraft carriers of only half that size would do. So we have these Admiralty and naval experts trying to perpetuate their existence, but completely out of touch with the realities of today, and the realities of today are those of the hydrogen bomb.
How is the hydrogen bomb likely to affect naval establishments in this country? How is it likely to affect naval shipbuilding in this country? I vividly remember the attack during the last war on Clydebank, referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence). Why did the Germans attack Clydebank? Because there is John Brown's yard, which has been for a long time a shipbuilding yard of the British Navy. Of course it will be a vital target again.
The Prime Minister talked on Tuesday about the 100 targets that could if necessary be pinpointed for attack in the U.S.S.R. That pinpointing works both ways. There will be somebody in the strategical department in Moscow who will work out 100 places on the map to be pinpointed if an attack on this country is supposed to be necessary—not an aggressive attack, but an attack purely in the interests of defence. Nobody is talking about aggressive wars. They are purely for defence.
The Russian strategist will say, "Where do they build British cruisers? Where are they likely to repair them?" He will say, "On the Clyde and at Belfast." And so here we come in. Unfortunately, I live in the West of Scotland. I live between Belfast and Glasgow, which is a very dangerous strategical position to live in—and there is Prestwick Airport on my doorstep as


well. What will be left of John Brown's shipbuilding yard after a hydrogen bomb attack?
One of my hon. Friends advocated transferring some of our dockyards to New Zealand. The question is, what is to become of the population? What is to become of the million people in Glasgow congregated in a radius of five miles of Clydebank? The "Glasgow Herald" has been recently examining these possibilities. Suppose there is another attack on Clydebank with a view to putting out of action John Brown's naval shipyard, where, presumably, some of the cruisers and other naval vessels are being built.
We are told by the "Glasgow Herald" that, if a bomb were dropped on John Brown's or on the centre of Glasgow,
A 20 million ton hydrogen bomb will produce complete devastation over an area extending from the explosion, with collapse of buildings and destruction of essential services, up to a distance of 10 miles. In a city such as Glasgow the death rate after such an experience would be measured in hundreds of thousands, and the number of gravely injured survivors needing blood transfusion and major surgical aid would be almost as great.
What is the use of deluding ourselves that the British Navy is going to protect the West of Scotland? If the British Navy is not able to do that, one can well imagine Scots people asking what is the use of spending over £300 million every year on something which is no earthly use in protecting the people, whom the Navy is presumably meant to defend.
It is no use talking about defending freedom unless we defend individuals, and there is no defence against the hydrogen bomb in the very places which for two or three generations have been making the British Navy. We are not told any of the secrets. Where are these ships to be repaired? One can apply that argument to the Fleet base in this country, and simply come to the conclusion that it is absolutely impossible to defend this country by means of the British Navy. One may bomb the other people and bomb all the targets in the U.S.S.R., but that is no comfort to the people who will be congregated in our shipyard areas.
We have reached the position prophesied by my right hon. Friend the Member

for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes), in this House in 1942, when he said:
I, myself, hate to think of the military centre of control shifting to Washington…it strengthens a nasty feeling which I have had for many years, that we may find ourselves reduced to occupying what I term the position of America's Heligoland off the coast of Europe."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 8th January, 1942; Vol. 377, c. 152.]
What a wonderful position we have come to as a result of recent history. We have become America's "Heligoland" in Europe. I believe we should cease to be that, and should face the fact that the intelligent course of action is not to have a programme of rearmament but a three-year programme of disarmament, winding up the British Navy by instalments, always remembering that we have to find alternative work for the dockyard ports. That is a realistic programme.
The days of the admirals are over. They are as obsolete as Guy Fawkes. There is no future for them, and in time they will find that even the First Lord of the Admiralty will not be able to come along to the House of Commons and insult hon. Members who are prepared to stay after midnight by presenting them with a colossal bill in which no one really believes. Of course we want to find jobs for these distinguished gentlemen. I do not want to see any of them unemployed.
Two years ago I was in Peking, and I remember listening to an address by the Minister for Waterways. I asked what this gentleman had done before he was Minister for Waterways, and he said he was a former military governor of Peking in the time of Chiang Kai-shek. That man has at last become an honest man, and is doing some useful work.
There is no reason why the admirals and all the people who organize military strength could not be employed in developing our national resources, and no reason why the naval dockyards should not be engaged in building river craft for the Chinese, or dredgers for the Soviet Union, or doing something to cement decent international friendship throughout the world. When one begins to think in those terms there is real hope and a real sign of sanity after all.
I have listened to the speeches in this House this week feeling sometimes that I was not in this Chamber but in the chamber of horrors. We have heard


people talking about the extinction of the human race. We have heard the Prime Minister talking about this country being devastated, and it is being taken as axiomatic that Western Europe and this country can be destroyed in a few hours or in a week. That is defeatism.
I do not believe that the people of this country would prefer that sort of thing to Communism. I do not want Russian Communism in this country, because as a free thinker and a political non-conformist I should be among the first to disappear. I would not be able to address the Soviet Praesidium of the U.S.S.R. in the way that I can address the House of Commons. I do not want to see Russian Communism in this country, but I would prefer to see Russian Communism here than this country become a mass of radio-active ruins.
After all, one of the worst things that could happen to us under Communism is that perhaps 1 per cent. of the politically conscious people might disappear or be liquidated, but the great majority of the people—up to 99 per cent.—would continue to live. They would prefer, I believe, any kind of system rather than suicide. If it were put to any ordinary woman who is not interested in politics whether she would prefer to live under a Communist society rather than see her children——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I think that the hon. Member is again going a little far from the Estimates.

Mr. Hughes: I agree I am going far from the Navy Estimates, but I do not often get such an appreciative audience.
I believe that hon. Members have reached a point where they are genuinely interested, but I will retire to a stronger position in the rear. I merely say that we have to look at the Navy Estimates and the Estimates which are to be presented next week in the proper perspective of decent, human relationships. I do not believe that what is represented by the sum of money that we are now discussing is going to be a deterrent to anybody. This is an anachronism, and the ideas that are behind it, however, genuinely held by hon. Gentlemen opposite, are completely out of date, and so far as they are held by the Opposition Front Bench they are out of date too.

Mr. Callaghan: My hon. Friend is the only one in isolation.

Mr. Hughes: I am not the only one in isolation. I am making converts all the time. I recall that only a few weeks ago there were only six; now there are 57 of us. There is no other political party increasing at that rate.
I have every reason to feel encouraged in my campaign against this ridiculous expenditure, and I believe that in 20 or 30 years' time, if this country survives, and if Hansard is still available—that is, if anyone reads the speeches that are published in Hansard—they will not think that my contribution has been the least intelligent.

12.49 a.m.

Major Patrick Wall: I hope that the hon. Gentleman the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) will forgive me if I do not follow him into the realms of strategy, fantasy and foreign affairs. Morale has been referred to frequently in the debate. I think hon. Members will agree that the Royal Navy does not occupy the high status in public opinion that it did in the past. That is due to many things—the run-down after the war, to the defensive mentality creeping over the Service, and, probably more than anything else, to the fact that no one knew what was to be the role of the Navy in future. In the past week my right hon. Friend has produced a White Paper which has, I believe, done more than anything else since 1945 to restore morale in the Navy, because it has shown that the Royal Navy still has a vital part to play in modern war.
In thermo-nuclear war the carrier will undoubtedly have an important part to play in the deterrent we talked about so much in the defence debate. The hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) dismissed the carriers in scant terms, but our records show that there are more than 100 carriers in the N.A.T.O. forces. One hundred mobile airfields, capable of operating the aircraft to deliver atomic bombs, must surely cause an aggressor to think twice.
On conventional warfare I will not waste time, because we are surely all agreed that the Navy will have a vital role to play. Anyone who does not agree has only to study the Soviet building programme of large cruisers and submarines.


In the White Paper we have postulated a balanced fleet—carriers, guided missile ships, escort vessels and submarines. The interesting fact about this balanced fleet is that its eyes and teeth are to be in the air. There may be times when the eyes of the Fleet namely airborne radar, and the teeth, strike aircraft will require to be larger land-based aircraft; I refer to Coastal or Maritime Command. It seems strange to me that in these cases aircraft, performing these vital functions for the Fleet, can be controlled by another Service.
In case hon. Members think that at this late hour I am trying to rake up an old inter-Service controversy, let me say that I am doing nothing of the sort. I am reinforcing the suggestion that has already come from both sides of the House, it came first I believe, last year, from the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), regarding the possible amalgamation of the Navy and the Royal Air Force. When I make a similar suggestion to Royal Air Force friends they say, "Yes; we know that the Navy is obsolete: it is now 'washed up,' All you want to do is to use this idea to create a new Senior Service." However, I believe that if we go into the question in detail we may find that in future the Royal Air Force as we know it with its bombers and fighters and vast airfields will be as obsolete as some people seem to think the Navy is today.
It seems probable that in the future the Navy and the Air Force will be operating guided missiles of similar types. Therefore, now is the time to start examining the question before we come to the position when both Services are operating similar weapons in similar ways which neither want to give up. It will take a long time, and a lot of thought, to produce any possible amalgamation of the two Services, so the sooner we start the better.
The next point I want to make concerns raiding. We are an island race, and throughout our history we have invariably won wars by the exercise of maritime strategy. Yet in each war we tend to forget the lessons of the past, and we do not have in readiness the technique the equipment or the forces immediately required on the outbreak of war. I suggest that there is a vital role to be played today by small-scale raiding forces.
In days of thermo-nuclear war we may not have sufficient bombers or nuclear bombs to neutralise the enemy airfields or rocket sites that threaten us. It may well be that small raiding parties, achieving surprise, could do much to neutralise some of these sites. Again, scientific intelligence is important. I suggest that small raiding parties are one of the best ways of obtaining scientific intelligence from an enemy nation, again, there are many reconnaissance roles, and so on, that could be, and would be, of importance.
Have we the forces existing today, or visualised for the future, that can provide these small-scale raiding parties? My right hon. Friend will know that we have the personnel in the Royal Marine Commando Brigades, and hon. Members who visited the National Boat Show at Christmas will have seen one or two of the prototype craft which the Admiralty are developing for the small-scale rocky landings. The point I want to make to my hon. and gallant Friend is this, is he satisfied that we have the ships capable of carrying these raiding craft to the scene of operations? Is he relying on the L.S.T.(A). with their slow speed, now rapidly becoming obsolete and falling to pieces because of age, or is he thinking in terms of the last war when we adapted cross-Channel steamers to carry these assault craft?
I do not suppose he can answer that question because of security, but I hope he can give an assurance that he is bearing in mind this important problem of having modern carriers for raiding craft in being at the start of any future war; and also that he is bearing in mind new forms of raiding craft, such as the transport submarine. We have heard already of the food carrying submarine, and I suggest that there is also a future for the raiding or transport submarine.
In case I should be accused of fighting the last war, may I say that I believe it is ridiculous to consider purely amphibious raiding forces? We must also consider air-borne raiding forces. I am again thinking in terms of small-scale raids. The helicopter and the vertical lift aircraft seem to promise the ideal carriers for these small raiding parties. I am told—I do not know if it is true—that the U.S. Marine Corps are already talking of abandoning landing craft altogether and are concentrating on helicopters and


vertical-lift aircraft. I hope that my hon. and gallant Friend will be able to assure me that we are developing aircraft on those lines and that, above all, the aircraft we have are available for training the personnel we have; or, to put it another way, are helicopters available for training the raiding forces we have in this country and in the Mediterranean today?
Finally, two points on recruiting. First, the question of maintaining the long-service personnel and encouraging them to sign on for further service. I believe that what a man looks for in the Service is security of employment, namely, a guarantee that he will be employed during the whole of his working life. I suggest that there are two ways of giving him this security. There is the question of pensions. Suggest again this year to my right hon. Friend that if we are really getting worried about people not re-engaging, we should look to increasing pensions rather than to increasing pay.
But there may be another way. If, by some means, the Government could give priority in employment in certain Government services or in certain nationalised industries to men who have served their country for a long time in the forces, it would be going a long way to solving this problem. I know that the argument which is immediately advanced against this suggestion is that if we do this for the Services we have to do it for the Civil Service. But I venture to suggest that this argument is fallacious because, in the Services, we have men who have been subject to discipline, who have been subject to the highest degree of moral and physical strain, and whose families have suffered continual disturbance throughout their Service life. If these men are prepared to make those sacrifices for the good of their Service and their country, then their country should do something about their future employment when, finally, they retire from the Service.
Also on the question of recruiting, there is another aspect—the attraction of young men. The Admiralty could do more than it is doing at the moment to help the youth organisations. The ones that give recruits to the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy are the Sea Cadet Corps, the Combined Cadet Force and the Sea Scouts. The Estimates show that the Sea

Cadet Corps, with a strength of 23,000, has an allowance of approximately £4 per head per year. For the Combined Cadet Force that allowance increases to £7. That is probably right because from that force, from our public schools and grammar schools, we expect to find the leaders of the future Service.
For the Sea Scouts, where the total is about 9,500, the allowance per head per year falls to 1s. 9d., but in Admiralty qualified units—if one allows only for them—there are about 3,600 and the allowance goes up to 4s. per head per year. I am not necessarily appealing to my right hon. Friend to be more generous in money, in capitation grants, to these youth services, but I believe that the Admiralty could do very much more than it does now to help these youngsters by supplying boats and equipment. The Admiralty should supply these boats and equipment without expecting the organisations, which have very little financial backing, to pay for insurance and transport charges, as they have to in the scout movement at present.
The Admiralty could also do something else. It could give more encouragement to the men who help to run these youth services. For instance it could do some propaganda to encourage young naval officers employed at the Admiralty in London to help in their spare time with those organisations. It could have arrangements whereby men who had previous service in the cadet force and had completed their two years' National Service, could spend their three years' residual liability in the cadet units instead of serving say as able seamen in Devonport Barracks for the two weeks of their training liability every year.
The Admiralty could do more to encourage the civilian committees that run these units, possibly by a more generous pat on the back occasionally when the time for honours and awards come round. A better liaison could be maintained with the Volunteer Reserve units. I shall be very interested to see how much the youth movements are allowed to use Captain Scott's training ship "Discovery" when she comes back to her moorings on the Thames Embankment under the White Ensign.
Lastly, we have an excellent system of school liaison officers in public schools and grammar schools. As we are short


of recruits for the lower deck, could not we have a similar liaison with the secondary schools? Could not it be not necessarily recruiting but part of the boys' education to receive balanced instruction on life in the three Services? The local education authorities could be encouraged to have more talks or demonstrations from Service officers than they have at present.
I apologise to the House for having spoken so fast, but the time is getting late. As an island and, more than that, we are a maritime Commonwealth. The future of our Commonwealth depends on the control of the sea, on the sea, under the sea and in the air above the sea. That control is now exercised by a partnership between the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. I suggest that we may find a better method of controlling maritime communications by integration rather than by partnership. I suggest that now is the time to examine this question which may be of very vital importance to the future of the greatest assembly of free nations the world has ever known.

1.5 a.m.

Mr. George Wigg: The hon. and gallant Member for Haltemprice (Major Wall) has a curious similarity to the Secretary of State for War at his best, a glibness in superfluity and a profundity which can best be gauged by his concluding remarks during which he informed us that we live in an island—an astonishing discovery. I hope that his future researches into recruiting and the like will take him a little deeper than they did tonight, because this is a very important problem which affects all three Services.
I congratulate the First Lord on his speech this afternoon and on the fact that he is setting up an inquiry into this problem of Regular recruitment. I wish that it were an all-party inquiry, and that the right hon. Gentleman could persuade the Minister of Defence of the wisdom of looking into the question of recruiting as a whole in relation to the working of the National Service Act.
The mere shovelling out of public money à la the Secretary of State for War is not the answer. I suggest that between now and next Tuesday the hon. and gallant Member for Haltemprice

should go into purdah and study in detail the speeches of those who are as glib as he about the solution being the pouring out of public money. There is far more in it than that.

Major Wall: I gather that the hon. Gentleman is referring to my remarks about the youth organisations.

Mr. Wigg: No, I was talking about the whole of the hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks, but I am now dealing in particular with his remarks about recruiting.

Major Wall: My point about youth services in relation to recruiting was made to stress that what was needed was leadership and equipment rather than money.

Mr. Wigg: I am sorry that I failed to make myself clear. I was saying that the problem of getting Regular recruits is quite clearly worrying the Admiralty as it worries all three Services, except, of course, the Secretary of State for War who is apparently quite satisfied. It does not matter what size the Estimates may ultimately become if we cannot get the Regulars from which to provide N.C.O.S or petty officers, because then the efficiency of the Services is bound to suffer. That seems to me to be an obvious problem.
I have noticed the regrettable reluctance of the First Lord to set up a Select Committee to inquire into the working of the Naval Discipline Act. Of course, one could easily say that the fact that the Navy has begun to lose its high reputation for getting Regular recruits is due to the fact that it has not set up such a Select Committee. It may well be that one should make that point. Perhaps there is dissatisfaction in the Navy about the code of discipline, and perhaps one of the things that the First Lord should do at the earliest possible moment is to set up a Select Committee. I certainly would not press for any revision of the Naval Discipline Act until such a Committee had been set up.
It is extremely regrettable that when the Minister for Housing and Local Government made his announcement about his circular to local authorities on the subject of housing he did not include naval ratings. It may well be that they are included. If they are, then I am


very glad, but, according to the terms of the right hon. Gentleman's announcement, it sounded very much as if it applied only to the Army. [HON. MEMBERS: "To all the Services."] Perhaps I was rather obsessed from the Army point of view, because it was one of the recommendations made by the Select Committee. I apologise if I am wrong.
I shall not detain the House for very long and I have stayed only because there is one central point that must be made and that is about the astonishing, disappointing and depressing speech of the Minister of Defence last night. I went home a very sad and sorry man. It does not matter very much what majorities the Government have, nor it does not very much matter that there are differences on this side, which I greatly regret. What does matter is that the Government—never mind what is said— have failed to face up to defence problems which confront this country.
The test will come, just as now has come the test of what was done in the last year. In a year there will be another test and we shall be able to see whether recruiting for the Regular Services has been improved, whether the Estimates have been spent—and perhaps the Minister will tell us whether he has spent the Estimate for last year. I do not believe that they have been spent either last year, or in previous years. In production, there is under-spending.
I am very sad and sorry about the statement of the Minister of Defence. He is a glib, slick politician who pulls out all the stops. Do hon. Gentlemen doubt that? They should read his speech in the debate of 14th February, 1951. Then, he prophesied—he said he had been informed on high authority—that in two years the Russians would have 1,000 submarines. Does he agree with that estimate? If not, why did he not take the opportunity to correct it last night? He has not corrected it, because the Government's policy when in Opposition was to boost the Russian menace to the maximum and now that they have become the Government they take the opposite policy, that of playing down the Russian menace.
This country, weakened as it is, yet with a vital role to play, must make a careful revision of the problems which confront us. If the Government, with the aid of their military advisers,, decide to

undertake a strategic planning which is based upon the use of the nuclear weapon, then, provided it is a conclusion at which they honestly arrive, would be a conclusion from which I could not dissent; but that should be reflected in the White Papers for all the Services and it is not there.
I shall not attack the Navy, nor say that aircraft carriers are finished, nor that the "Vanguard" does not have a role. I am prepared to leave that to the experts —and I am certainly not that—but I have very grave doubts indeed about the conception which is implicit in these Estimates.
Here I come to a point which I want to emphasise. When it comes to the role of the missile ship, is there anybody very sure that missiles will work out? We do not yet have—in spite of all the announcements and enthusiasm of the Government Press—a satisfactory air-to-air missile. I agree that they have gone into production, but it is only a limited production and it is not at all the final answer. To build ships before we have them is a risk that we might take, but I shall be very interested indeed to hear more of this project.
I am not at all sure that the conception of push button warfare is right. I am equally sure that the conception of the hydrogen war and the nuclear age has not penetrated to the Government benches. The speech we heard tonight from the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke) who held a very senior rank in the Army, of his conception of a hot war demonstrates the complete failure of the Government to explain to their own supporters what they are really about.
If that can happen to hon. Members, what must be the effect on people in the country? We are unlike the Russians. The Russian Government have the power and the organisation to act administratively. Here, we cannot get action unless there is an informed public opinion behind it to understand what the Government want to do and to back it. The general public is a long way from understanding what the role of the Royal Navy is, or what the overall picture is.
I should like, briefly, to turn to the question of aircraft. It is all very well to have carriers with the fleet, but we


must also have aircraft to put in them; and they must be satisfactory aircraft, and while I let go by default—or rather, I would say, do not press the argument— the question of the efficiency of the aircraft carriers with the Fleet, I can say that I am a little more certain about some of the aircraft. For all the arguments that have been made, and all the answers to questions which I have had in this House, the DH 110 was turned down by the Royal Air Force. It certainly had a great deal of trouble, and my view is that de Havilland would never have done much about this machine after it was turned down at Boscombe Down except for the fact that they were in trouble with the Comet and wanted to keep going.
We are spending £20 million on an aircraft which is the last of a vintage. This aircraft is a long, long way short of being technically satisfactory. It is true, of course, that the Air Ministry had the choice between the Javelin and the DH 110,and I should like to congratulate the First Lord's advisers on choosing the DH 110 in preference to the Javelin. If I may put it this way, that is one up to the Navy; and the Navy should run this as hard as it can. This is entirely better than the Javelin, which has two engines and carries 780 gallons of fuel, with a fuel consumption which is such as to give very low endurance; and, faced with the choice between the two, the Admiralty made a decision which means that it comes out much better than the Air Staff on this point.
But that is not saying much. It is rather like having to choose between a horse with only one leg and a horse with none. I believe that the Javelin is "no go" for all that has been said about it. I believe that it belongs to the same class as the Swift, and if the case is made out for the aircraft carrier—and that is a matter for the closest research at the highest level without the inter-Service rows which are rather childish—then might I suggest that the First Lord ought to fight the battle with his colleagues, even, if necessary, to the point of resignation, in order to ensure that he gets aircraft worthy of the carriers?
If the case for the carrier is established, then do not let it be loaded with junk; because that is what we have been

doing. Not that I make any great point about that; it was choice between junk and nothing. I am suspicious that the smart operators at the Ministry of Defence lacked the political knowledge about what ought really to be done about the Navy, but I congratulate the First Lord. He must have had "bags of guts" to have got away with it. I hope he is right. If he is, he has taken £350 million of public money, and he has either got away with things which he should not have done, or he has not got away with quite enough because he has the carriers but not the aircraft.
May I say now that I am astonished to read a statement in the "Daily Express" which, I hope, is not quite true. It is not a newspaper which I buy, but I came across this report of the Government's decision to have some form of coordination by the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as a sort of supreme commander of all three Services. That makes me very suspicious when I see the political triumph achieved by the Admiralty over the other two Services. I hope that we shall not foist this minor Royalty on to the Service in the hope that that will gloss over the real need for co-operation.
Although the First Lord has triumphed to the extent that he has, I would remind him that when he is fighting the Secretary of State for War he is not fighting very much. I believe that the Secretary of State for Air is in a different class, and I should have thought that the Under-Secretary had plenty of "go" when fighting for his Service. But if the right hon. Gentleman gets away with it to the extent of foisting Earl Mountbatten on the Army, I can assure him that he will have more trouble from some of us than from the Secretary of State for War. I hope he will tell us that this leak to the "Daily Express" is not another example of the smart politics played so admirably by the Minister of Defence.
I wish the Navy well. Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes),I do not want to bring the Navy to an end, but if there is a choice between my hon. Friend and the hon. and gallant Member for Portsmouth, West I shall become a pacifist. After listening to the hon. and gallant Member on the subject of the hydrogen bomb, I must say that. In the months that lie ahead I hope we shall get the question


of the use of the aircraft carrier cleared up, and, if it is established, that we shall make absolutely sure that the Navy gets the aircraft that it ought to get.

1.22 a.m.

The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty Commander Allan Noble): I think the House will agree that this has been a very good debate. It has covered a variety of topics, besides the main topic which has run through the whole debate, about the role of the Navy. A great many points of detail also have been raised, and I shall find it extremely difficult to answer them all.
I feel rather like the young author who visited one of Her Majesty's ships recently to write a book. He was asked how long he was going to stay. He said, "I arrived yesterday and I am leaving tomorrow." When asked what his book was to be called, he said, "The Navy Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow."
First, I should like to welcome to our naval debates my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett). As was said by the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) he brings to our debates the most up-to-date professional knowledge from the Service. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) made, as he so often does, on naval topics, a most moderate and thoughtful speech.
I shall try, first, to deal with the personnel and more general points and then turn to the role of the Navy, ship construction and merging of the Air Force and Navy which has been suggested. I shall not be able to cover all the points, but I will write to hon. Members to whom I cannot reply, especially as I have received apologies from a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House for being unable to be present for my winding-up speech.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Mait-land) and my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) referred to promotion and the careers of officers. What my right hon. Friend said today about the new officer structure made it quite clear that we are actively attacking the problem of providing better careers for naval officers. He said that the base of the

pyramid was too big, with the result that too few got to the top and many had to leave at a time when a man had no wish to finish his career. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wells asked how we were to reduce the base of the pyramid.
My right hon. Friend said there were to be fewer entries of cadets, and that we intended, if need be, to employ for special duties special service officers, and would also make some appointments from the branch officers. Officers on promotion to commander and officers on promotion to captain will be promoted either into what is called the new Post List or into the General List. Of course, the new Post List will provide opportunities to sea time for all those selected to proceed through that channel of promotion.
I would emphasise what is called the General List. Many officers may find that on the General List they will have just as good as or an even better chance of promotion than they would have had today. There will be many appointments open to them. I think that the other steps my right hon. Friend mentioned, such as the taking away of the colours between stripes and the suffixes after those branches and increasing the marks of respect to cover flag officers, give a good idea of the lines on which the Board of Admiralty is thinking today.
An hon. Member—I cannot remember who it was—asked whether this meant that there would be fewer jobs in the Civil Service. That will not be the case. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle, when talking of promotion, referred, I think, to what is often called the "master rate." That has had a considerable amount of study in the past. I have found, when visiting the Fleet, many men who thought that when warrant officers went to the wardroom and became branch officers a new rating would grow up, the master rate, on the lower deck, rather like that of warrant officers in the other Services. That matter is still being examined. It is too early to say what decision will be reached, because that is the sort of point that will be considered by the structure committee, which is still sitting, when it considers branch officers.
I was very much impressed by what my hon. and gallant Friend the Member


for Haltemprice (Major Wall) said about Sea Cadets and Sea Scouts, and school liaison, but I am afraid that I have not time to deal with all the details of his case tonight.
Several hon. Members on the other side of the House have raised the question of the Naval Discipline Act—the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler), the hon. Member for Oldbury and Halesowen (Mr. Moyle) and the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). Hon. Members opposite are very fond of saying that the Naval Discipline Act is of great age and contains a number of out-of-date provisions. They know perfectly well—at least, the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East knows—that it was amended in 1922 and that it has been kept up to date by orders and regulations ever since. I would not deny that some of it is in rather picturesque language, but it is being interpreted today in the spirit of the times.
It is very misleading to say, as the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) does in the Motion of which he gives notice on the Order Paper, that it
… fails to reflect that mutual respect between officers and men which is the basis of discipline….
I think that that is going a bit far.
I am asked by several Members about a Select Committee to amend the provisions of the present Act.

Mr. Wigg: To examine them.

Commander Noble: To examine them, and recommend, no doubt, amendments, to the present Act as in the case of the other Acts.
My right hon. Friend has made it quite clear that he does not rule out the possibility of a Select Committee, but let us look for a moment at the position. As the hon. Member said, there have been two Reports, by the Committee which sat under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Pilcher, on the Naval Discipline Act since the war. They made a number of recommendations, most of which have been implemented without legislation, either in full or in part. As I told the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme yesterday, those that have not been implemented deal primarily with court-martial reforms, and although they are

desirable they are, nevertheless not indispensable. On the other hand, there has been a most thorough Select Committee on the Army and Air Force Acts, which has produced a variety of recommendations, and the resultant Bills are now going through Parliament.
The Admiralty, therefore, wish to consider the Naval Discipline Act in the light of these Bills and of the Pilcher Committee recommendations, because some of those recommendations conflict with those of the Select Committee, but surely it would not be beyond the bounds of human ingenuity to produce a Bill which would be acceptable to both sides of the House. I would also mention, in passing, the Admiralty committee that is still examining the officer structure. The statement my right hon. Friend made today about non-executive officers points to the lines on which we are thinking and which would affect the naval disciplinary code. I ask the House to accept the assurance, on behalf of my right hon. Friend, that this will be proceeded with as soon as possible.

Mr. Callaghan: With great respect, this is just about the same answer in just about the same language as we had last year. The time has gone by, and the Select Committees have reported. We know what the Bills are to contain, and they are not opposed in any party sense. We know roughly the shape in which they are to become Acts, so what is the Government waiting for now? Why cannot they tell us now? When will they be able to tell us? Is it the Royal Assent that will enable them to determine when they are in a position to set up the committee, or not? The Admiralty really is giving the impression of stalling.

Commander Noble: I think I made the position quite clear. I said that some of the recommendations of the Select Committee are in conflict with those of the Pilcher Committee. The Select Committee produced a very long report under the chairmanship of my right hon. and learned Friend, the Member for Kensington, South (Sir P. Spens), and we want to give that careful consideration, especially in conjunction with the changes that may be made in the officer structure. It would be silly to have to try to amend it again. We should only be told by hon. Members opposite that the Act was out of date again.

Mr. Wigg: This is rather an important point, because we have tried to work on an all-party basis. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East that this reply is not satisfactory, and I hope that the next time it comes before the House will be on a Supply day, and that it will be carried to a vote.

Commander Noble: I think we had better wait for that to happen.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East asked me about stocks of stores, and how many weeks' fuel and stores, etc., we were maintaining. I am sure that he and the House will understand that it is not normal to give such figures, but perhaps I should amplify the statement that is in the White Paper, which says that we are running down our stocks.
That is for two reasons: the sea-going Fleet is to be smaller, and the Reserve Fleet that is to be brought forward is to be smaller. Therefore, less stores will be required; and during the past few years we have been able to stock up with short-term items, when we were not able to spend the money we had on the new construction which had not then come forward. So our stocks are relatively high. As an example, in 1952–53, the increase in stocks was about £18½ million, while the decrease next year will be only about £3½ million.
I want to say a word about the dockyards, about which I think every hon. Member who has a dockyard in his constituency has spoken. I was very glad that the hon. Member for Devonport (Mr. Foot) thought so highly of our plan of dockyard modernisation, but I am sorry it was not agreeable to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth, West (Brigadier Clarke). After his remarks about the hydrogen bomb, I really emphasise the word "gallant."
We did spend about £1 million last year as a first contribution towards this £7 million programme and this year we are to spend another £2½million. There also is a major expenditure on works in the lockyards which, of course, covers those buildings to which several hon. Members have referred.
The hon. Member for Devonport and my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton (Mr. J. J. Astor) raised the question of our now requiring less land in Devonport. That, of course, is also in

connection with the point raised by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East. To achieve a higher degree of dispersal we have decided to take 17½fewer acres of land in Plymouth. The changes in the plan have been explained by my hon. Friend the Civil Lord to the Plymouth City Council and he has assured them that the changes will have no material effect on the labour force employed.

Mr. Foot: On that matter, will the hon. Gentleman deal with two points that I mentioned? The first is that this land is not now to be included but there has been a considerable deterioration in the houses there. Will that be taken into account in any arrangement between the Admiralty and Plymouth Corporation? Secondly, can the hon. Gentleman say whether this is the final decision of the Admiralty on the matter?

Commander Noble: On the first point, I think that that is a matter for consideration between the Admiralty and the City Council. On the second point, I am rather loth to use a word like "final" in this House, because one never knows what might happen in the future. One might have something far worse than the weapons we have been concerned with today. But I will say that as far as I know today this is our final decision.
Several hon. Members asked about employment in the yards, and, again, I would say that we do not foresee any unemployment in the Royal dockyards and we do use them to the full capacity.
The hon. Member for Devonport talked about the appointments that had been made in the dockyards at the instance of the recommendations of the Select Committee. The Deputy Superintendent (Industrial) at Chatham was appointed for a trial period of three years with the task of securing economic production and good labour relations in the yard. He has been there a little over a year, and I do not think the House will expect any spectacular results can be reported yet. He has, of course, had to spend much of his time analysing data, statistics and examining the practices and procedures currently in use in the dockyard at the moment. He has, however, re-organised the Central Estimating Office, which, we hope, will lead to a closer watch on the out-turn of expendi-


ture on ship work. He has established machinery for the allocation of labour in the different parts of the yard. He has also achieved a number of economies in the use of labour, particularly of non-productive work.
The Civil Lord will, I am sure, deal individually with any other dockyard points I have not been able to mention. Only one hon. Member said anything about shipbuilding and that was the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence). He said he hoped to stay awake on this occasion to hear me, but he does not seem to be here.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: He is sleeping on the "Night Scot."

Commander Noble: I was sorry to hear what the hon. Member had to say about the Clyde. It had been the impression of the Admiralty in the last few weeks that there had been an upsurge not only in ordering, but in inquiries.
Turning now to the role of the Navy, the Admiralty has been criticised in this debate, and was also criticised in the defence debate this week, for not replying to its critics in the last few months when they have been saying the wrong things about the Navy. I think it would have been most improper when, as the House knows, a complete review of what was going on within the Government on our defence policy and the roles of the Services, if Service Ministers had stumped the country selling their wares in public by speeches and articles.
The role of the Navy has been set out clearly by the Prime Minister in his speech on Tuesday and in the Defence White Paper. In his speech on Tuesday my right hon. Friend said:
Unless we were prepared to unleash a full-scale nuclear war as soon as some local incident occurs in some distant country, we must have conventional forces in readiness to deal with such situations as they arise.
Later, he said:
Thus, substantial strength in conventional forces has still a vital part to play in the policy of the deterrent. It is perhaps of even greater importance in the cold war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st March, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 1907.]
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, East, in an excellent speech, re-emphasised the point about local wars when he said that it might be necessary to deal with a series of swift campaigns

with limited objectives, in which the enemy might think he could get away with it without risking thermo-nuclear reprisals. One cannot help thinking of-the years which led to 1939.
In this sort of operation the Navy can play a necessary part in getting our forces to out of the way parts of the world in the shortest possible time. Perhaps I might give the House a quotation from Sir Arthur Bryant. It reads:
The sea's relation to England is a kind of 'Escape me Never.' At various times in our history we have tried to ignore her, but never without disaster.

Sir R. Acland: Does the Parliamentary Secretary feel that the Prime Minister's words about some local incident which would be dealt with by conventional weapons, cover a prolonged, all-out submarine and surface-raider attack against shipping?

Commander Noble: I do not want to go further into that now. The Minister of Defence made the position clear last night.
When talking about the rôle of the Navy, I was surprised that the Leader of the Opposition said last night that he did not believe in the aircraft carrier and cruisers, and that we ought to have a small-ship Navy. I do not think that the small ship Navy is a cold war deterrent. It might be able to sweep the mines when laid, and chase the submarines; but it could not prevent these things happening. That, of course, is the rôle of the Navy.
I have been rather surprised that there has not been the real criticism of carriers which I thought there would be. Many authorities on carriers have been quoted, so I would like to quote General Gruenther, who gave an interview to a magazine called "The Aeroplane." This is the quotation:
When a correspondent of ours recently interviewed General Gruenther he said that since an enemy's first move must undoubtedly concern itself with the neutralization of airfields, or as many of them as possible, he favoured the aircraft carrier construction programme and welcomed the use of such vessels in the Mediterranean. While he was not concerned with the question of how limited funds should be applied as between the construction of land bases and carriers he felt we should welcome all the platforms ashore and afloat we could be given. They would all be needed and the side which survived the first phase of an atomic attack with most airfields—afloat or


ashore—in an operational condition would clearly hold the advantage for further phases of the war.
Some of the conventional arguments against carriers were well dealt with by my hon. and gallant Friends the Members for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder), South Angus (Captain Duncan) and Horncastle. We are told that aircraft carriers are vulnerable. Personally, at the start of a thermo-nuclear war I would very much rather be at sea in an aircraft carrier than I would be on one of the airfields in this country from which our own bombers are to operate and I have a feeling that most hon. Members would share that preference.
First, the carrier has to be located. Anyone who has seen those recent television films "War in the Air" will realise how small a ship is compared to the ocean. After it is located it can put up a pretty good defence because it carries the most powerful radar and its own interception fighters, and both the carrier and its escort have their own anti-aircraft weapons. I think that a carrier task force is about the most elusive and heavily defended target that a bomber could attack. I was asked last year, and again today, what deterrent a carrier provides in the cold war. They form, of course, an integral part of our N.A.T.O. forces, and they show that we are able and determined to deal with any emergency that may arise.
With regard to their use in a striking fleet, which is mentioned in the Defence White Paper, I feel that I must emphasise the primary rôle of the aircraft carrier, which is to provide our own forces with protection and, in company with our other forces and Coastal Command, to deny the enemy the seas. One does not know where air power will be needed. Looking back on the last war one saw carriers in the Arctic, the North Atlantic and the South Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the landings at Salerno, Madagascar, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. And do not let us forget that aircraft carriers are not static; they can move 500 miles a day. The "Sunday Express" seemed to complain last week that a carrier does not go as fast as a bomber, but it certainly goes very much faster than an airfield.
To answer the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, who asked about the "Vanguard," she is undergoing a refit

and is to come into commission with a reduced complement. Many arguments are advanced on either side of this problem and I appreciate that opinions vary. We have, however, gone into the matter fully and, on balance, we think it right to commission the "Vanguard." Not only is she the greatest possible deterrent to the Sverdlov cruiser, but she forms part of the deterrent in the cold war and a possible warm war. Her fire-power and her sea keeping qualities are of the highest order, added to which, there is no getting away from the fact that her cold war prestige value cannot be denied. She also provides training facilities for a large number of men of a kind that is most valuable, but is getting less and less available today.
When the "Victorious," is completed we shall have a first-class fleet carrier with all the modern equipment—radar, angled deck, steam catapults, and all the modern improvements. Though it has taken a long time, she has cost less than we would have to pay for a modern carrier. All the same, I rather agree with the hon. Member; I do not think we would attempt another modernisation like this, because it is a very great strain on the resources and the organisation of a Royal dockyard.
Now the "Tigers." I was sorry that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East was not in agreement with his noble Friend, Lord Hall, a previous First Lord of the Admiralty who, in a debate in the House of Lords in December said:
It is pleasing to note that the First Lord, in a very recent speech, mentioned that the three 'Tiger' class cruisers… are now being proceeded with, with a view to their completion."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 2nd December, 1954; Vol. 190, c. 147–8.]
My argument just now about wars in various parts of the world, which are sometimes called peripheral wars, applies to the "Tigers" just as well. They are of great use in a cold war and a warm war. Even with the guided weapon ships coming along, we may not always want to use the guided missile. The conventional weapon for bombardment, or whatever it may be, will have to be used.

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. I should like to ask, for my own guidance in future, whether it is in order for the hon. and gallant Gentleman to quote from the proceedings in another place in the way he did?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: No, not in the same Session.

Commander Noble: I understood that it was either a Government statement or an official Opposition statement. I am sorry if I transgressed the rules of the House.
I personally saw one of these ships in the Gareloch a few weeks ago and I was astonished by the fine condition in which I found her——

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. A Government statement, but not an Opposition one, would be in order.

Commander Noble: The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East asked one or two questions about new construction. He mentioned the frigates. There are 26 under construction, 11 of which will complete in this financial year. When he was talking of destroyer conversions he had forgotten the eight that were completed in the year before, so nine plus ten plus eight makes the 27 that I think he was looking for.
Several questions were asked about naval aircraft, but I really do not think that I can answer them all tonight in great detail. The Minister of Supply put the position pretty clearly yesterday and my right hon. Friend in his opening speech today dealt with a lot of the points made during the debate. He said that the front line of the Fleet Air Arm will be reinforced with new aircraft by the end of this year. He also told the House of the fine new aircraft that we are providing for the future. Do not let us think that these fine aircraft are only in the future, for a young officer of the Royal Navy won the de Havilland award for last year for the fastest flight in 1954. He flew in a Sea Hawk from London to Amsterdam at an average speed of 571·5 miles an hour.
These new aircraft that we have in the Fleet today have teething troubles. The Minister of Supply explained that yesterday. He also said when talking about new aircraft that all aircraft in use are obsolescent because there is always a new aircraft being produced. The hon. Member said that the Attackers and the Sea Hawks are not satisfactory. He knows as well as I do that the Attacker is an interim aircraft which is to be succeeded by the Sea Hawk. I seem to remember him when he was on this side of the House referring to the new tailor-made

aircraft that were to be made for the Fleet Air Arm. I think that probably his Sea Hawk is one of them.

Mr. Callaghan: If I was misled, I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will profit from my experience. I should like to ask him a question. I realise that he is trying to finish his speech, but can these heavy carriers expect to have the new planned replacement of the Wyvern which is really the only justification for having carriers of that sort?

Commander Noble: If the hon. Gentleman had not interrupted, I would have come to that.
We are just as disappointed as he is that the Wyvern has had these troubles, but we are confident that they will soon be cleared. The successor for the "strike" rôle is in the design stage. The design has been chosen and his estimate as to when it will come into service is not unduly pessimistic. The hon. Gentleman knows that it is not possible for me to give dates to the House. Aircraft carriers of the "Hermes" class will be able to operate all the aircraft we have in mind, including this one.
There are two or three other points. It has been suggested both in the defence debate and today, especially by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Croydon, East and the hon. Member for Preston, South that there should eventually be some merger of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. They did not say that it should take place at once. I think they said that it should take place over a period of years. But I do not think that that sort of thing can happen quickly. It is more a question of evolution than of revolution, and an example of that is the way in which the chiefs of staffs' committees which grew out of the war exist today. The Board of Admiralty has taken a step in this direction, because when we discuss aircraft supply matters an air marshal from the Ministry of Supply joins us on the Board of Admiralty.
This is a most serious subject. Perhaps the inquiry suggested is no answer. That is the sort of thing for evolution and the sort of thing that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will always be considering. I do not think that one has to be a Jules Verne or indeed a Parliamentary Secretary to the


Admiralty to be allowed to look into the future. It is not a very easy thing to do.
I doubt very much whether when in 1946 the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick) and I went to Bikini to represent this House at the atomic bomb test we realised that in about six years' time the weapon which we had seen as the wonder of the world would be relegated almost to the role of a conventional weapon. One cannot help wondering, as has also been mentioned, what will be the role of pilot less planes with the coming of long-range ballistic rockets. One cannot visualise a ballistic rocket or a guided missile carrying out search and reconnaissance at sea. At the same time, the Navy being required to provide launching platforms perhaps some thousands of miles nearer the target than our most forward shore bases.
In conclusion, there is just one further point I wish to make, and that is that the Royal Navy much resents the implied criticism both inside and outside this House that it is merely hanging on to old weapons in order to find a place in our defence programme today, and also the suggestion that the money which we have been allocated is merely out of sentiment——

Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. Surely it is not proper for the hon. and gallant Gentleman to make a political speech as though he is uttering words on behalf of the Fighting Services. He has every right to speak on behalf of the Government, but not of the Royal Navy in a political sense.

Commander Noble: The hon. Gentleman must have misunderstood me. I am perfectly entitled to say, as an Admiralty Minister, that the Admiralty and the Royal Navy—and I use the terms collectively—resent the implied criticism both inside and outside this House as I have just said, and also the suggestion that the money which we have been allo-

cated is merely out of sentiment for a Service which has a proud place in the heart of the nation. The Government have made their views quite clear, both in the Defence White Paper and in the recent debate, that the Navy has a vital task to perform.

Mr. Wigg: It is a piece of impertinence for the hon. and gallant Gentleman to say that the Navy resents or does not resent, or approves or does not approve, the action which this House may take as a result of its deliberations. The House of Commons, in Supply, has a right to go into these questions perfectly free from any pressure that the hon. and gallant Gentleman may care to bring on behalf of that Service. I savagely resent that intrusion in the name of a Fighting Service to influence the House and public opinion.

Question put and agreed to.

Supply accordingly considered in Committee.

[SIR RHYS HOPKIN MORRIS in the Chair]

NAVY ESTIMATES, 1955–56.

Vote A. Numbers.

Resolved,
That 133,000 Officers, Seamen and Boys and Royal Marines, who are borne on the books of Her Majesty's Ships and at the Royal Marine establishments, and members of the Women's Royal Naval Service and Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service, be employed for the Sea Service, for the year ending on the 31st day of March. 1956.

To report Resolution and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. Legh.]

Report to be received this day; Committee to sit again this day.

ADJOURNMENT

Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Legh.]

Adjourned accordingly at two minutes past Two o'clock.